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INTRODUCTION
Since multilateral trade negotiations produced the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")' in Geneva in 1947, the
world has made dramatic progress toward free trade in goods. Sev-
eral subsequent rounds of negotiations under GATT have steadily lib-
eralized international trade, and numerous regional initiatives seek to
deepen economic integration among countries prepared to go fur-
ther. Standard economic theory prescribes free trade as the regime
that maximizes global economic welfare. Economists also recom-
mend trade liberalization as a policy that is likely to produce gains for
each country.
The gains from trade will arise from the fact that different coun-
tries will produce various goods at different costs. When countries re-
strict trade, the price of a good will be low in countries that can pro-
duce the good at low cost, but its price will be high in countries that
can produce the good only at higher cost. Liberalized trade allows
both countries to gain. The high-price country can import the good
at a price lower than the cost of producing the good at home; the low-
price country can export the good and receive a higher price than it
would otherwise fetch.
Precisely the same theory applied to trade in goods also applies to
trade in services. The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations recog-
nized this fact in 1994, extending the international regulation of
trade to service markets through the General Agreement on Trade in
Services ("GATS") . Free trade in all services, including labor serv-
' General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pt. 5, 55 U.N.T.S.
187 [hereinafter GATT].
2 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1167
[hereinafter GATS]. For a summary of the CATS, see MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK &
ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 225-36 (1995), Bernard
Hoekman, The GeneralAgreement on Trade in Services, in JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL, LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 921
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ices, would imply free movement of people across borders. To pro-
vide many services, workers must cross borders to where the work
must be performed, either on a temporary basis or to accept perma-
nent employment.3 Thus, the free movement of workers across bor-
ders promotes economic welfare by promoting free trade in the labor
market 4  The European Union recognizes the importance of free
mobility of labor as an element of a comprehensive free trade regime,
enshrining this freedom in its constitution as one of the "four free-
doms" that are the basic pillars of the European common market, "an
area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods,
persons, services and capital is ensured." 5 This "freedom of move-
ment for workers" in turn entails "the abolition of any discrimination
based on nationality between workers... with respect to employ-
ment."5
Immigration barriers interfere with the free flow of labor interna-
tionally and thereby cause wage rates for the same class of labor to di-
verge widely among different countries. For any given class of labor,
residents of high-wage countries could gain by employing more im-
migrant labor, and residents of low-wage countries could gain by sell-
ing more of their labor to employers in high-wage countries. Given
(3d ed. 1995), or Pierre Sauve, Assessing the General Agreement on Trade in Services-Half-
Full orHaIf-Empty?,J. WORLD TRADE, Aug. 1995, at 125.
- Conversely, to consume services provided only in other countries, such as sight-
seeing for tourists or education for students, the consumer must travel abroad.
See Kevin R. Johnson, Free Trade and Closed Borders: NAFTA and Mexican Immigration
to the United States, 27 U.C. DAVIS L REV. 937,964 (1994) ("True believers in the free mar-
ket presumably would prefer the free flow of both labor and trade."). The Reagan ad-
ministration's Council of Economic Advisors recognized the importance of the free flow
of labor, noting: "Like international trade in goods ... international migration connects
domestic and international markets. The free flow of resources in response to market
signals promotes efficiency and produces economic gains for both producers and con-
sumers. The migration of labor, both domestically and internationally, represents such a
flow of productive resources." ECONOMIC REPoRT OFTHE PRESIDENT 213 (1986).
5 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNIy, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC TREATY] art. 8A (as amended 1987), art. 7A (as amended
1992); see Klaus E Zimmermann, Tackling the European Migration Problem, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Spring 1995, at 45, 58 (1995) ("This implies the abolition of any restrictions on internal
labor mobility, including internal border controls."). "By drafting the treaty this way, its
authors-in common with many scholars-assumed a link between 'free trade' and the
relatively free movement of labor." John A. Scanlan, A Viewfrom the United States-Socia4
Economic, and Legal Change, the Persistence of the State, and Immigration Policy in the Coming
Century, 2 IND..J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 79, 126 (1994) ("A bigger Europe without tariffs
and fewer barriers to the movement of goods, capital, and people, it was argued, would
be able to create bigger and more efficient firms, produce and sell goods more cheaply,
and be in a much better position to compete in the world marketplace.").
EEC TREAIY art 48(2).
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the large international differences in wages, it should be apparent
that the potential gains from international trade in labor (and the
costs we bear as a result of immigration barriers) are large.
Indeed, studies suggest that the gains to the world economy from
removing immigration barriers could well be enormous and greatly
exceed the gains from removing trade barriers. For example, Bob
Hamilton and John Whalley provide estimates that suggest that the
gains from free migration of labor would more than double worldwide
real income, indicating that immigration controls "are one of the
(and perhaps the) most important policy issues facing the global
economy."8 Even their most conservative estimate suggests that the
gains would be a significant fraction (over thirteen percent) of
worldwide real income.9 Furthermore, their analysis indicates that
the free migration of labor would also greatly improve the global dis-
tribution of income by raising real wages dramatically for the world's
poorest workers.' °
Recognizing the importance of immigration barriers as costly
trade barriers, developing countries, especially India, have pressed for
liberalized movement of labor as part of the liberalization of world
trade in services. India, with the support of the Philippines, Egypt,
Brazil, and Pakistan, has threatened to block progress on the liberali-
To some extent, international trade in goods can substitute for the free mobility
of factors of production (including labor). International trade enables consumers in
some countries to take advantage of the lower cost of labor in other countries by im-
porting labor-intensive products. International trade will be a complete substitute for
the free mobility of factors only if it causes "factor price equalization," which would
equalize the cost of labor worldwide. Factor price equalization is possible in theory,
but only under conditions that do not obtain in the real world. See, e.g., PAUL R.
KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICs: THEORYAND POLICY 79-81
(2d ed. 1991) (describing factor price equalization). For example, "factor prices need
not be equalized between countries with radically different ratios of capital to labor or of
skilled to unskilled labor." Id. at 76. Factor price equalization also requires that the price
of all goods be equalized through international trade. The presence of natural barriers
to trade (such as transportation costs) imply that many goods and services are not traded
internationally. See Alan 0. Sykes, The Welfaw Economics of Immigration Law, inJUsTICE IN
IMMIGRATION 158, 163 (Warren E Schwartz ed., 1995) ("[D]ifferences across countries in
factor returns can be attributed to differences in technology, to governmental barriers to
trade, to transport costs and [to] the related fact that some goods and services are not
'tradeable' (certain perishables, haircuts) ....").
8 Bob Hamilton &John Whalley, Efficiency and Distributional Implications of Global Re-
strictions on Labour Mobility, 14J. DEv ECON. 61, 70 (1984).
" See id. at 71-72.
'0 See id. at 73-74; see also Scanlan, supra note 5, at 140 (noting that "eliminating
borders" for "those seeking work" would "increase production, create wealth, and help
reduce poverty").
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zation of trade in financial services in the absence of progress on the
"movement of natural persons," which is the subject of a parallel set
of negotiations in the World Trade Organization ('WTO")." In spite
of the large efficiency gains that liberalized immigration policies
would produce, however, the authors of the GATS were careful to
avoid imposing any obligations with respect to immigration policies.'
2
Similarly, in negotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA")s,' the United States refused to discuss the liberalization of
labor movement as an element of free trade.1
4
Indeed, in 1995 the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform,
headed by Barbara Jordan, urged Congress to move radically in the
opposite direction, toward more restrictive immigration laws.' s The
Jordan Commission recommended sweeping changes in longstanding
U.S. immigration laws, including a reduction in the overall level of
legal immigration into the United States by one-third.16 The pro-
posed changes included permanent cuts in both employment-based
and family-based immigration. 7  These proposals would entail the
most restrictive changes in U.S. immigration law since immigration
it See India Warns of Financial Services Link to Free Eo of Labor in Negotiations, 12 Int'l
Trade Rep. 649 (BNA) (Apr. 12, 1995); Financial Services Committee Approves Accord Without
U.S., 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1311, 1311 (Aug. 2,1995).
1 See GATS, supra note 2, Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Serv-
ices Under the Agreement, para. 2, 33 I.L.M. 1187, 1187 [hereinafter GATS Annex]
("The Agreement shall not apply to measures affecting natural persons seeking access
to the employment market of a Member, nor shall it apply to measures regarding citi-
zenship, residence or employment on a permanent basis.").
,s North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, 605.
SeeJohnson, supra note 4, at 940 ("[T]he United States excluded the subject of
labor migration from the bargaining table."); Scanlan, supra note 5, at 137-38 (noting
"[t]he refusal of the United States to even consider bringing free labor migration under
the NAFTA umbrella"); id. at 86 ("NAFrA's drafters consciously chose to avoid creat-
ing an integrated continental labor market."). This position failed to acknowledge the
"inconsistency between free trade and closed borders." Johnson, supra note 4, at 956.
"' See U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, LEGAL IMMIGRATION: SETTING
PRIORITIES (1995) [hereinafterJORDAN COMM'N]. "Despite all the 'globalism' talk about
breaking down walls and collapsing boundaries, immigration talk is increasingly restric-
tionist." Kitty Calavita, US. Immigration Policy: Contradictions and Projections for the Future, 2
IND.J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 143, 149-50 (1994).
1 SeeJORDAN COMM'N, supra note 15, at xii; Robert Pear, Change of Policy on US. Im-
migrants Is Urged by Panel N.Y TIl~MS,June 5, 1995, atAl.
17 The Jordan Commission proposed permanent reductions in the numerical lim-
its for employment-based admissions (from 140,000 to 100,000 per year) and for fam-
ily-based admissions (from 480,000 to 400,000 per year). SeeJORDAN COMM'N, supra
note 15, at xii. The Commission also proposed the complete elimination of all family-
based immigration categories other than nuclear family admissions. See id. at xviii.
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quotas were first introduced in 1921.18 President Clinton immediately
endorsed these proposals.' 9 Senator Alan Simpson and Representa-
tive Lamar Smith, both Republicans, soon introduced bills to imple-
ment the Jordan Commission's recommendations. With public
opinion polls indicating that most voters believe that current immi-S 21
gration levels are excessive, many observers predicted that these bills
would pass with bipartisan support. These radical cuts in legal immi-
gration proved controversial, however, and after heated debate, both
the House of Representatives and the Senate ultimately voted to ex-
clude these cuts from their immigration reform bills.2 Observers ex-
pect restrictionists to revive these proposals in the near future. 23 Yet,
as Commissioner Warren Leiden observed in his statement dissenting
from the Jordan Commission's proposal to reduce legal immigration,
the Commission "can provide no convincing argument for this drastic
reduction" because "there is no objective basis for a drastic reduc-
tion."
24
18 Immigration quotas are a relatively recent innovation: the United States did not
introduce quantitative restrictions on immigration until 1921. SeeAct of May 19, 1921,
ch. 8, § 2(a), 42 Stat. 5, 5 (temporary legislation superseded by permanent legislation
in 1924). Thus, for most of our history, the United States admitted immigrants with-
out numerical limits. As Kitty Calavita observes, "the irony is that in this period of
globalization marked by its free movement of capital and goods, the movement of la-
bor is subject to greater restrictions than at the dawn of the Industrial Revolution."
Calavita, supra note 15, at 152.
ID See Robert Pear, Clinton Embraces a Proposal to Cut Immigration by a Third, N.Y TIMES,
June 8, 1995, at B1O. As a presidential candidate, Senator Bob Dole appeared to take a
more moderate stand, endorsing "a modest, temporary reduction" in legal immigration.
Presidential Candidates Hold Range of Views on Immigration, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 263,
263 (1996).
'0 See S. 1394, 104th Cong. (1995) (the Simpson bill); H.R. 2202, 104th Cong.
(1995) (the Smith bill).
21 See, e.g., Bruce W. Nelan, Not Quite So Welcome Anymore, TIME, Special Issue, Fall
1993, at 10, 11 (reporting that a Time poll found that 60% of those surveyed favored
"changes in federal law to reduce the number of immigrants who enter the U.S. legally");
Rich Thomas, The Economic Cost of Immigration, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 9, 1993, at 18, 19
(reporting that a Newsweek poll found that 60% of those surveyed thought that immigra-
tion was "a bad thing for this country today").
See House Approves Immigration Bill After Removing Legal Immigration Restrictions, 73
INTERPRETER RELEASEs 349 (1996); Senate Approves Omnibus Immigration Bill After Removing
Exclusion Provisions, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 601 (1996).
See William Branigin, Immigration Issues Await New Congress: Surging Legal Influx Will
BeAmong Topics of RenewedDebate, WASH. POST, Nov. 18,1996, atAl.
24 JORDAN COMM'N, supra note 15, at 229. Leiden explains:
Virtually all the research and analysis received by the Commission indicated
that [current] levels of legal immigration continue to provide a net positive
benefit to America in a multitude of ways. Whatever interest is examined-
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In fact, as this Article will show, the application of trade principles
to immigration law suggests instead that specific liberalizing reforms,
which are likely to increase levels of employment-based and family-
based immigration by eliminating certain immigration barriers,
would raise national economic welfare as well as global economic wel-
fare. In particular, this Article will begin with a focus on immigration
for the purpose of employment, although the analysis will have impli-
cations for immigration in general. Employment-based immigration
is largely justified on economic grounds, unlike refugee or family-
based immigration, which raise other issues such as humanitarian
considerations. I will turn to these other categories of immigration,
however, as they become relevant to the analysis. I will use the term
"immigration" in a broad sense, including not only the admission of
aliens for permanent residence (on "immigrant" visas) but also the
admission of guestworkers on a more temporary basis (on what are
called "nonimmigrant" visas in the United States).2' Thus, I will focus
on the issue of admission to the labor market of the host country,
which does not necessarily imply access to citizenship in the host
country. Given the importance of economic concerns in the public
debate over immigration policy, I will focus on the implications of
immigration for economic welfare, but I will also touch upon some
noneconomic concerns as they relate to the economic analysis. 26 Al-
though my economic analysis applies to any country of immigration,
my focus will be on the United States, and I will derive policy implica-
tions for the United States in particular.
Before reaching any conclusions regarding the optimal level of
immigration, one must specify the criterion by which one will evalu-
economic, social, political, scientific, or cultural-the current levels of legal
immigration are found to benefit each of these aspects of American life.
Id. at 228; see MICHAEL FIx &JEFFREY S. PASSEL, IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANTS: SET-rING
THE RECORD STRAIGHT 69 (1994) ("[T]he economic effects of immigration are largely
positive.").
U.S. law creates numerous categories of "nonimmigrant" aliens admitted to the
United States on a temporary basis. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (15) (1994). These categories
include not only students, see id. § 1101 (a) (15) (F), and temporary visitors for business
or pleasure, see id. § 1101 (a) (15) (B), for example, but also temporary workers, see id.
§ 1101(a) (15) (H).
26 For essays discussing the broader philosophical and moral issues raised by im-
migration barriers, see FREE MOVEMENT: ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE TRANSNATIONAL
MIGRATION OF PEOPLE AND OF MONEY (Brian Barry & Robert E. Goodin eds., 1992);
JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION, supra note 7; OPEN BORDERS? CLOSED SOCIETIES? THE ETHICAL
AND POLITICAL ISSUES (Mark Gibney ed., 1988); andJoseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens:
The Casefor Open Borders, 49 RE' POL 251 (1987).
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ate the effects of immigration. To shed light on our immigration
laws, I will explore what policies would be optimal from the perspec-
tive of economic welfare. In evaluating the effects of immigration
policies upon economic welfare, however, we must first address the
question of whose welfare we are considering. Should we seek to
maximize the welfare of natives alone, or does the welfare of immi-
grants count as well? Should we seek to maximize national economic
welfare or global economic welfare? Once we decide whose welfare
counts, we must also address whether our objective is merely to
maximize their wealth (that is, to pursue economic efficiency with re-
spect to their welfare) or whether our objectives also include an equi-
table distribution of wealth among them. If our objectives include
distributive concerns, then our measure of social welfare must specify
how much weight to give these concerns. We might adopt a utilitar-
ian measure of social welfare, which would imply one criterion that
would aggregate these objectives, or we might choose to maximize a
more egalitarian measure of social welfare. Thus, the optimal immi-
gration policy will depend upon what measure of social welfare we
choose to maximize.
I will not set forth a full philosophical defense of any particular
measure of social welfare. Instead, my strategy will be to explore the
policy implications of several different measures of social welfare. I
assume each measure in turn, for the sake of argument, and as a
theoretical exercise, I will derive the optimal policy given that welfare
objective. I conclude that under any reasonable measure of social
welfare, optimal policies would probably entail higher levels of em-
ployment-based and family-based immigration than we currently allow
into the United States. In particular, although the economic welfare
of natives and distributive justice among natives are often advanced as
reasons to reduce immigration, I will demonstrate that neither objec-
tive provides a sound justification for more restrictive laws regarding
employment-based and family-based immigration.
In Part I, strictly as a thought experiment, I examine what policies
the United States would pursue if its goal were simply to maximize
the economic welfare of U.S. natives. I begin the analysis with an ex-
amination of immigration policies that efficiently promote the wel-
fare of natives, setting aside questions of distribution. Standard trade
theory prescribes free trade for any country that is too small to have
any market power. If a country decides to protect an industry in spite
of this prescription, then tariffs will do less harm to national eco-
nomic welfare than import quotas. If the country is large enough to
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have some market power, then it can improve its own welfare by levy-
ing an appropriate tariff. I apply these lessons to trade in labor serv-
ices and conclude that the United States should eliminate quantita-
tive restrictions on employment-based immigration. Trade principles
also suggest that the United States should eliminate its "labor certifi-
cation" requirements for immigration visas. Optimal immigration
policy would instead take the form of a "tariff," that is, a tax imposed
on immigrants. This tariff could take the form of an income tax that
discriminates between natives and immigrants.
Although some economists have previously suggested a tax on
foreign workers,27 my analysis builds on that suggestion by exploring
the features of the optimal immigration tariff in detail. This compre-
hensive analysis goes beyond the prior "optimal tariff' literature by
taking account of both "market power" considerations and external
effects from immigration through the public sector, such as conges-
tion costs and effects on the public treasury, and by incorporating les-
sons drawn from the theory of externalities and "optimal tax" theory.
Based on these considerations, I find that the optimal tariff is positive
for immigrants with low income but is likely to be negative for immi-
grants with sufficiently high income. These results suggest that
skilled immigration should be permitted (indeed encouraged) with-
out quantitative or other protectionist restrictions and that unskilled
immigration should be permitted without quantitative restrictions but
subject to less generous fiscal policies than those applied to natives.
My analysis of the optimal tariff also adds to the prior literature by
taking account of family-based immigration and exploring the extent
to which current U.S. laws implement the optimal immigration tariff.
In Part I.G, I address restrictions on the access of aliens to public enti-
tlement programs, including sweeping new restrictions enacted by
Congress in 1996, and characterize these restrictions as a positive tar-
iff on low-income immigrants. In Part I.I, I briefly discuss the degree
to which the U.S. Constitution constrains the power of Congress to
impose a tariff on aliens, and I conclude that constitutional doctrine
as it currently stands does not appear to bar such policies. In Part I.T,
I address family-based immigration and characterize the ability to
27 See, e.g., Jagdish N. Bhagwati & T.N. Srinivasan, On the Choice Between Capital and
Labour Mobility, 14J. INT'L EcON. 209, 218-19 (1983); Barry R. Chiswick, The Impact of Im-
migration on the Level and Distribution of Economic Well-Being, in THE GATEWAY: U.S. IM-
MIGRATION ISSuES AND PoLcrEs 289, 308-10 (Barry R. Chiswick ed., 1982); Melvyn B.
Krauss & William J. Baumol, Guest Workers and Income-Transfer Programs Financed by Host
Governments, 32 KYKLos 36, 44 (1979); Sykes, supra note 7, at 180-82.
11551997]
1156 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 145:1147
sponsor relatives for immigration as a negative tariff that the United
States reserves for relatively high-income immigrants, especially fol-
lowing new restrictions on sponsorship enacted by Congress in 1996.
In Part I.L, I introduce distributive justice among natives as an ob-
jective. Concern for the distribution of income among natives, how-
ever, does not imply that more restrictive immigration laws are in or-
der. Instead, the appropriate response to distributive concerns is
redistribution through progressive reforms of tax and transfer poli-
cies, not immigration restrictions. Combined with appropriate fiscal
policies, liberalized immigration can make each class of natives better
off.
In Part I.M, I address the question of whether preferences for the
ethnic status quo should enter our analysis as a consideration. I ar-
gue that although one might in theory include the satisfaction of
these preferences as an element of economic welfare, moral princi-
ples militate in favor of excluding these preferences from considera-
tion as a matter of public policy. I survey some of the ethical prob-
lems raised by giving weight to such preferences given that these types
of preferences would also support racial segregation and discrimina-
tion in the domestic context.
In the remainder of the paper, I relax the assumption of a purely
nativist measure of social welfare s.2  This extension of the analysis
contributes to the existing literature by revealing how the optimal
immigration policy varies with our welfare objectives. In Part II, I
consider what policies the United States would pursue if it gave some
weight to the welfare of immigrants. I consider not only the pursuit
of economic efficiency in this context, but also issues of distributive
justice. Once we give sufficient weight to the welfare of immigrants,
the optimal immigration policy would feature more generous fiscal
policies for poor immigrants than those that maximize the economic
welfare of natives alone and would probably feature much more lib-
eral levels of immigration than our current laws permit.
In Part III, I explore what policies would maximize global welfare.
I consider not only global economic efficiency, but also global dis-
I use the term "nativist" to refer to "the practice or policy of favoring native-born
citizens as against immigrants." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN
LANGUAGE 947 (David B. Guralnik ed., 2d college ed. 1976). Commentators often use
"nativism" in a narrower sense to refer to a particular species of xenophobia in U.S. his-
tory. See, e.g.,JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATrERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM
1860-1925, at 4 (2d ed. 1963) (defining "nativism" as "intense opposition to an internal
minority on the ground of its foreign (i.e., 'un-American') connections").
LIBERALJZE, D IMMIGRATION AS FREE TRADE
tributive justice. These objectives imply immigration levels far higher
than our laws currently permit. In Part IV, I explore the normative
implications of my economic analysis and formulate proposals for lib-
eralizing U.S. immigration laws in light of some of the political obsta-
cles to such reforms.
I. NATIONAL ECONOMIC WELFARE
I begin my analysis with an examination of the pursuit of national
economic welfare through immigration policy, not because I believe
that immigration policy should be guided solely by considerations of
economic self-interest, but because such concerns have played a
dominant role in the public debate over immigration policy.2 Na-
tional governments, including the U.S. government, will probably
continue to deem the promotion of the interests of natives as the
paramount objective of immigration policies." I define national eco-
nomic welfare narrowly, in terms of the economic welfare of natives
(those born in the country of immigration). I adopt this strictly nativ-
ist measure of social welfare not because it is morally defensible, but
because this nativist welfare objective is commonly thought to provide
a strong case in favor of restrictive immigration laws.3 '
My economic analysis reveals, however, that even from this narrow
perspective, which "stacks the deck" against the immigrant, optimal
See, e.g., S. REP. No. 98-62, at 3-4 (1983) ("[T]he paramount obligation of any na-
tion's government, indeed the very reason for its existence and the justification for its
power, is to promote the national interest-the long-term welfare of the majority of its
citizens and their descendants.");JORDAN COMM'N, supra note 15, at 1-3 (introducing its
report to Congress with a discussion of benefits, costs, and "the national interest");
VERNON M. BRIGGS,JR., MASS IMMIGRATION AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST (1992).
'a See Scanlan, supra note 5, at 79-83 (predicting that nations will continue to pur-
sue self-interested immigration policies); see also id. at 107 ("[N]o State can afford to
pursue a policy that does not promise clear benefits to enough of its constituents, if
not immediately, then in the near future.").
3' One could define the national interest more broadly, to include the welfare of
immigrants or other moral considerations. SeeJohn A. Scanlan & O.T. Kent, The Force
of Moral Arguments for a Just Immigration Policy in a Hobbesian Universe: The Contemporary
American Example, in OPEN BORDERS? CLOSED SOCIETIES? THE ETHICAL AND POLIrcAL
ISSUES, supra note 26, at 61, 78 ("[T]hose who invoke the national interest tojustify re-
strictive immigration policies often ignore moral values that must be counted among the
various kinds of interests that U.S. citizens hold."); HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUB-
SISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 141 (1980) (suggesting that even if
"national leaders are to be expected... to be advocates for the national interest," it re-
mains "entirely possible that... the people served by a particular national government
would... themselves have transnational duties and that these citizens would ask their
government to act in their behalf to coordinate the performance of the citizens' duties").
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policies would probably allow higher levels of employment-based and
family-based immigration than current U.S. immigration laws permit.
Even if we give zero weight to the welfare of aliens in our measure of
social welfare, the optimal immigration policy would be more liberal
than our current laws in most important respects. First, I will con-
sider the effects of immigration upon participants in labor markets,
setting aside economic effects that operate outside the market. Sec-
ond, I will extend the analysis to include the effects of immigration
through the public sector.
A. Effects of Immigration Through the Labor Market
For a country with no market power in international markets,
such that it cannot affect world prices, standard trade theory pre-
scribes free trade to maximize national economic welfare. Import
quotas or tariffs restrict trade and thereby sacrifice gains from trade.3
Protectionism imposes costs by driving up the price paid by domestic
consumers for the goods in question. As a result, consumption falls
(the "consumption effect"), leading to deadweight loss insofar as con-
sumers forego consumption even if the value they would derive from
it exceeds the amount paid to foreigners for the imported good.
Domestic production also rises (the "production effect"), leading to
deadweight loss insofar as productive resources are drawn from alter-
native uses more valuable than the amount paid to foreigners for the
imported good. Domestic producers may gain from higher prices for
their goods, but this gain comes only at the expense of consumers.
Indeed, because protectionism causes distortions in domestic produc-
tion and consumption, consumers lose more than domestic produc-
ers gain. The national economy as a whole suffers a net loss as a re-
sult of protectionism.
The same theory indicates that free immigration would maximize
the gains from trade in the labor market for a country with no market
power in foreign labor markets. Immigration restrictions impose
costs by driving up the cost of labor, which in turn drives up the cost
of goods and services to consumers. Native workers may gain from
higher wages, but this gain comes only at the expense of employers in
the host country and ultimately consumers. The increase in wages for
domestic labor is a pure transfer from owners of other factors of pro-
32 See, e.g., KRUGMAN & OBSTELD, supra note 7, at 218-14.
See, e.g., PETER B. KENEN, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 22-23, 188-89 (3d ed.
1994).
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duction (for example, capital) in the host country and from consum-
ers.3 Immigration restrictions not only redistribute wealth among na-
tives but also destroy wealth by causing economic distortions. Restric-
tions prevent employers from hiring foreign workers even if the value
that they would produce exceeds the wage that would be paid to the
worker: Immigration restrictions entail a sacrifice of this
"immigration surplus," 5 which is analogous to the harmful consump-
tion effect from protectionism in a goods market. Domestic workers
are drawn from alternative activities that would be more valuable than
the wage that would be paid to foreign workers. This misallocation of
labor is analogous to the harmful production effect from protection-
ism in a goods market. Thus, the U.S. private sector would benefit
from the elimination of all restrictions on the immigration of labor,
including unskilled workers as well as skilled workers. 6
-" To the extent that firms pass on their higher labor costs to consumers, the con-
sumer bears the cost of immigration restrictions. Given the international mobility of
capital, the return to capital would be constant in the long run for a country with no
market power in the world capital market. Thus, in the long run, consumers and
owners of immobile factors of production (for example, land) bear the full cost of
immigration restrictions.
In theory, the costs of immigration restrictions may fall in part on foreign owners
of capital invested in the host country. If so, then some of the benefits of liberalized
immigration would go to these foreigners. See Sykes, supra note 7, at 167-68. Whereas
foreign owners of capital would gain only in the short run, foreigners who own land in
the host country would gain even in the long run. To ensure that natives capture
these benefits, whether to capital in the short run or to land in the long run, the host
country could impose a tax on the relevant assets and redistribute the revenue to na-
tives. See infra Part I.L (suggesting tax and transfer policies to redistribute the benefits
of liberalized immigration).
s- George J. Borjas, The Economic Benefits fmm Immigration, J. ECON. PERS., Spring
1995, at 3, 5.
George Borjas has claimed that current immigration into the United States is
less skilled than it was in the past. See GEORGEJ. BORJAS, FRIENDS OR STRANGERS: THE
IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE U.S. ECONOMY 133 (1990) [hereinafter BORJAS, FRIENDS
OR STRANGERS] ("The facts are clear. the skills and earnings of recent immigrant waves
are substantially below the skills and earnings of earlier waves."). As evidence, he points
to the economic performance of immigrants relative to natives. See id at 115-33. Yet the
evidence also reveals that immigrants are becoming more skilled over recent decades; na-
tives are simply becoming more skilled at an even greater rate. See GeorgeJ. Borjas, The
Economics of Immigration, 32J. ECON. LITERATURE 1667, 1676-77 (1994) [hereinafter Bor-
jas, Economics of Immigration].
In terms of the economic benefits for the private sector, this increasing divergence
between the skill levels of immigrants and those of natives may be salutary rather than
a cause for concern. Borjas presents a simple model in which "an immigrant flow that
is very different from the native workforce ... maximizes the immigration surplus" by
importing labor that complements rather than merely replicates the domestic work-
force. Borjas, supra note 35, at 14. For the United States, which "presumably has a
relatively skilled workforce," this model suggests that unskilled immigration
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If a country nevertheless chooses to protect a domestic market,
standard trade theory, as well as international trade law, recommends
tariffs over quotas.3 7 Both tariffs and quotas sacrifice gains from trade,
but tariffs produce some revenue for the government, whereas quotas
do not. Quotas make the right to import scarce and therefore valu-
able. This value derives from prices in the importing country that are
higher than those available on the world market. The scarcity of
quota rights create "quota rents," which an importing country could
capture by selling the right to import. In practice, countries do not
sell these rights, allowing importers to enjoy these quota rents. A tar-
iff that restricts trade to a level equivalent to a quota will capture these
quota rents in the form of tariff revenue. s
Similarly, if a country restricts immigration of labor, the optimal
restriction would take the form of a tariff, not quotas. Quotas allow
immigrants to keep the quota rents in the form of after-tax wages
higher than those that prevail in alternative labor markets.3 9 A tariff
.maximizes the economic gains to natives by fully exploiting the production comple-
mentarities between immigrants and natives." Id.
Introducing capital into the model, however, may imply that skilled immigration
produces more surplus for the United States than unskilled immigration if skilled la-
bor is highly complementary with capital. See id. at 14-17. Borjas concludes that "the
immigration surplus might be larger when the immigration flow is composed exclu-
sively of skilled workers." Id. at 19. Borjas assumes, however, that quantitative restric-
tions force us to choose between skilled and unskilled workers. The policy that maxi-
mizes the immigration surplus would impose no restrictions on either type of
immigration and let market demand determine how much of each type of labor we
import.
37 The GATT allows the use of tariffs but generally prohibits the use of quantitative
restrictions on trade. See GATT, supra note 1, 61 Stat. pt. 5, at A32, 55 U.N.T.S. at 224.
" See, e.g., KRUGMAN & OBSTIFELD, supra note 7, at 196 ("[T]he transfer of rents
abroad makes the costs of a quota substantially higher than the equivalent tariff.").
Julian Simon claims that this feature of immigration distinguishes the econom-
ics of immigration from the economics of trade: "[I]mmigrants tend to receive higher
wages in the richer country to which they move. The immigrants benefit by the
higher wages. But there is little or no immediate gain to the consumers in the new
country analogous to the gains when goods are traded internationally." JULIAN L.
SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION 338 (1989). The same state-
ments, however, also apply to goods imported subject to quantitative restriction, espe-
cially if foreign firms in the exporting country receive the quota rights (as is often the
case): the recipient of a quota right gains by receiving higher prices in the importing
country, and there would be little gain to consumers in the importing country from a
small increase in imports. On the other hand, a large increase in imports would produce
larger gains for consumers by driving down prices, as would a large increase in immigra-
tion. Any difference in this regard between the effects of international trade in goods
and those of international trade in labor services derives not from any fundamental dif-
ference in the underlying economic theory but rather from differences in the policy in-
struments used to restrict trade.
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could take the form of a charge for admission, which would be similar
to quantitative restrictions with an auction to allocate the available vi-
sas to those potential immigrants.4° By selling visas, the country of
immigration can capture the quota rents that would otherwise go to
the immigrant. A tariff, however, could also take the form of a dis-
criminatory income tax, rather than a payment up front, which would
have the advantage that the immigrant would not need to have the
resources to pay the tariff at the border. The immigrant could pay
the tariff as extra income taxes withheld from income earned after
immigration.
For a country with some market power, protectionist trade poli-
cies will have an effect on prices on the world market.4 In this case,
standard trade theory predicts that the country can improve on free
trade by imposing the "optimal tariff."43 The optimal tariff would still
'0 Julian Simon has advocated such an auction for immigration visas. See id. 329-
35; see also Gary S. Becker, Why Not Let Immigrants Pay for Speedy Entry?, BUS. W., Mar. 2,
1987, at 20 (proposing that we retain the present admission system but add a separate
new track for aliens willing to pay a flat fee).
4' See Chiswick, supra note 27, at 309 (proposing that the United States allow immi-
grants "to substitute an annual surcharge on their federal income tax as an alternative
to [a] large entry fee"); Julian L. Simon, Auction the Right to Be an Immigrant, N.Y TIMES,
Jan. 28, 1986, at A25 (suggesting that the United States "allow 'buyers' to enter now and
pay later together with income tax").
42 If the host country's trade policies can affect prices in its export markets, then
its immigration policies can also affect these prices: liberalized immigration could re-
duce the costs of producing these exports and could thereby bring down the relative
price of its exports. If so, then the benefits of liberalized immigration would go in part
to foreign consumers of goods produced in the host country. It is more likely, how-
ever, that immigration would on balance turn the terms of trade in favor of the host
country rather than against it, because trade tends to occur along the lines of com-
parative advantage.
For example, a country in which capital and technology are relatively abundant,
like the United States, would tend to export goods intensive in these factors and im-
port labor-intensive goods from countries in which labor is relatively abundant. Labor,
which is relatively scarce in the United States, would immigrate and would tend to
bring down the cost of producing importable goods more than the cost of exports.
This effect would drive up the price of exports relative to imports and would therefore
on balance shift the terms of trade in favor of the United States and against foreigners.
See AVINASH Dixrr & VICrOR NORMAN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 149 (1980)
("[A] movement of labour to the labour-scarce, technologically advanced economy in-
creases world output of the labour-intensive good by more than it increases world de-
mand for that good. The rich country importing the labour-intensive good will therefore
experience an improvement in the terms of trade following immigration."). These
terms-of-trade effects would reinforce the gains for natives produced by liberalized immi-
gration.
'- See, e.g., RICHARD E. CAVES & RONALD W.JONES, WORLD TRADE AND PAYIENTS: AN
INTRODUCIlON 212-13 (4th ed. 1985).
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entail costly distortions, but it would also bring a gain to the import-
ing country by driving down the price received by foreigners for the
imported goods.44 The tariff drives a wedge between the higher
prices prevailing in the importing country and the lower world prices
paid to foreigners. The importing country can thus extract more of
45the gains from trade through tariff revenues.
The same principles apply to imported labor. To the extent the
United States can affect wages abroad, it has market power in the
market for foreign labor, and it can gain by imposing a "tariff' on
immigrant labor (that is, a discriminatory tax imposed only upon for-
eign workers). Under these conditions, the burden of a tariff would
fall not only on employers and consumers but also on immigrant la-
bor. To maximize national economic welfare, a country with some
market power in the relevant market would raise taxes on migrants so
as to drive their after-tax wages below what they would be in a world of
free trade in labor. For a sufficiently small tariff, the gains from driv-
ing down foreign after-tax wages would exceed the costs of deterring
valuable immigration. The government would capture these gains for
46the benefit of natives in the form of tariff revenue.
14 For a small tariff, the benefits would be large ("first-order") insofar as we import
a large amount, so that any decrease in the price of imports would represent a large
gain. The deadweight losses from the distortion of domestic consumption and pro-
duction would be small ("second-order") for a small tariff. As we increase the tariff,
however, the marginal benefits fall as imports fall, and the marginal costs increase as
the tariff induces more costly distortions in domestic consumption and production.
Furthermore, a reduction in imports becomes more costly to the public treasury as it
loses larger tariffs per unit of import. The optimal tariff equates these marginal costs
and benefits. The optimal tariff may vary from product to product, depending on cir-
cumstances in each product market.
The more elastic the supply of imports to the United States, for example, the less
market power the United States has, and the lower the optimal tariff. For an elastically
supplied import, a tariff would have an effect mainly on the quantity of imports and
cause little fall in the price of imports. In the case of a perfectly elastic import supply,
the United States would have no market power, and a tariff has no effect on the price
paid to foreigners for imports. Then the incidence of the tariff would only be on buy-
ers in the United States rather than on foreign sellers. Therefore, under these as-
sumptions, the optimal tariff would be zero.
A quota cannot extract any of these gains unless the quota rights are sold.
The Jordan Commission proposed that those who employ foreign workers "pay a
substantial fee," which would resemble a tariff, but this proposal would "ensure that
the employer, and not the foreign worker, pays the fee." JORDAN COMM'N, supra note
15, at 112. From the perspective of the welfare of natives, however, it is perverse to place
the burden of this tax on the employer. This tax would discourage the hiring of foreign
workers and drive up the costs of goods and services to consumers without extracting tar-
iff revenue from immigrants.
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The optimal tariff would vary depending on the type of labor, be-
cause different classes of labor would entail different market condi-
tions.47 Thus, a discriminatory income tax would have an advantage
over a uniform charge for admission, insofar as it could impose a tar-
iff that is a function of income. By discriminating among immigrants
in setting the tariff level, a country can not only capture quota rents
but also charge a higher tariff on those who value immigration the
most and thereby do a better job of extracting tariff revenue from
immigrants.
4
B. External Effects of Immigration
The foregoing analysis considered the economic effects of immi-
grant labor through the labor market alone. Immigrants, however,
also have economic effects that are not internalized by private partici-
pants in that market. An immigration tariff, for example, yields bene-
fits only for the public sector. Indeed, much of the debate over the
economic effects of immigration has focused on the effects on the
public sector. 9 The presence of the public sector introduces external
effects that must be included in the analysis. These effects include
both benefits and costs, so that depending on the immigrant, it is
possible for the net external effect to be either positive or negative.
47 See Sykes, supra note 7, at 181 ("[T]he... exercise would... have to be repeated
for different types of immigrant labor, just as the optimal tariff varies across imported
goods."). Given that immigration barriers segregate labor markets abroad, the opti-
mal tariff can also vary depending on the country of origin.
48 See id. ("[E]ven greater gains for original residents can be obtained through
price discrimination. In the limit, if it were possible to observe the gains ... for each
immigrant, the optimal tax on each (from the perspective of the original residents)
would extract those gains but stop short of discouraging immigration altogether."); see
also Bhagwati & Srinivasan, supra note 27, at 218-19 (discussing the optimal tax on im-
migration and comparing this policy with a perfectly discriminatory tax).
4 See, e.g., George J. Borjas & Stephen J. Trejo, Immigrant Participation in the Welfare
System, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL REV. 195 (1991); REBECCA L. CLARK & JEFFREY S. PASSEL,
How MUCH Do IMMIGRANTS PAY IN TAXES? EVIDENCE FROM Los ANGELES COUNTY
(Program for Research on Immigration Policy, Population Institute, Urban Institute, Pol-
icy Discussion Paper PRIP-UI-26, 1993); JEFFREY S. PASSEL, IMMIGRANTS AND TAXES: A
REAPPRAISAL OF HUDDLE'S "THE COSTS OF IMMIGRANTS" (Program for Research on Immi-
gration Policy, Urban Institute, Policy Discussion Paper PRIP-UI-29, 1994); LOS ANGELES
COUNTY INTERNAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT, IMPACT OF UNDOCUMENTED PERSONS AND
OTHER IMMIGRANTS ON COSTS, REVENUES AND SERVICES IN Los ANGELES COUNTY: A
REPORT PREPARED FOR Los ANGELES COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS (1992). For surveys
of this literature, see Bojas, Economics of Immigration, supra note 36, at 1700-08, and FIX &
PASSEL, supra note 24, at 57-67.
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First, like natives, immigrants pay taxes, including income taxes,
social security taxes, sales taxes, and property taxes. Immigrants and
natives pay these taxes not only directly, but also indirectly through
the effects of these taxes on prices. For example, property taxes paid
nominally by landlords may be passed on to tenants through higher
rents. Higher rents for commercial property may be passed on to
consumers through higher prices. Similarly, immigrants also pay a
share of the corporate income tax, whether as shareholders, employ-
ees, or consumers. All these taxes introduce an additional reason to
value immigrants: they contribute tax revenues. Immigrants increase
tax revenues by expanding the tax base. Once we take these external
benefits into account, even in the absence of any discriminatory tax
(that is, a tariff), the marginal benefit to a private employer of hiring
a foreign worker will understate the marginal benefit to the
"importing" country from the immigration of that worker.
Second, an immigrant also imposes external costs. For example,
to the extent that an immigrant receives transfer payments from the
government or has access to other public entitlement programs, these
transfers will represent a cost to the country of immigration. Immi-
grants also gain access to public goods when they immigrate. To the
extent they are pure public goods, like national defense, they feature
nonrivalry in consumption. That is, immigrants can enjoy the public
good without imposing any cost on natives. Immigrant access to
other public goods, like parks or roads, however, may aggravate prob-
lems of congestion. Although free access to these goods would lead
to congestion even in the absence of immigration, immigration in-
creases the demand for these goods and presumably adds to the prob-
lem. Roads, for example, may become congested more frequently or
more severely.
The ideal response to congestion problems is a "Pigouvian" access
fee, which causes each person to internalize the negative externality
imposed on others.0 Such a Pigouvian fee would not only optimize
use of the public good, but also ensure that immigrant users (as well
as native users) compensate the public treasury for any inconvenience
they cause others.1 Such an access fee, however, may not always be
50 See RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC
GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 52 (1986); DAVID A. STARRET, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC
ECONOMICS 51 (1988).
5, Indeed, such a fee would overcompensate the public treasury. Because marginal
congestion costs increase with the number of users, an access fee based on the mar-
ginal congestion cost will exceed the congestion cost imposed by all the inframarginal
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practical. If it is not feasible to exclude users from the public good in
question, then we cannot charge for access. If we cannot use an ac-
cess fee to internalize the congestion externality that immigrants can
impose on each public good, however, we can still seek to do so im-
perfectly through taxes correlated with use of the good in question.
Taxes could target users (both natives and immigrants) indirectly: for
example, gasoline taxes target the users of public roads, and property
taxes target those who use infrastructure in the local area. Local taxes
could vary so as to discourage residence or economic activity in areas
where infrastructure is subject to congestion. These taxes could re-
duce congestion somewhat, and even if they do not discriminate be-
tween natives and immigrants, they would also contribute to public
coffers and thereby offer compensation to natives for the externalities
that immigrants might impose by using congested infrastructure .
Even after making appropriate use of tolls, gasoline taxes, prop-
erty taxes, and other nondiscriminatory taxes and fees, we may find
that some immigrants may impose congestion externalities in excess
of the taxes they pay (both directly and indirectly). Those immi-
grants who pay the least in such taxes would be the most likely to im-
pose net external costs on natives. To the extent that the taxes paid
by immigrants do not cover the costs of congestion they impose and
public entitlements they use, they would impose a net burden on the
public sector.53 Thus, the net effect of an immigrant on the public
sector may be positive or negative, so that the immigrant's effect on
the private sector through the labor market may understate or over-
state the immigrant's effect on the economy of the country of immi-
gration as a whole.
Thus, because skilled workers tend to have higher incomes and to
pay more in taxes, it is in the national economic interest to promote
their immigration. As long as they make a positive contribution to
the public sector, there is in general no economic justification for ex-
cluding these immigrants. Therefore, quantitative or other protec-
tionist restrictions on their immigration should be eliminated.
users. If each user pays a fee equal to the marginal congestion costs, then the total
revenues will exceed the total congestion costs.
-2 See SIMON, supra note 39, at 153 ("[A] large part of public capital is built with bor-
rowed money. And with the taxes they pay, new dwellers help cover the service of this
debt to an extent that the new dweller is not a burden on old dwellers in this respect.").
5s See George J. Borjas, ired, Poor, on Welfae in ARGUING IMMIGRATION 76, 77
(Nicolaus Mills ed., 1994) (arguing that because "a larger population will lead to more
crowded freeways and parks, schools and hospitals," immigrants "should be assigned a
user fee for them").
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To the extent that unskilled workers tend to have lower incomes,
they tend to pay less in taxes and to take greater advantage of public
entitlement programs. Thus, the benefits flowing to the national
economy from their immigration may be reduced and may indeed be
negative at the margin. A net negative effect through the public sec-
tor introduces a potential justification for restricting their immigra-
tion. The international trade perspective, however, suggests that if
some immigrants have a negative effect on the public sector, the op-
timal response is not nontariff restrictions on immigration, such as
quotas. Rather, the appropriate response is fiscal. In such cases, we
can use a tariff, that is, a tax imposed only on immigrants, to restrict
access to all our public goods and public entitlements. If we seek to
maximize the welfare of natives and give no weight to the welfare of
immigrants, then we would prefer tariffs over quotas because tariffs
shift wealth from immigrants to natives in the form of tax revenues.54
C. The Optimal Tariff on Unskilled Immigrants
Suppose unskilled immigrants would have a negative effect on the
public sector in the absence of a tariff, and consider the optimal tariff
for natives to levy on them. A tariff would increase the contribution
of these immigrants to the public coffers as well as discourage their
immigration. We could, for example, impose a tariff high enough to
ensure that the marginal immigrant's net effect on the public sector
would be zero. This Pigouvian tariff can reduce immigration to a
level that equates the marginal benefits to natives with the marginal
costs imposed on natives by immigration, including congestion
costs. 55 Immigration would expand only to the point where the pri-
vate sector no longer derives any surplus from hiring another immi-
grant. Because the tariff would ensure that the marginal immigrant
' Contrast this policy with that suggested by Borjas, supra note 35, at 12-19. Borjas
takes an overall quota on total immigration as given. He assumes implicitly that this
quota is fixed, applies to all classes of labor, and binds regardless of how these visas are
allocated among classes. Borjas suggests that to maximize the welfare of natives, the
United States should allocate the visas subject to this quota to skilled immigrants
rather than unskilled immigrants. The analysis in this paper assumes instead that we
can use tariffs rather than quotas and indicates that the policy that would maximize
the welfare of natives would not impose any quotas on immigration. Only less skilled
immigration would be restricted, and this restriction would take the form of tariffs in-
stead of quotas.
55 If marginal congestion costs rise with the level of immigration, then we would
expect this tariff to overcompensate natives for the immigrants' total contribution to
congestion costs.
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would impose no net external cost, this outcome would also be opti-
mal for the domestic economy as a whole.56 This tariff would elimi-
nate any immigration expected to have a negative effect on national
economic welfare. The resulting Pigouvian level of immigration
would be first-best from the perspective of maximizing the welfare of
natives.
Although this level of immigration is efficient in this sense, it will
nevertheless be in the interest of natives to raise the tariff still higher.
A tariff above Pigouvian levels will reduce immigration below optimal
levels, but will in general produce gains sufficient to justify this distor-
tion. These gains derive from two different sources. First, the forego-
ing analysis has not considered the need to raise tax revenues, which
will justify higher tariffs. Second, to the extent that the country of
immigration has market power, tariffs will drive down the after-tax
wages of immigrants.
Consider the first reason to raise tariffs above Pigouvian levels.
Governments need revenues to finance the provision of public goods,
but most taxes they use to raise revenues will cause costly distortions
in the economy. These distortions imply an "excess burden" of taxa-
tion: taxes impose costs on the private sector that exceed the revenue
collected by the government.57 An optimal tax system seeks to mini-
mize the excess burden associated with raising any given amount of
tax revenue. Because tariff revenue raised from immigrants would
allow distortionary taxes elsewhere in the economy to be reduced, op-
timal-tax considerations would call for a tariff even if it causes some
distortion in the level of immigration. An optimal tariff would be
higher than that which induces the optimal quantity of immigration.
Thus, the optimal tariff would assure that each immigrant makes on
balance a net positive contribution to the public sector.
The optimal tariff would exceed Pigouvian levels even in the ab-
sence of any market power. Suppose the supply of unskilled labor is
perfectly elastic, so that a tariff would have no effect on the after-tax
wage of immigrants. Instead, the burden of the tariff would fall on
the employer, who must pay the tariff on top of the immigrant's wage.
Although there is no "market power" rationale for a tariff in this case,
See Krauss & Baumol, supra note 27, at 44 (describing how a tax on guest workers
"would equate the marginal private cost of guest workers with their marginal social
cost and lead to an optimal use of imported labor by the host country").
-1 See, e.g., DAVID N. HymAN, PUBLIC FINANCE: A CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION OF
THEORYTO PoLIcY 384 (4th ed. 1993).
1997] 1167
1168 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIALAWREVIEW [Vol. 145:1147
for all the reasons discussed above, the optimal tariff would be high
enough to distort immigration below the first-best level.
Suppose the supply of unskilled labor is less than perfectly elastic.
The less elastic the supply of immigrant labor, the more a tariff causes
a fall in immigrant after-tax wages rather than a fall in the quantity of
immigration. This inelasticity would present two reasons to raise the
tariff still higher. First, this smaller distortion in immigration would
militate in favor of a higher tariff under optimal-tax principles be-
cause the excess burden imposed on employers would be lower.
Second, to the extent that a tariff drives down the after-tax wage
of immigrants, the burden of the tariff would fall on immigrants, and
this portion of the tariff revenue represents a net gain to the eco-
nomic welfare of natives rather than a transfer from employers to the
public treasury. Because we assign no weight to the welfare of immi-
grants (by assumption for the purposes of this discussion), the fall in
their after-tax wages represents an unambiguous increase in national
economic welfare. The more inelastic the supply of immigrant labor,
the stronger this effect, and the higher the optimal tariff. Thus, the
presence of market power presents a second rationale for higher tar-
iffs that is distinct from the optimal-tax rationale: even if distortion-
ary taxes were unnecessary to finance public goods, the transfer from
immigrants to public coffers would represent a gain for natives that
would justify a distortionary tariff.
Thus, for immigrants who would otherwise have a negative eco-
nomic effect on the public sector, the optimal tariff is unambiguously
positive. The larger the (nondiscriminatory) taxes paid by an immi-
grant, however, the more valuable the immigrant will be for public
coffers, and the less inclined we should be to levy a positive tariff in
addition to these other taxes. Indeed, for skilled immigrants who
would on balance have a sufficiently positive economic effect on the
public sector, the optimal tariff could well be zero or even negative. 58
D. The Optimal Tariff on Skilled Immigrants
Consider skilled immigrants who have a net positive effect on the
public sector even in the absence of a tariff. To analyze how the ex-
ternal net benefits associated with these immigrants affect the calcula-
tion of the optimal tariff, suppose first that the country of immigra-
5' Sykes observes that "if immigration yields sufficiently large positive externalities,
the optimal tax might be negative (a subsidy)," but he does not explore this idea any
further. Sykes, supra note 7, at 181.
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don has no market power: the supply of immigrants is perfectly elas-
tic. In this case, there is no "market power" basis for a positive opti-
mal tariff, because taxes do not drive down the wages received by im-
migrants. Instead, the incidence of taxes falls only upon employers,
who must pay higher wages as a result of taxes.
Given these assumptions, it is likely to be in the national eco-
nomic interest to discriminate in favor of skilled immigrants in our in-
come tax rates. The fact that these immigrants make net positive con-
tributions to the public sector implies that their tax payments are
high enough to distort their immigration below first-best levels. Taxes
on immigrants in excess of Pigouvian levels produce deadweight loss
by making immigrant labor too costly for employers. Lower taxes
would expand immigration toward the first-best level, which would
bring a gain for the economy as a whole.
A complete analysis, however, would also consider the need to
raise tax revenues. Taking these effects into account still points to-
ward lower tax rates on immigrant labor if the supply of this labor is
perfectly elastic. Optimal-tax theory prescribes lower tax rates on
markets where supply or demand is more elastic, so as to minimize
the excess burden of taxation.7 ' Thus, suppose that skilled immi-
grants pay enough in taxes other than income taxes (such as sales
taxes and property taxes) to cover any external costs they impose on
natives. Optimal-tax theory would prescribe higher income taxes on
natives as long as the supply of their labor is less elastic than the per-
fectly elastic supply of immigrant labor. Lower taxes on immigrants
would increase immigration, which would generate new tax revenues
as well as reduce the cost of labor for employers. Under these cir-
cumstances, the optimal tariff is unambiguously negative.
Suppose instead, that the supply of immigrant labor is less than
perfectly elastic. If the supply of immigrant labor is upward-sloping,
then the optimal tariff is no longer unambiguously negative. Inelas-
ticity of immigrant labor supply introduces two considerations that
would cut in favor of higher tariffs.
First, "market power" considerations militate in favor of a positive
tariff on immigrants. These considerations tend to be weak, however,
when nondiscriminatory taxes are already high. To the extent we
have market power, income and wage taxes not only discourage im-
migration but also drive the after-tax wages of immigrants downward.
See, e.g., ANTHONY B. ATKINSON & JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, LECTURES ON PUBLIC
ECONOMICS 368-69 (1980); HYMAN, supra note 57, at 385-87.
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Both of these effects undercut the case for a positive tariff. The more
immigrants pay in these other taxes, the greater the marginal cost of a
tariff (we lose more tax revenues when immigration falls) and the
smaller the marginal benefit (there are fewer immigrants whose
wages will fall).
Second, the more inelastic the supply of immigrant labor, the less
optimal-tax considerations militate in favor of negative tariffs. These
considerations would still militate in favor of lower taxes on immi-
grants, however, as long as the supply of immigrant labor is more elas-
tic than the supply of domestic labor. We would expect this condition
to hold over the relevant range of wages: the supply of domestic la-
bor is elastic largely because native workers have the option of leaving
the labor force, whereas immigrants have not only the option of leav-
ing the labor force but also the option of remaining in their native
countries and accepting employment there. Natives of a country of
immigration are less likely than immigrants to respond to taxes by
leaving (or failing to enter) the domestic labor market, because each
worker is inclined, ceteris paribus, to remain in the worker's native
country. ° Immigrants by definition have self-selected as workers will-
ing to move, given the international differences in wage levels, but
the costs of moving, both psychic and financial, imply that many
would also decide not to move if taxes reduce the rewards to migra-
tion.6' Thus, the decision of each individual immigrant to supply la-
60 See RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERr S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS:
THEORYAND PUBuC PoLIcy 331 (5th ed. 1994) ("[A] large part of the costs of migration
are psychic, the losses associated with giving up friends, community ties, and the benefits
of knowing one's way around."); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OFJUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF
PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 38 (1983) ("Human beings... move about a great deal, but
not because they love to move. They are, most of them, inclined to stay where they are
unless their life is very difficult there."); Carens, supra note 26, at 270 ("They normally
feel attached to their native land and to the particular language, culture, and community
in which they grew up and in which they feel at home.").
6' Even free immigration policies probably would not eliminate international dif-
ferences in wages. The financial and psychic costs of migration would drive a wedge
between domestic and foreign wages, just as transportation costs can sustain differ-
ences in prices among different geographic markets. Consider Puerto Rico, for ex-
ample, which is a territory of the United States. Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens and
are thus free to move to the U.S. mainland. See Fernando A. Ramos, Out-Migration and
Return Migration of Puerto Ricans, in IMMIGRATION AND THE WORK FORCE: ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES FOR THE UNITED STATES AND SOURCE AREAS 49 (George J. Borjas & Rich-
ard B. Freeman eds., 1992) [hereinafter IMMIGRATION AND THE WORK FORCE]. Yet, de-
spite the free mobility of labor, large real-wage differentials for unskilled workers per-
sisted between Puerto Rico and the U.S. mainland for decades until Puerto Rico's
minimum wage was brought up to U.S. levels in 1983. See Alida J. Castillo-Freeman &
Richard B. Freeman, When the Minimum Wage Really Bites: The Effect of the U.S.-Level Mini-
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bor to the country of immigration is likely to be more sensitive to
taxes than the decision of natives to supply labor to the domestic la-
bor market.
Furthermore, we would expect the elasticity of the supply of im-
migrant labor to be particularly large if the immigrant labor is drawn
from a world labor market that is large relative to the domestic labor
market. Given the size of the world labor market, we would in gen-
eral expect the supply of immigrant labor to be quite elastic. Thus,
optimal-tax considerations not only militate in favor of a negative tar-
iff, but these considerations may also be significant. Furthermore, the
elasticity of immigrant labor supply also suggests that "market power"
considerations in favor of positive tariffs may be weak.
Thus, the optimal tariff may be positive, but without precise in-
formation on elasticities and other data, the optimal tariff may also be
negative. It is especially likely to be negative for classes of immigrants
who already bear a high tax burden, because they are attractive from
62a fiscal perspective. For skilled immigrants expected to pay a large
amount in income and other taxes, it is likely to be in the national in-
terest to offer lower tax rates than those imposed on natives, in order
to encourage the immigration of more taxpayers.
mum on Puerto Rico, in IMMIGRATION AND THE WORK FORCE, supra, at 177. Similarly, the
free movement of labor within the European Union has failed to eliminate all wage dis-
parities. See Johnson, supra note 4, at 972-73 (noting that "those who predicted
that... free movement... would result in large-scale emigration from member countries
with floundering economies were proven wrong," in spite of "wage disparities among the
European Union's member nations" (footnotes omitted)). Any nontariff barriers to mi-
gration would only reinforce the tendency for workers in countries of immigration to en-
joy higher wages than similar workers in countries of emigration.
62 Furthermore, to the extent that other countries of immigration are eager to at-
tract these immigrants, they may have more options than less skilled immigrants. See
BORJAS, FRIENDS OR STRANGERS, supra note 36, at 199-217 (reviewing the competition
among countries of immigration for skilled immigrants and concluding that the United
States has not fared well relative to Australia and Canada). The migration of less skilled
workers may be more likely to be blocked by protectionist quotas in other countries of
immigration. Thus, the supply of highly skilled immigrants to the United States may be
more elastic in the relevant range than the supply of less skilled immigrants compared to
the supply of similarly skilled native workers. The net supply curve for labor immigrating
to the United States would reflect the subtraction of the net labor demand curves of all
other countries that offer these workers access to their national labor markets. On the
other hand, in a zero-tariff free-trade equilibrium, the United States might employ a
larger fraction of the world supply of highly skilled labor than it would of the world sup-
ply of less skilled labor. If so, this fact would make it ambiguous whether the supply of
highly skilled immigrants to the United States is more elastic than the corresponding
supply of less skilled immigrants compared to the supply of similarly skilled native work-
ers.
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E. Immigration of Nuclear Families
For simplicity of analysis the foregoing discussion has treated
immigrants as individual workers only. In reality, workers may often
be reluctant to migrate without bringing close family members with
them. What would be the optimal immigration policy regarding the
admission of an immigrant worker's family? As long as the psychic
and economic benefits of family unification (measured by the immi-
grants' willingness to pay for these benefits) exceed the congestion
costs the additional immigrants would impose on natives, it will be
optimal to allow workers to bring their relatives. These benefits are
likely to be sufficiently large for a worker's immediate family (spouses
and dependent children), who derive large benefits from cohabita-
tion. Given the large benefits of keeping nuclear families united, the
total benefits to the immigrant family would probably exceed any net
external costs that these relatives would impose on natives, even after
accounting for congestion costs.
With appropriate fiscal policies, natives can gain from the admis-
sion of these relatives. First, the immigrant household will pay more
in sales and other taxes. Second, if these extra taxes are insufficient
to create a net positive external effect of these additional immigrants,
the immigrant family would be willing pay a higher tariff to compen-
sate natives for any increase in external costs, such as congestion costs
and any net transfers. By charging a higher tariff, natives can capture
some of the surplus produced by family unification.
F. Future Generations
The foregoing analysis has focused only on the effects of immi-
gration on the current generation of natives. Extending the analysis
to include the effects on the descendants of these natives, however, is
unlikely to change our conclusions significantly. Consider how immi-
gration today will affect the welfare of future generations.
The children and other descendants of the immigrant workers we
admit will produce the same type of gains from trade in the labor
market that the immigrants themselves will bring. These positive ef-
fects upon the private sector offer no reason to adopt more restrictive
immigration laws. The only possible negative effect would come
through the public sector. Is there any reason to think that immigra-
tion will produce negative external costs on future generations of na-
tives?
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To answer this question, we must first address the issue of whose
welfare counts in our analysis of future social welfare. The descen-
dants of immigrants, after all, will be natives, and on that score would
seem just as entitled to our concern as those who are currently natives
or their descendants. In this spirit, the Fourteenth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution confers U.S. citizenship on anyone born in the
United States.63 The main purpose of this amendment was to estab-
lish the citizenship of blacks, which the Supreme Court had put in
doubt in Dred Scott v. Sandfor,' but its effect is to create a general rule
of universal citizenship by birth.65 From this perspective, if the de-
scendants of immigrants are better off than they would be had their
forebears not immigrated, then the improvement in their welfare
would count as an additional benefit of immigration.
Nativists may balk, however, at counting this effect as a benefit.
They may consider the descendants of immigrants less worthy of our
concern than the descendants of natives.66 Nativists may object that
because we are formulating immigration policy, we are deciding
whether these descendants will be natives. In evaluating alternatives,
therefore, we cannot assume that their welfare counts. Excluding
their welfare may underscore the discriminatory nature of nativism,
6' See U.S. CONST. amend. X1V, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside.").
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 676 (1898); THOMAS A. AL-
EINIKOFF ET AL, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY 993 (3d ed. 1995). Nevertheless,
bills pending in Congress would seek to deny birthright citizenship to the children of
undocumented immigrants and of nonimmigrant alien visitors. See House Panels Hear Tes-
timony on Birthright Citizenship, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 97 (1996); see also PETER H.
SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE
AMERICAN POLITY (1985) (proposing a reinterpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
to allow Congress to deny birthright citizenship to the children of undocumented immi-
grants and of nonimmigrant alien visitors). Governor Pete Wilson of California and oth-
ers have called for a Constitutional amendment that would prevent the children of un-
documented immigrants from acquiring U.S. citizenship by birth. For a critique of such
proposals, see Note, The Birthright Citizenship Amendment: A Threat to Equality, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1026 (1994). Since the triumph of liberalism over feudalism, or at least since the
abolition of slavery, these proposals to shift our focus toward lineage as the factor deter-
mining a person's legal status might seem anachronistic. See Carens, supra note 26, at 252
("Citizenship in Western liberal democracies is the modern equivalent of feudal privi-
lege-an inherited status that greatly enhances one's life chances. Like feudal birthright
privileges, restrictive citizenship is hard tojustify when one thinks about it closely.").
This type of nativism may strike us as particularly unseemly, because it discrimi-
nates between future natives based on how recently their forebears immigrated and
thus seems at odds with a commitment to the equal moral worth of all natives.
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but it is consistent with a strictly nativist view of social welfare. Sup-
pose we adopt this nativist measure of social welfare and consider
only the welfare of the descendants of those who are currently natives.
This definition of social welfare, however, still leaves some con-
ceptual problems. Because some immigrants and some of their de-
scendants will marry some of those who are currently natives and
some of their descendants, the distinction between these two popula-
tions will disappear over time. The higher the rate of intermarriage
between these groups, the more rapidly this distinction will erode.
6 7
Eventually, given the passing of a sufficient number of generations,
the terms "descendants of immigrants whose admission we are con-
templating" and "descendants of those who are currently natives" will
describe virtually the same population, because nearly everyone will
have at least one ancestor who is currently a native and at least one
ancestor who immigrated subsequently.
Thus, two effects of immigration on the descendants of those who
are currently natives-and the main effects in the long term-will be
to increase their number and to change their identities. Because they
will be less likely to marry one another, there will be a larger popula-
tion of descendants of those who are currently natives. This effect re-
quires us to define our measure of social welfare more precisely. If we
adopt a utilitarian measure of social welfare, for example, we must
specify whether we take our measure of social welfare to be total util-
ity or average utility. If we adopt the principle of total utility, then an
increase in population, ceteris paribus, would represent an increase in
social welfare. To avoid "stacking the deck" in favor of immigration,
suppose we adopt a social welfare criterion based on average wealth
rather than total wealth. From this perspective, the main cost of
population growth would be to increase per capita congestion costs
for public goods that are subject to congestion on the plausible as-
sumption that marginal congestion costs rise with population. On
the other hand, there would also be some economies of scale: a
larger population could produce pure public goods at a lower cost
per capita.
67 This rate may be high even if the rate of intermarriage across ethnic or racial
groups is low: if both the current native population and the immigrant stream include
people from all ethnic and racial groups, as is true for the United States, then inter-
marriage may occur frequently between these two populations within each ethnic or
racial group. This phenomenon is especially likely for future generations, who are
unlikely to discriminate among potential spouses based on how recently their fore-
bears immigrated.
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Our calculus would also include the costs imposed and the bene-
fits conferred by the descendants of immigrants upon the descen-
dants of those who are currently natives, but only in the short term,
while these populations remain distinct. The benefits would include
the gains from trade in the labor market and the taxes paid by the de-
scendants of immigrants. The costs would include entitlements con-
sumed by these descendants."'
To derive the optimal immigration policy, we would add up all
these costs and benefits in economic terms on a per capita basis, dis-
61counting each cost and benefit to a net present value. With respect
to each class of immigrant, we would estimate the expected total net
present value associated with each immigrant worker, which would be
an average calculated in the face of uncertainty.7° We would count
this expected value as one component of an immigrant's external ef-
fects. The only implication for the optimal immigration policy, then,
would be an adjustment in the optimal tariff.
There would appear to be no reason to presume that these effects
would always call for a higher tariff. If these future effects produce a
positive value for immigration, then a lower tariff may be optimal.
Given the correlation between an immigrant's income and the in-
come of the immigrant's descendants, we might generally expect
skilled immigration to have a positive net effect through future gen-
erations, whereas unskilled immigration might have a negative net ef-
fect.71 If so, then these effects serve to reinforce the conclusions de-
rived above: the optimal tariff on unskilled labor is positive, but the
optimal tariff on skilled labor may be negative. On the other hand,
one would expect the descendants of immigrants to assimilate and to
obtain language and other skills that enable them to fare better than
their parents in terms of economic performance. The available em-
pirical evidence suggests that the children of immigrants do tend to
63 Insofar as the descendants of immigrants acquire citizenship by birth, they may
have greater access to public entitlements than their immigrant forebears.
For a helpful discussion of the role of discounting in cost-benefit analysis, see
John Broome, Discounting the Future, 23 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 128 (1994).
70 After calculating the per capita effect on the descendants of those who are cur-
rently natives, to calculate the total value associated with each immigrant, we need to
multiply this per capita value with the number of people affected. To apply a criterion
based on average wealth, however, the number must be fixed exogenously. Suppose
we choose the number of descendants that natives would have in the absence of any
immigration.
71 See Borjas, Economics of Immigration, supra note 36, at 1711-12 (discussing evidence
that immigrant skill differentials persist over generations).
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outperform their parents on average.n This fact would tend to un-
dercut a presumption of a negative future effect of unskilled immi-
gration.
In sum, there seems to be little reason to expect that these con-
siderations would have an important effect on the optimal tariff.
Most of these effects occur in the distant future. Given that we must
discount all these effects to a net present value, their total would
probably be relatively small.
G. Avoiding External Costs
A country of immigration may implement a positive tariff on im-
migration not only through a tax on immigrants but also through re-
strictions on immigrant access to public entitlement programs.73 Ei-
ther form of tariff could improve the effect of immigration on the
economic welfare of natives. The national economic interest, how-
ever, would not call for the elimination of immigrant access to public
benefits in all cases. To maximize the economic welfare of natives, we
would at least allow immigrants access to public entitlements when
the benefits to natives from such access exceeds the costs of providing
the access. Moreover, to the extent we allow still broader access to
these programs, we can charge a correspondingly higher tariff to
cover the additional cost imposed on the public sector.
We provide many public services that serve our own interests and
not simply the interests of the recipients of those services. For exam-
ple, the education of immigrant children is likely to have benefits for
natives that exceeds the costs of providing access to public schools.74
Investment in the human capital of immigrant children provides
them with skills that will yield external benefits in the future when
they enter the labor market.' 5 As skilled workers, they will have
72 See id. at 1711 (discussing the convergence of skill differentials over generations
and noting that "the empirical evidence ... indicates that second-generation workers
do experience a 'jump' in their earnings capacity").
73 See Krauss & Baumol, supra note 27, at 37, 44-45 (discussing a special tax and ex-
clusion from welfare benefits as alternative responses to the same problem).
7 See Borjas, Economics of Immigration, supra note 36, at 1708 ("These costs ... must be
contrasted with the benefits of having a more educated work force later on in the life cy-
cle.").
73 As the U.S. Supreme Court understood in Ply1r v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), this
reasoning applies to immigrants whether they are legal or undocumented. The Court
held that states may not deny undocumented immigrant children the free public edu-
cation that they provide to U.S. citizens and legal immigrants. The Court stressed that
.education provides the basic tools by which individuals might lead economically pro-
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higher incomes and pay more in taxes than they would without an
education.76 Other programs designed to support investments in
human capital may yield similar benefits for natives by creating a
more skilled immigrant labor force. Thus, while Congress enacted
new limits on the access of future immigrants to federal "means-
tested" public benefits as part of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, this welfare legislation also
preserved their access to specific programs related to education and
S• 77
training.
The provision of some publicly subsidized health care could also
yield benefits for natives exceeding its costs. Immunizations, for ex-
ductive lives to the benefit of us all." Id. at 221. Even the four dissenters conceded
that "it is senseless for an enlightened society to deprive any children-including ille-
gal aliens-of an elementary education" and that "it would be folly-and wrong-to
tolerate creation of a segment of society made up of illiterate persons, many having a
limited or no command of our language." Id. at 242 (Burger, CJ., dissenting)
(footnote omitted); see Sykes, supra note 7, at 172 ("Plyler v. Doe... need not be con-
trary to the pursuit of the national advantage."). Despite these considerations, the
voters of California in November 1994 passed Proposition 187, which would deny un-
documented aliens access to various public services, including education. See Proposi-
tion 187, § 7 (codified at CAL EDUc. CODE § 48215 (West 1997)). A federal court, citing
Plyler v. Doe, has since enjoined implementation of this provision. See League of United
Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F Supp. 755, 785 (C.D. Cal. 1995) ("[D]enial of a
public education based on the immigration status of the child or the child's parent or
guardian conflicts with and is preempted by federal law as announced by the Supreme
Court in Plyler."). Although the House of Representatives subsequently passed legislation
that would allow states to exclude undocumented children from public schools, Presi-
dent Clinton threatened to veto any bill including this provision. See Showdown Looms over
Public Education Measure in Immigration Legislation, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 817, 817
(1996). Faced with this threat, Republicans in Congress deleted this provision from the
immigration bill eventually enacted into law. See Eleventh-Hour Agreement Folds Immigration
Bill into Omnibus SpendingMeasure, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1281, 1282 (1996).
76 Indeed, from this perspective, countries of immigration "free ride" on the in-
vestments that countries of emigration have made in the education of migrants. See
Borjas, Economics of Immigration, supra note 36, at 1708 ("[Ilmmigrants who enter the
United States after they complete their education import 'free' human capital into the
United States."). The host country derives the external benefits of the immigrant's skills
without paying for the creation of that human capital. See Sykes, supra note 7, at 172
("[T]his observation suggests why countries might seek to restrict emigration to promote
the national advantage, but does nothing to justify restrictions on immigration.").
See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, sec. 403, 110 Stat. 2105, 2265-66 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1613) (denying future immigrants access to "any Federal means-tested public benefit
for a period of 5 years" but exempting school lunch benefits, certain programs of stu-
dent assistance, certain elementary and secondary education programs, Head Start
benefits, andJob Training Partnership Act benefits).
78 For these reasons, it is doubtful that Proposition 187, see Proposition 187, § 6
(codified at CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130 (West 1997)), which would exclude un-
documented aliens from publicly funded health care, is in the interest of U.S. natives. See
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ample, provide benefits not only to those immunized, but also to all
others, because immunizations reduce the risk that infectious diseases
will spread] 9 Natives have a similar interest in the diagnosis and
treatment of immigrants with communicable diseases. Thus, while
the welfare legislation enacted in 1996 restricts immigrant access to
Medicaid and other federal public benefits, it preserves access to
some public health assistance for immunizations and for the testing
and treatment of communicable diseases. 80
Prenatal care for pregnant immigrant women may be another ex-
ample, because it yields benefits for babies who will be natives when
born. To the extent that natives enjoy a public entitlement to health
care, these babies could impose costs on other natives if they are born
sickly or prematurely. If prenatal care efficiently prevents these later
costs, then it is in the interest of natives to provide such preventive
care. Nevertheless, the 1996 welfare legislation does not exempt pre-
natal care from its new restrictions.
Other public entitlements for immigrants may be less likely to
yield benefits for natives. Some public entitlements are pure trans-
fers: they serve only to redistribute income and not to subsidize the
provision of a public good. Natives may gain, for example, by deny-
ing immigrants access to transfers, such as the earned income tax
credit in the United States, which provides cash payments to low-
income workers.8' A positive tariff on immigrant labor can take the
form of an income tax credit provided to all citizens but denied to
immigrants, combined with an otherwise nondiscriminatory income
tax system.
The objective of reducing the burden immigrants impose on na-
tives through the public sector underlies restrictions on the access of
aliens to various entitlement programs. Under U.S. law, for example,
even before Congress enacted new restrictions in 1996, aliens were
Kevin R.Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of Immigration Status, Eth-
nicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509, 1568-70 (1995) (discussing these and
other costs of Proposition 187).
See Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration, Federalism, and the Welfare State, 42 UCLA L.
REV 1453, 1465 (1995) ("Prohibiting publicly funded facilities from immunizing immi-
grants against... contagious diseases would pose... dangers to public health.").
'0 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, sec.
403(c) (2)(E), 110 Stat. at 2265-66 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1613(c)(2)(E)). The
legislation preserves similar access for undocumented immigrants. See id. sec.
401 (b) (1) (C), 110 Stat. at 2261 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1611 (b) (1) (C)).
" For an examination of the earned income tax credit, see Anne L. Alstott, The
Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L REV.
533 (1995).
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generally ineligible for most public entitlements, including Medicaid,
Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC"), and food
stamps, unless they had been lawfully admitted for permanent resi-
dence. s2 Thus, not only undocumented immigrants but also aliens
admitted to the United States temporarily as nonimmigrants, includ-
ing temporary workers, were ineligible for most public benefits be-
cause they were not lawfully admitted for permanent residence.83 The
recently enacted welfare legislation expands the range of public bene-
fits from which nonimmigrants and undocumented immigrants are
generally excluded: with only narrow exceptions, these aliens are in-
eligible for "any Federal public benefit.,1
4
The same legislation also adds extensive new restrictions on the
access of other aliens, including even legal permanent residents, to
federal entitlement programs. In particular, an alien admitted for
permanent residence after enactment of the new law is ineligible for
"any Federal means-tested public benefit for a period of 5 years be-
ginning on the date of the alien's entry into the United States," with
See 7 U.S.C. § 2015(f) (1994) (limiting the eligibility of aliens for food stamps);
42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(33), 1396b(v), 1436a (1994) (limiting the eligibility of aliens for
AFDC benefits, Medicaid benefits, and public housing assistance, respectively); DAVID
CARLINERETAL, THE RIGHTS OFALIENS AND REFUGEES 214 (1990); Sykes, supra note 7, at
189, 191. For a survey of these restrictions on alien access to public entitlements, see
Richard A. Boswell, Restrictions on Non-Citizens'Access to Public Benefits: THawed Premise, Un-
necessary Response, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1475, 1487-97 (1995).
s "Aliens other than permanent residents, however, may be eligible for the earned
income tax credit if they are resident aliens for tax purposes. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 32(c)(1)(E) (1994). A lawful permanent resident is a resident alien for these pur-
poses, but other aliens may also be resident aliens if they meet certain conditions. See
id. § 7701(b) (1) (A). For example, if an alien's presence in the United States satisfies
the "substantial presence" test set forth in the statute, see id. § 7701 (b) (3), then the
alien is treated as a resident.
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, sec. 401(a),
110 Stat. at 2261 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a)). The statute defines "Federal
public benefit" very broadly, including not only "any retirement, welfare, health, dis-
ability, public or assisted housing, postsecondary education, food assistance, unem-
ployment benefit, or any other similar benefit for which payments or assistance are
provided... by an agency of the United States or by appropriated funds of the United
States" but also "any grant, contract, loan, professional license, or commercial license
provided by an agency of the United States or by appropriated funds of the United
States." Id. sec. 401(c) (1), 110 Stat. at 2262 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1611(c) (1)).
The law also makes explicit the exclusion of aliens from the earned income tax credit
if they are not authorized to work in the United States. See id. sec. 451, 110 Stat. at
2276-77 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 32). Thus, undocumented immigrants are ineli-
gible for the earned income tax credit. Furthermore, the new law also prohibits states
from providing "any State or local public benefit" to undocumented aliens unless the
state subsequently enacts a law that "affirmatively provides for such eligibility." Id. sec.
411, 110 Stat. at 2268-69 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1621).
1997] 1179
1180 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol.145:1147
only narrow exceptions.8 Furthermore, the new law makes perma-
nent resident aliens, including current recipients already admitted to
the United States, ineligible for food stamps and for Supplemental
Security Income, without regard to length of residence in the United
States, also with only narrow exceptions." Finally, the new law also
permits states to exclude permanent resident aliens, including cur-
rent recipients already admitted to the United States, from benefits
under other federal programs, including Medicaid, and under state
programs, without regard to length of residence in the United
States.8 The law explains that Congress enacted these new rules to
ensure that "aliens not burden the public benefits system.88
Immigrants other than those likely to impose a fiscal burden
might also be deemed to impose external costs on natives. Aliens
with criminal records, for example, might be thought likely to impose
negative externalities. If these costs are large enough, then the opti-
mal tariff for this class of aliens may be so high as to be prohibitive.
We could simply exclude immigrants deemed to be that costly: be-
cause a truly prohibitive tariff produces no tariff revenue, it offers no
advantage for natives over outright exclusion. Aliens with criminal
records might be considered sufficiently costly to justify their exclu-
sion. In fact, current U.S. law makes certain criminal convictions
grounds for the exclusion of an alien seeking admission.Y
8
85 Id. sec. 403(a), 110 Stat. at 2265 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1613(a)).
86 See id. sec. 402(a), 110 Stat. at 2262-64 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)).
One exception applies to legal permanent residents who have "worked for 40 qualify-
ing quarters." Id. sec. 402(a) (2) (B), 110 Stat. at 2262-63 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1612(a)(2)(B)). Thus, under this law, a permanent resident alien must work for a
sufficient period of time to earn an entitlement to these benefits.
87 See id. secs. 402(b), 412, 110 Stat. at 2264-65, 2269-70 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1612(b), 1622) (allowing states to restrict alien access to designated federal pro-
grams and state public benefits, respectively). Each provision features exceptions that
include legal permanent residents who have "worked for 40 qualifying quarters." Id.
secs. 402(b) (2) (B), 412(b) (2), 110 Stat. at 2264-65, 2269 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1612(b) (2) (B), 1622(b) (2)).
Id. sec. 402 (4), 110 Stat. at 2260 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1601 (4)).
89 See8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2) (1994). Aliens with "a communicable disease of public
health significance" or "a physical or mental disorder and behavior associated with the
disorder that may pose.., a threat to the property, safety, or welfare of... others," as
well as those who abuse drugs, are also excludable. Id. § 1182(a) (1) (A). Aliens be-
lieved to be seeking entry to engage in espionage, sabotage, or terrorism are also ex-
cludable. See id. § 1182(a) (3).
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H. Unemployment
The foregoing analysis assumes that the supply of labor does not
exceed the demand for labor. More precisely, it assumes that the rate
of unemployment is no more than the "natural" rate.90 If instead the
labor market fails to clear, so that unemployment rises above equilib-
rium levels, then immigration would entail two types of problems.
The first arises from the unemployment of immigrants; the second
arises from the unemployment of natives.
First, poor immigrants who are (or are likely to become) unem-
ployed may be unlikely to pay enough taxes to cover the costs of pub-
lic entitlements that they would receive and the congestion costs that
they would generate. Thus, even with the "optimal" discrimination
against immigrants in taxes and public entitlements, some immigra-
tion might have a negative effect on the economic welfare of natives.
Unless the tariff is collected up front at the border, some immigrants
may avoid paying it.
For this reason, it may be prudent for the United States to gener-
ally reserve most employment-based immigration visas for those who
have offers of employment in the United States.9' In fact, the immi-
gration laws of the United States currently require employer sponsor-
ship for most categories of employment-based immigration visas.92 To
go Economists define the natural rate of unemployment, also known as the "full
employment" or "long-run equilibrium" level of unemployment, as the rate at which
the flows of labor in and out of unemploymentjust balance and "at which the expecta-
tions of firms and workers as to the behavior of prices and wages are correct."
RUDIGER DORNBUSCH & STANLEY FISCHER, MACROECONOMICS 549 (4th ed. 1987). For
models of equilibrium unemployment, see EFFICIENCY WAGE MODELS OF THE LABOR
MARKET (George A. Akerlof &Janet L. Yellen eds., 1986).
91 We may also admit immigrants who can otherwise demonstrate that they have
sufficient resources to support themselves. Note that although much of the preceding
analysis addresses the migration of workers, it also suggests that there is little reason to
exclude those who wish to immigrate for any reason, as long as they will make a net
positive contribution to the public sector. Employment is only one type of transaction
that can yield gains from trade in the private sector. Gains also arise for those who
choose to reside in the United States for purely personal reasons, and transact with
landlords, merchants, and other natives in the United States, producing gains for all
parties to the transactions.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(D) (1994). The only exceptions are aliens with
.extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics," id.
§ 1153(b)(1) (A), "qualified special immigrants," id. § 1153(b) (4), and "qualified im-
migrants seeking to enter the United States for the purpose of engaging in a new
commercial enterprise" that will employ U.S. workers, id. § 1153(b)(5)(A). The rela-
tively small number of immigrants falling into these categories, including especially
skilled or wealthy aliens, may file petitions on their own behalf. See id.
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enter Canada as an economic immigrant, an applicant must pass a
test based on a "point system" that does not strictly require ajob offer
as a condition of admission, but it awards points for arranged em-
ployment and enables those otherwise barred from immigrating to
gain admission if they have such an offer.93 Furthermore, if immi-
grants who are unlikely to "pay their way" can be identified, and they
do not have sponsors (such as relatives in the country of immigra-
tion) willing and able to support them, they can be excluded on that
ground. The U.S. immigration statute authorizes the exclusion of
aliens deemed "likely at any time to become a public charge.
"94
Second, unemployment among native workers introduces an-
other negative externality from immigration if immigrants increase
the involuntary unemployment of natives. Involuntary unemploy-
ment entails deadweight loss to the extent that the marginal product
of the worker's labor would exceed the value of leisure time to the
worker. The U.S. immigration statute responds to this concern by
imposing various restrictions, including quantitative restrictions and
"labor certification" requirements, on the admission of employment-
based immigrants and temporary workers.95 Labor certification is a
determination by the Department of Labor that "there are not suffi-
cient workers who are able, willing, qualified.., and available.., at
the place where the alien is to perform" the work in question and that
the employment of the alien "will not adversely affect the wages and
§ 1154(a)(1)(C), (E), (F). Aliens seeking visas as temporary workers under U.S. law
also require sponsoring employers. See id. § 1101(a)(15)(H).
'" See BORJAS, FRIENDS OR STRANGERS, supra note 36, at 202-03; Manuel Garcia y
Griego, Canada: lexibility and Control in Immigration and Refugee Policy, in CONTROLUING
IMMIGRATION: A GLOBAL PERSPECIVE 119, 126 tbl.4.2 (Wayne A. Cornelius et al. eds.,
1994); Daniel Kubat, Canada: Immigration's Humanitafian Challenge, in THE PoLrIICs OF
MIGRATION PoLIciEs 23,32 tbl.2 (Daniel Kubat ed., 2d ed. 1993).
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (4) (1994) ("Any alien who ... at the time of application for a
visa.., is likely at any time to become a public charge is excludable."); see infra notes
161, 168-71, 176 and accompanying text.
13 Employment-based immigration is normally capped at 140,000 visas, see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1151(d) (1994), but the qualitative restrictions are so stringent and the "labor certi-
fication" requirement so burdensome that this ceiling has not in fact been binding. In
the 1994 fiscal year, for example, the United States admitted only 90,134 employment-
based immigrants. SeeJORDAN COMM'N, supra note 15, at 89 chart 25. Furthermore, no
more than 65,000 temporary workers may enter on H-lB visas "to perform services... in
a specialty occupation... or as a fashion model," 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (15) (H) (i) (b)
(1994), and no more than 66,000 temporary workers may enter on H-2B visas, see id.
§ 1101 (a) (15) (H) (ii) (b). See id. § 118 4(g) (1). Congress imposed these numerical limits
on temporary workers only recently, in 1990, and these ceilings represent the first quanti-
tative restrictions ever imposed on any category of nonimmigrants. See STEPHEN H.
LEGOMSIK IMMIGRATION LAW AND PoucY 253 (1992).
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working conditions of workers in the United States similarly em-
ployed."g The U.S. immigration statute requires labor certification
for most employment-based immigrants, even aliens "who are mem-
bers of the professions holding advanced degrees," aliens of
"exceptional ability," professionals "who hold baccalaureate degrees,"
and others "performing skilled labor."97  Through the labor-
certification requirement, the U.S. government requires U.S. employ-
ers to discriminate against foreign workers: the statute requires an
employer to prefer any qualified U.S. worker over any alien, no mat-
ter how much better qualified the foreign worker may be.98
As long as fiscal policies, employer sponsorship, and the "public
charge" provision ensure that these immigrants and temporary work-
ers are expected to have a net positive economic effect on natives,
however, it would be in the economic interests of U.S. natives to ad-
mit them without protectionist "labor certification" requirements or
quantitative restrictions.' A requirement that immigrants have a job
offer in hand to obtain a visa makes it unlikely that immigrants could
enter a domestic labor market with excess unemployment. Employers
would be unlikely to turn to foreign workers if many domestic work-
ers are available.'0
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (5) (A) (i) (1994).
97 Id. § 1153(b)(2)-(3); see id. §§ 1154(b), 1182(a)(5)(C). The requirement also
applies to temporary agricultural workers on H-2A visas, see id. § 1188(a)(1), and other
temporary workers on H-2B visas, see 8 C.ER. § 214.2(h) (6) (iv) (1997). A similar labor
"attestation" requirement applies to temporary workers who enter "to perform services
as a registered nurse" on H-1A visas, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (15) (H) (i) (a) (1994), or "to
perform services ... in a specialty occupation ... or as a fashion model" on H-1B visas,
id. § 1101 (a) (15) (H) (i) (b). The H-1A visa requires an attestation, for example, that
"[t]here would be substantial disruption ... in the delivery of health care serv-
ices ... without the services of such an alien" and "employment of the alien will not
adversely affect the wages and working conditions of registered nurses similarly em-
ployed." Id. § 1182(m)(2)(A)(i)-(ii). The H-lB visa requires the employer to attest,
for example, that it will offer the alien wages that are at least "the prevailing wage level
for the occupational classification in the area of employment" and "working condi-
tions ... that will not adversely affect the working conditions of workers similarly em-
ployed." Id. § 1182(n) (1) (A) (i) (II), (ii).
03 See LEGOMiSKY, supra note 95, at 199 ("[T]he employer ordinarily must hire a mini-
mally qualified American over a more qualified alien (or hire no one at all)."). The stat-
ute requires the U.S. worker to be "equally qualified" only in the case of an alien who "is a
member of the teaching profession" or "has exceptional ability in the sciences or the
arts." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (5) (A) (1994).
09 See Sykes, supra note 7, at 187 ("The labor certification process ... has little to
commend it. ... [Tlhe likely effect of labor certification is simply to allow domestic
workers to exclude competition.").
"0 See id. ("In the presence of substantial unemployment, the likelihood that an
employer would be inclined to hire someone from abroad seems minimal since the
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Furthermore, immigration need not increase the unemployment
rate among natives. Immigrants not only expand the local supply of
labor but also expand the local demand for labor. Immigrant workers
demand goods and services, and many of these goods and services re-
quire locally supplied labor.'0' In fact, studies consistently demon-
strate that immigration has little effect on the employment of na-
tives.1
0 2
Moreover, we would expect labor markets to clear eventually, ei-
ther because aggregate demand recovers from a negative shock or
because excess unemployment drives real wages down until the de-
mand for labor expands to meet supply. If wages cannot adjust, how-
ever, then unemployment above the natural rate might persist. Per-
sistent excess unemployment might result, for example, from
minimum wage laws that place a floor on nominal wages. 0 3 In a labor
employer can draw on a local pool of... individuals who can be interviewed person-
ally and whose language skills and work history... are readily verifiable.").
See id. at 169 ("[A]n influx of new immigrants ... raises aggregate demand,
which ameliorates unemployment problems, other things being equal."); SIMON, supra
note 39, at 214 ("lAin immigrant increases the demand for goods and services immedi-
ately upon arrival, and hence increases the demand for labor independently of starting
work."). This effect stimulates the demand for labor, even setting aside the job-creation
effects of immigrants as business owners. For descriptions of the role of immigrant en-
trepreneurs in the U.S. economy, see BORJAS, FRIENDS OR STRANGERS, supra note 36, at
163-76.
102 Surveys of this empirical literature reveal wide consensus on this conclusion.
See, e.g., Borjas, Economics of Immigration, supra note 36, at 1698 ("It is evident that immi-
gration has a weak effect on the employment of natives."); Rachel M. Friedberg & Jenni-
fer Hunt, The Impact of Immigrants on Host Country Wages, Employment and Growth, J. ECON.
PERSR, Spring 1995, at 23, 42 ("There is no evidence of economically significant reduc-
tions in native employment."). For example, David Card studied the effect of the arrival
of 125,000 Cubans from the port of Mariel who expanded the labor force in Miami by
seven percent almost overnight, but found little effect on the unemployment rates
among Miami's workers. See David Card, The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor
Marke4 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL REV. 245 (1990).
103 For this reason, economists often criticize minimum wage laws and urge the use
of alternatives like the negative income tax as a means of addressing issues of distribu-
tivejustice. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 110-14, 226-
28 (1979). Despite the broad consensus among economists on this issue, David Card and
Alan Krueger note that empirical studies have provided little evidence that minimum
wage laws have produced unemployment. See DAVID CARD & ALAN B. KRUEGER, MYnIi
AND MEASUREMENT: THE NEW ECONOMICS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE 1-4, 6-7 (1995)
(noting the wide agreement among economists that minimum wage laws cause unem-
ployment and summarizing their findings to the contrary). They concede, however:
"This is not to say that the employment losses from a much higher minimum wage would
be small: the evidence at hand is relevant only for a moderate range of minimum wages,
such as those that prevailed in the U.S. labor market during the past few decades." Id. at
393; see id. at 15 ("One explanation for the small effect of the minimum wage in the U.S.
labor market is that the minimum wage is set at a low level relative to average wages."); see
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market subject to a minimum wage, once equilibrium wages fall to
the minimum wage, the minimum wage is in fact binding, and fur-
ther immigration of labor runs the risk of generating higher rates of
unemployment. 'O4 Although this risk appears to be minimal at cur-
rent levels of immigration, higher levels of unskilled immigration may
pose greater risks. '05
Even in labor markets with excess supply, however, it may be op-
timal to permit the immigration of more workers. Tariff revenues
would benefit the public sector. This benefit must be weighed against
the risk of deadweight loss from the involuntary unemployment of
natives. That is, it may be optimal to tolerate some unemployment, in
order to generate tariff revenues. The optimal level of immigration
would equate the external costs associated with the marginal immi-
grant, including the expected deadweight loss associated with any re-
sulting unemployment of native workers, and the taxes paid by that
immigrant.
Thus, even if immigration were to cause some unemployment of
natives for any reason, the only implication for the optimal immigra-
tion policy would be an adjustment in the optimal tariff. The risk that
immigration could cause some unemployment among natives caused
by immigration would be merely one more external cost that the Pig-
ouvian component of the optimal tariff would be designed to offset.
If the effect of immigration on the unemployment rate among natives
is sufficiently small, then the optimal tariff may be lower than a pro-
hibitive tariff, even in labor markets with excess unemployment.
I. Constitutional Law
Some commentators have suggested that efforts to impose dis-
criminatory taxes on immigrants could encounter constitutional ob-
also id. at 265 ("We suspect that, at sufficiently high levels, the minimum wage probably
does reduce employment."). Thus, even if existing minimum wage laws do not cause un-
employment under current conditions, they might do so if equilibrium wages were to fall
relative to the minimum wage, as they might under a regime of unrestricted immigration
of unskilled workers.
'0' See Barry K. Chiswick, Illegal Immigration and Immigration Contro J. ECON. PERsP.,
Summer 1988, at 101, 106 (noting that immigration can "lead to a decrease in the em-
ployment of native workers .... if there is downward wage rigidity, say, because the market
wage is bounded by the legal minimum wage or a union-imposed wage"); Sykes, supra
note 7, at 169 ("An obvious source of this problem is the minimum wage, which may cre-
ate a pool of unemployed workers that may simply grow with the immigration of less
skilled workers.").
,05 See supra notes 102-03.
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jections. °6 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has applied a lenient
standard of review to federal laws that discriminate against aliens.1
0 7
In Mathews v. Diaz,"0' the Court held that Congress could restrict the
access of aliens to federal medical insurance. Federal law extends
certain Medicare benefits to aliens only if they have been admitted for
permanent residence and have also resided in the United States for at
least five years. 19 The Court rejected the argument that this law vio-
lates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment:
The fact that all persons, aliens and citizens alike, are protected by
the Due Process Clause does not lead to the further conclusion that all
aliens are entitled to enjoy all the advantages of citizenship or, indeed,
to the conclusion that all aliens must be placed in a single homogeneous
legal classification. For a host of constitutional and statutory provisions
rest on the premise that a legitimate distinction between citizens and
aliens may justify... benefits for one class not accorded to the other;
and the class of aliens is itself a heterogeneous multitude of persons with
a wide-ranging variety of ties to this country.0
In particular, the Court pointed to the federal government's plenary
power to regulate immigration, which entails sweeping discrimination
against aliens:
In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration,
Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to
citizens. The exclusion of aliens and the reservation of the power to
deport have no permissible counterpart in the Federal Government's
power to regulate the conduct of its own citizenry. The fact that an Act
of Congress treats aliens differently from citizens does not in itself imply
that such disparate treatment is "invidious.""'
6 See, e.g., Bhagwati & Srinivasan, supra note 27, at 211 ("[T]he (discriminatory)
taxation by the country of residence of foreign labour is fraught with numerous diffi-
culties from legal, constitutional, human-rights and political standpoints."); Chiswick,
supra note 27, at 309 n.34 (predicting that an "annual income tax surcharge" would
raise the objection that it is unconstitutional).
107 "[A]lienage classifications created by federal law will be subjected to only the
rational basis standard of review." JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CON-
STrrUTIONAL LAW § 14.12, at 704 (4th ed. 1991). "[lit would appear that the federal gov-
ernment may use a citizenship classification so long as it is arguably related to a federal
interest." Id.
10 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
'(* See 42 U.S.C. § 1395o(2) (B) (1994).
11o Diaz, 426 U.S. at 78.
"'. Id. at 79-80 (footnotes omitted). The Court's deferential review of federal laws
that discriminate against aliens contrasts sharply with the heightened scrutiny that the
Court applies to state laws that discriminate against aliens:
] LBERALZED IMMIGRA TIONAS FREE TRADE
This deferential standard of review for federal laws discriminating
against aliens (and also discriminating between immigrant and
nonimmigrant aliens) in the distribution of welfare benefits suggests
that the Court would uphold similar discrimination in our tax laws,
for example, with respect to the earned income tax crediL
2
Although a full normative analysis of the deference shown by the
Court in Mathews v. Diaz is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth
noting some of the issues raised. Gerald Rosberg, for example, has
criticized Mathews v. Diaz. He asks whether the plenary power to re-
strict immigration necessarily implies such broad powers in the con-
text of the Medicare statute, which "was not on its face concerned
with immigration and.., reflected no judgment.., about the classes
of aliens that should be admitted to the United States.""3 Similarly,
Alexander Aleinikoff has argued:
[T] he courts have wrongly assumed that every federal regulation based
on alienage is necessarily sustainable as an exercise of the immigration
power. It should be apparent that some statutes burdening aliens are
based on considerations other than a policy judgment regarding the
[W] hen state ... laws classify persons on the basis of United States citizenship
for the purpose of distributing economic benefits .... the law will be sub-
jected to strict judicial scrutiny. In this situation, the Court recognizes that
classifications based on alienage should be deemed "suspect" and upheld only
if necessary to promote a compelling or overriding interest.
NOWAK ROTUNDA, supra note 107, at 703 (footnote omitted); see Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (holding that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prevents a state from conditioning welfare benefits on either U.S. citizen-
ship or residence in the United States for a specified number of years). The Court in
Mathews v. Diaz distinguished Graham v. Richardson by pointing to the exclusive federal
power over the "entry and residence of aliens." Diaz, 426 U.S. at 84. The Court stressed
that "the Fourteenth Amendment's limits on state powers are substantially different from
the constitutional provisions applicable to the federal power over immigration and natu-
ralization." Id. at 86-87.
112 Indeed, in defending the discrimination at issue in Mathews v. Diaz, the Court
drew an analogy between medical benefits and tax benefits: "The task of classifying
persons for medical benefits, like the task of drawing lines for federal tax purposes,
inevitably requires that some persons who have an almost equally strong claim to fa-
vored treatment be placed on different sides of the line.. . ." Diaz, 426 U.S. at 83.
,'s Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Tratment by the Na-
tional Governmen4 1977 SuP. Cr REV. 275,337; see id. at 317, 334 ("The provision restricting
alien participation in the Medicare insurance program was not in any obvious way con-
cerned with immigration."); see also id. at 335 ("[T]he great majority of the statutory pro-
visions discriminating against resident aliens, certainly including the provision at issue in
Diaz, have no explicit connection with immigration. They are not codified in the immi-
gration laws.").
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number and classes of aliens who may enter or remain in the United
States.
114
Rosberg describes the objective of such statutes at the most general
level: "Most federal classifications based on alienage... are ulti-
mately designed to enhance the economic well-being of members of
the national polity at the expense of outsiders."
5
As Rosberg notes, "[i] t is tempting to say that the goal of enhanc-
ing the economic well-being of citizens at the expense of aliens makes
discrimination 'an end in itself' and is inherently illegitimate."" 6 This
claim, however, would also imply that immigration restrictions are
also suspect, because immigration restrictions by their very nature
discriminate against aliens, supposedly in order to promote the eco-
nomic welfare of citizens. Indeed, Michael Perry argues that the fed-
eral power to discriminate against aliens follows logically from the
federal power to restrict immigration:
Few would take issue with the proposition that the members of a politi-
cal community may appropriately decide whether, to what extent, and
under what conditions persons who are not members may enter the ter-
ritory of the political community and share its resources and largesse.
This... necessarily entails the view that a person, in some respects at
least, is more deserving by virtue of his status as a citizen than a person
who is not a citizen. And this view is inconsistent with the notion that al-
ienage is a morally irrelevant status ....117
To deny that the federal government has the power to discriminate
against aliens is to cast doubt on the federal power to exclude them.
If we accept the federal power to exclude aliens from the United
States entirely, then this power would seem to include less restrictive
forms of discrimination against aliens.
Rosberg asks: "If aliens have no right to enter the United States
and the federal government can exclude them on any remotely rea-
sonable basis, can it not condition their admission on acceptance of
any terms it dictates?"" 8 For example, most nonimmigrants, includ-
ing tourists, are admitted without the right to work in the United
"' T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J.
INT'LL. 862, 869-70 (1989) (footnote omitted).
" Rosberg, supra note 113, at 314-15.
"G Id. at 307 (quoting Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915)) (footnotes omitted).
117 Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisa=4 79
COLUM. L. REV 1023, 1061 (1979).
"8 Rosberg, supra note 113, at 328.
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States; they must accept this condition in order to enter."9 Rosberg
concedes that this condition "is plainly an integral part of the immi-
gration scheme.., debated in terms of its impact on immigration
policy,"2 0 which raises the question: "Is it not possible to say... that
aliens admitted for permanent residence are admitted subject to cer-
tain conditions?"' 2' Nevertheless, Rosberg criticizes the Court's
treatment of the statutory provisions at issue in Mathews v. Diaz, which
"are not part of any bargain between the government and the aliens
who enter," because they "are simply not a part of the congressional
judgment about the classes of aliens that should be admitted to the
United States."'2
Even if Congress did not view the provision in Mathews v. Diaz as
part of its immigration policy, however, current debates over immigra-
tion make it abundantly clear that immigrant access to public enti-
tlements is now understood to be part of immigration policy. 2 3 While
enacting sweeping new restrictions on this access in 1996, Congress
adopted a statement of the "immigration policy of the United States"
that includes the principles that "the availability of public benefits not
constitute an incentive for immigration to the United States" and that
"aliens within the Nation's borders not depend on public resources to
meet their needs." 24 This statement also declares: "It is a compelling
See id. at 329 ("If the term was unacceptable to the nonimmigrant, he should
not have come.").
'" Id. at 335.
121 Id. at 329. As Rosberg notes, however, the conditions on entry must be reason-
able. "Otherwise, the government could impose the most appalling restrictions on
aliens by inducing them to 'accept' these restrictions as the price of admission to the
United States." Id. Rosberg asks for "evidence that the political process has acted
fairly in balancing their interests against the interests of the United States." Id. at 335.
2 Id. at 335-36.
,23 See Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69
N.YU. L. REV. 1047, 1048-54 (1994) (reviewing current efforts to exclude aliens from
various benefits as expressions of anxiety over immigration).
124 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, sec. 400(2), 110 Stat. 2105, 2260 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1601(2)).
The two principles set forth by Congress correspond to two senses in which restric-
tions on public benefits are "characterized by supporters as integral to their broader
immigration restriction program." Bosniak, supra note 123, at 1053. The first princi-
ple illustrates the view that "such measures are ... an indirect means of deterring the
entry... of immigrants." Id.; see EH. Buckley, The Political Economy of Immigration Policies,
16 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 81, 81 (1996) ("Current proposals to cut welfare benefits to re-
cent immigrants might usefully deter unwanted immigrants .... "); Hiroshi Motomura,
Immigration and Alienage, Federalism and Pmposition 187, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 201, 202 (1994)
("Often, the intended and/or actual effect of an alienage rule is to affect immigration
patterns."). In this sense, these measures are instruments of immigration policy as surely
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government interest.., to assure that aliens be self-reliant in accor-
dance with national immigration policy."125
From the perspective of the economic welfare of natives, immi-
grant access to public entitlements is intimately related to immigra-
tion policy, because the fiscal policies applied to any set of immigrants
will determine the economic costs and benefits of allowing their im-
migration. Congress may be inclined to exclude unskilled immi-
grants in the absence of restrictions on immigrant access to public
benefits. 126 In this sense, Congress may deem such restrictions to be
important and necessary conditions attached to the right to immi-
grate.12 ' These considerations suggest that the Court will continue to
subject such restrictions to the same type of deferential review con-
ducted in Mathews v. Diaz.
2
1
J. Citizenship, Guestworkers, and Illegal Immigration
Up to this point, I have analyzed immigration independent of the
issue of naturalization as a U.S. citizen. The possibility of naturaliza-
tion raises the question of whether discrimination against the immi-
grant would cease once the immigrant obtains citizenship. If so, then
immigrants might anticipate citizenship and subsequent access to
as tariffs are instruments of trade policy. The second principle expresses the view that
"the exclusion of aliens from access to various... benefits... properly preserves the
benefits of membership for those deemed to belong within ... the national commu-
nity." Bosniak, supra note 123, at 1053.
2 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, sec. 400(5),
110 Stat. at 2260 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1601 (5)).
'2 See Legomsky, supra note 79, at 1466 ("Liberal benefit rules might induce Con-
gress to think twice before admitting a particular class of immigrants in the first
place.").
127 SeeJohnson, supra note 78, at 1538 ("Some would argue that, in allocating the
scarce privilege of immigrating, it is entirely permissible, indeed advisable, to condi-
tion entry on the potential immigrants' economic self-sufficiency and limit their access
to public benefits once they immigrate."). The nature of a discriminatory tax as a
condition on immigration becomes transparent once it is characterized as a form of
entry fee. For example, Barry Chiswick has proposed that the United States impose an
"annual income tax surcharge" on immigrants as "a voluntary substitute" for a "large
entry fee" that the immigrant could also choose to pay immediately upon admission.
Chiswick, supra note 27, at 309 & n.34.
2 This level of scrutiny need not be as deferential as that applied to other aspects
of immigration policy. See Motomura, supra note 124, at 210 (suggesting that the Diaz
Court did not exhibit the "total judicial deference" seen in other immigration cases).
Nevertheless, discrimination between citizens and aliens in fiscal policies seems likely
to pass muster. See id. at 211 ("If one views alienage as something less than full mem-
bership, the restriction on Medicare benefits in Diaz was just the sort of difference be-
tween citizens and aliens that might seem reasonable.").
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public entitlements. If the period of alienage is too short to permit
the collection of an appropriate tariff, then fiscal policies limited to
aliens may fail to deter all immigration with negative economic im-
pact on natives.
Citizenship, however, need not imply access to public entitle-
ments. Discrimination against immigrants in taxes and public enti-
tlements might continue for some time even after an immigrant natu-
ralizes.'2 One could adjust the duration as well as the extent or
severity of discrimination against immigrants in designing the
"optimal tariff." If immigrants become a significant portion of the
electorate, however, then there may be limits to how long fiscal poli-
cies could discriminate against immigrants.30 Furthermore, such dis-
crimination against immigrant citizens would pose serious constitu-
tional problems.'
Alternatively, we can separate admission to the United States from
access to naturalization. Indeed, under U.S. law, only aliens
"admitted for permanent residence" may naturalize as U.S. citizens.3
Aliens admitted on nonimmigrant visas only, including temporary
workers, are not admitted as permanent residents and are thus not
eligible to naturalize and also not eligible for most public entitle-
ments.' In fact, the United States has in the past regularly admitted
more temporary workers annually than the number of permanent
residents admitted on employment-based visas.TM Countries in West-
12A Republican-sponsored bill, H.R. 4, 104th Cong. (1995), would have excluded
some immigrants from benefits even after they had naturalized as U.S. citizens. See
Senate OKs Welfare Bill with Sweeping Immigration Consequences, 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES
1365 (1995). President Clinton, however, vetoed that welfare bill. See Immigration, Other
Priorities on CongresionalAgenda for 1996,73 INrERPRETERRELEASE S 133, 135 (1996).
"a See Sykes, supra note 7, at 179 ("[D]isadvantaged aliens who become citizens
might well develop the political power to force an increase in payments under such
programs.").
" In Schneiderv. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964), the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a
federal law providing that a naturalized U.S. citizen could lose U.S. citizenship by re-
siding abroad. This law discriminated against naturalized citizens because no such
rule applied to native-born citizens residing abroad. The Court held that such dis-
crimination violated the Fifth Amendment by creating "a second-class citizenship." Id.
at 169; see id. at 165 ("We start from the premise that the rights of citizenship of the
native born and of the naturalized person are of the same dignity and are coexten-
sive."); see also Motomura, supra note 124, at 213-14 ("Constitutional difficulties arise
when disabilities visited on aliens carry over as disabilities that handicap their lives as
citizens .... ").
'32 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1994).
1 See supra note 82.
See Sykes, supra note 7, at 188.
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ern Europe have made heavy use of similar "guestworker" pro-
135grams.
Classes of foreign workers deemed likely to have a negative eco-
nomic impact if treated as citizens can be admitted on nonimmigrant
visas without the same entitlement to citizenship implied by immi-
grant visas. The host country can keep an alien worker in guest-
worker status for as long as it deems necessary to collect the appropri-
ate tariff. The collection of this tariff need not entail permanent
status as an alien: the host country could allow the alien to naturalize
after a sufficient probationary period has passed.I" The appropriate
tariff would at least cover the present discounted value of any net
* costs that we expect the worker to impose on natives after the worker
obtains U.S. citizenship.
Guestworker status may strike some observers as an unjust form of
second-class membership. 3 7 Michael Walzer argues:
Political justice is a bar to permanent alienage-either for particular in-
dividuals or for a class of changing individuals. At least, this is true in a
democracy.... No democratic state can tolerate the establishment of a
fixed status between citizen and foreigner.... Men and women are ei-
ther subject to the state's authority, or they are not; and if they are sub-
ject, they must be given a say, and ultimately an equal say, in what that
authority does. Democratic citizens, then, have a choice: if they want to
bring in new workers, they must be prepared to enlarge their own
membership; if they are unwilling to accept new members, they must
find ways within the limits of the domestic labor market to get socially
necessary work done. And those are their only choices.
38
If Walzer's all-or-nothing choice precludes the use of guestworkers,
however, then his approach is likely to condemn unskilled alien
workers to an even worse fate. If the welfare of natives is the decisive
consideration in formulation of immigration policy as a matter of po-
1 See, e.g., Philip L. Martin, Germany: Reluctant Land of Immigration, in CONTROLUNG
IMMIGRATION: A GLOBAL PERSPECIVE, supra note 93, at 189, 198-210, 217-20 (describing
the history of migrant worker programs in Germany).
"" Nor would a guestworker program produce a hereditary class of alien residents
in the United States, because the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
gives U.S. citizenship to anyone born in the United States, including the children of
nonimmigrants. See supra note 63. Thus, guestworker programs in the United States
cannot create the type of caste society that they might in countries that do not provide
birthright citizenship.
'37 SeeWALZER, supra note 60, at 56-61.
"3 Id. at 61.
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litical reality, then the alternative to guestworker status for most un-
skilled aliens would be exclusion from the United States.' 9
Although a full discussion of "politicaljustice" is outside the scope
of this discussion, which takes the welfare of natives to be our sole ob-
jective, it is important to compare guestworker programs with exclu-
sion (which would be the most likely alternative policy) in light of
these concerns. Exclusion offers no obvious advantage over a guest-
worker program, whether from the standpoint of political justice or
from the perspective of migrant welfare. Like admission under a
guestworker program, exclusion is an exercise of "the state's author-
ity" over aliens, and neither policy offers aliens any say in the formula-
tion of that policy. '  Exclusion discriminates against aliens just as
surely as guestworker status does. If we must choose between these
two forms of discrimination, then we should opt for guestworker
status, because complete exclusion from the United States is the more
severe form of discrimination and inflicts the greater harm on the
alien. The guestworker program at least offers the migrant a choice,
and by choosing to come, the migrant reveals a preference for guest-
worker status in the United States over the alternative of exclusion.' 4'
If guestworker status makes us uneasy, then exclusion should only
make us more so, because it keeps alien workers in a state of poverty
that they would prefer to escape as guestworkers.'42 From a welfare
"9 See SIMON, supra note 39, at 303 ("Being a temporary worker may well be inferior,
and may even seem 'unfair,' compared to full admission as a legal immigrant, but this
simply is not a realistic alternative; to compare a temporary worker program unfavorably
against a non-existent alternative is either thoughtless or dishonest.").
"o Carens concedes that to admit guestworkers without "giving them the opportu-
nity to become citizens" is "incompatible with our liberal democratic principles," but
adds that "so is a restrictive policy on immigration." Carens, supra note 26, at 268.
... See SIMON, supra note 39, at 310 (arguing that if we wish to show respect for the
alien's "human dignity," then "giving people the choice of whether they do or do not wish
to serve as guestworkers seems to be more dignified than deciding for them that serving
as guestworkers would not be good for them"); see also id. at 303 ("Participating in the
program must be better for at least some persons than not participating, or else there
would be no participants in the program."). There seems to be little reason to second-
guess the alien regarding the decision to seek employment as a guestworker. While pa-
ternalistic regulations might be appropriate when we have evidence that individuals will
make irrational choices and we believe the government can make superior choices, it
would be difficult to declare the decision to become a guestworker irrational or harmfil,
given the alternatives that these aliens face.
142 If we think that a guestworker program mistreats the alien, then Julian Simon
responds: "Here we must ask the fundamental practical and moral question: Com-
pared to what:'" Id. at 303. He explains: "Compared to a beautiful world of no bor-
ders and perfect freedom to live with full rights wherever one likes, having both citi-
zens and non-citizens within a country may seem undesirable. But compared to a
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perspective, it would be foolish public policy to exclude the worker
from our labor market as well as from U.S. citizenship, given that ad-
mission as a guestworker would make both the alien worker and U.S.
natives better off.
Furthermore, the alternative in reality, for many migrant workers,
is probably entry as an illegal immigrant. A liberalized guestworker
program would relieve the pressures in the labor market that gener-
ate illegal immigration. In fact, the United States brought in hun-
dreds of thousands of agricultural guestworkers from Mexico annually
for most years of the "bracero" program from 1942 to 1964, and the
decline in admissions of such workers was closely correlated with the
rise in the estimated number of undocumented aliens.
4 3
Legalization of this migration would serve the interests of all par-
ties concerned. The workers would gain from having a legal alterna-
tive to illegal entry and life as an undocumented alien, which leaves
them vulnerable to deportation by the government and to abuse by
employers.'" Illegal immigration implies that the undocumented
alien must bear the costs of evading detection, apprehension, and
deportation by the government. As a result, producers of counterfeit
documents, smugglers, and unscrupulous employers can extract sig-
nificant quota rents from the immigrant.
At the same time, the government must waste scarce law-
enforcement resources on the detection, apprehension, and deporta-
tion of large numbers of undocumented aliens.' 45  A liberalized
guestworker program would also avoid the inefficiencies that private
world in which every country controls who may enter... the comparison may seem
quite different." Id. at 310.
"' Simon concludes: "Experience with the bracero program provides solid evi-
dence that a legal temporary worker program will indeed reduce illegal immigration
.... " Id. at 302 (footnote omitted); see id. at 286 fig.15.1; Hearing on Proposal to Amend
the Immigration and Nationality Act, House Comm. on Education and Labo, Subcomm. on
Labor Standards, 98th Cong., 27-28 tbl.1 (1983) (statement of George F. Sorn); Sykes,
supra note 7, at 189. As Calavita observes, "when the government got out of the busi-
ness of importing braceros .... illegal immigrants replaced the braceros of the past."
Calavita, supra note 15, at 146 (noting that the termination of the bracero program
"turned legal braceros into today's undocumented farm workers").
144 See SIMON, supra note 39, at 303 (arguing that being a guestworker "must be better
than being an illegal; if this is not obvious, then the fact that many Mexicans chose the
bracero program rather than entering illegally should be evidence enough"); Johnson,
supra note 78, at 1544 (noting that given the "threat of deportation" it is not surprising
that "undocumented immigrants historically have been, and continue to be, exploited in
the labor market" (footnote omitted)).
4 See Sykes, supra note 7, at 191 ("These expenditures could be reduced if workers
desiring employment in the United States could enter readily as temporary workers.").
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employers encounter when hiring employees on the black market.46
Furthermore, insofar as a liberalized guestworker program serves as a
substitute for illegal immigration, such a program may increase tax
revenues by improving compliance with tax laws: employers hiring
migrant workers on the black market may also be more prone to
evade taxes than those hiring legal guestworkers.4 4 Through a posi-
tive tariff, the government can collect some share of the value that
immigrants would enjoy as a result of legal status, including quota
rents they would otherwise transfer to forgers, smugglers, and un-
scrupulous employers. Natives would derive more benefit with these
rents going to the public treasury instead, which would allow a reduc-
tion in other taxes.
More skilled immigrants, however, will make positive contribu-
tions to the public sector even when treated as citizens. There would
be little reason from an economic perspective to deny these immi-
grants access to citizenship or to delay their naturalization for a sig-
nificant period of time. On the contrary, because their presence
yields external benefits, it is in the interest of the country of immigra-
tion to promote their immigration and to strengthen their ties to the
host country. Legal status that includes the option of U.S. citizenship
in relatively short order would make our offer more attractive to pro-
spective skilled immigrants and increase the likelihood that they will
stay once they take up residence here. Thus, at least in the case of
skilled immigrants, we can make the offer of citizenship that Walzer
demands and simultaneously further the economic interest of natives.
In fact, the categories of employment-based immigration visas
under U.S. law are largely designed to select particularly skilled or
wealthy immigrants for permanent residence. Quotas for employ-
ment-based immigration allocate most visas to "priority workers,"
which include aliens with "extraordinary ability," "outstanding profes-
sors and researchers," and "multinational executives and managers,"
to "members of the professions holding advanced degrees or aliens of
exceptional ability," and to other "skilled workers" and
145 See id. ("An expansion of the temporary worker program would most likely fa-
cilitate better matching of employer needs with employee skills.... By contrast, when
employers hire illegals, they must search in a potentially thin and possibly clandestine
local market in which worker's [sic] backgrounds, experience, and work histories are
generally unverifiable.").
147 See id. at 192 ("Presently, in cases where employers are willing to hire undocu-
mented workers despite the threat of sanctions, they may also be willing to risk the
consequences of omitting them from the payroll for purposes of the payroll tax and
tax withholding.").
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"professionals.'4 8 The vast majority of employment-based immigrants
enter through these categories.1 4 9 Few unskilled workers can obtain
such visas: of the 140,000 visas allocated to employment-based immi-
gration per year, only 10,000 may go to unskilled workers.' 50
More employment-based visas are available for unskilled workers
who enter as nonimmigrants. Unskilled workers may enter on H-2A
visas as agricultural workers, which are not subject to a quantitative
restriction, or on H-2B visas for workers who come "temporarily to the
United States to perform... temporary service or labor," which are
limited to 66,000 per year.' This "double requirement of
'temporariness' requires the H-2B alien not only to enter temporar-
ily but also to fill a temporary job. Furthermore, both visas are sub-. 153
ject to labor certification requirements. As a result of these re-
quirements, the demand for each of these visas has remained low, but
the liberalization or elimination of these requirements could greatly
increase use of these programs.154
8 U.S.C. § 1153(b) (1)-(3) (1994).
SeeJORDAN COMM'N, supra note 15, at 89 chart 25. Smaller numbers of visas are
available for unskilled workers, see 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(iii), (B) (1994), for
.qualified special immigrants," id. § 1153(b) (4), and for foreign investors, who must in-
vest at least $1 million in a new commercial enterprise that will create at least ten jobs in
the United States, see id. § 1153(b) (5).
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151 (d) (1) (A), 1153 (b) (3) (A) (iii), (B) (1994).
Id. § 1101(a)(15)(H) (ii); see id. § 1184(g)(1)(B).
'52 ALEINIKOFFETAL., supra note 65, at 244.
'-" See8 U.S.C. § 1188(a) (1) (1994); 8 C.ER. § 214.2(h) (6) (iv) (1994).
1 Admissions under H-2B visas has remained below one third of the quota limit in
recent years, and admissions under H-2A visas have been similar. ALEINIKOFF ET AL,
supra note 65, at 244-45. "It is clear, however, that the demand would be much higher but
for the double 'temporariness' requirement." Id. at 245 ("These rules have made it very
difficult to use the H-2B category for certain types of workers-nannies for example."); see
Sykes, supra note 7, at 189 (reporting that "[a]dmissions under the H-2 categories have
been modest in recent years, on the order of 35,000 for the two combined" and explain-
ing that "because of the transaction costs of obtaining a visa coupled with the limited cer-
tifications for labor shortages in the agricultural sector, employers often find that these
visas are not worth the effort to procure"). Sykes argues:
Because all of these worker categories require employer sponsorship, it
is ... difficult to fashion compelling justification for explicit or implicit ceil-
ings (in the form of labor certification and high approval costs) on the num-
ber of admissions. Temporary workers are even less likely than permanent
immigrants to be a net drain on the public sector, given that these workers
pay taxes just like anyone else, federal funds cannot be used to provide them
with public safety net benefits, and their right to remain in the country gen-
erally depends on continuing employment.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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Employment-based immigration of unskilled workers into the
United States has largely taken the form of illegal rather than legal
immigration, with this undocumented population growing by as many
as 300,000 aliens each year."s5 Given that undocumented immigrants
have little access to public entitlements, they may make a positive con-
tribution to public coffers even under current fiscal poIicies.'1 These
considerations suggest that the Pigouvian tariff, which would be suffi-
cient to internalize the external costs of their immigration, may be
well below the prohibitive level. Under a liberalized guestworker pol-
icy without quotas, more unskilled workers would probably enter le-
gally than the few who do so under our current laws, even if we were
to impose the optimal tariff on these guestworkers and continue to
exclude them from most public benefits.
5 7
Under current employment-based immigration policies, the
United States reserves permanent residence, and thus citizenship, for
the skilled and the wealthy. Similarly, the "points system" used in
Canada to evaluate economic immigrants awards points for educa-
tion, vocational skills, and experience, among other criteria, and
thereby screens visa applicants for skills and wealth. 'r As in the
"' See FIX & PASSEL, supra note 24, at 24.
' See SIMON, supra note 39, at 296 ("On balance ... natives exploit illegal immigrants
through the public coffers by taking much more from the illegals in taxes than is spent
on them in public expenditures."); Sykes, supra note 7, at 191 ("[T]here is no clear evi-
dence that undocumented aliens as a group are a net drain on the public treasury once
their contributions to tax revenues are taken into account").
117 The maximization of tariff revenues would militate in favor of keeping the tariff
well below the prohibitive level, especially if the elasticity of the supply of unskilled
immigrant labor implies that "market power" considerations are weak. The degree of
international inequality in wages and the magnitude of illegal immigration into the
United States suggest that a large number of aliens may be willing to enter as guest-
workers even if this required paying a significant tariff. Furthermore, the fact that we
cannot enforce our immigration restrictions perfectly and costlessly would militate in
favor of less discrimination against guestworkers in our tax laws, because discrimina-
tion may induce aliens to immigrate illegally rather than as guestworkers if they can
thereby avoid a positive tariff. Given the phenomenon of illegal immigration, the op-
timal tariff may even be below the Pigouvian level. With taxes below the Pigouvian
level, guestworkers would impose a net external cost on natives, but if illegal immi-
grants have greater net external costs than guestworkers, then tariff reductions may
bring net fiscal benefits by reducing illegal immigration.
s See BORJAs, FRIENDS OR STRANGERS, supra note 36, at 202; Buckley, supra note 124,
at 94-95; Garcfa y Griego, supra note 93, at 126 tbl.4.2; Kubat, supra note 93, at 32 tbl.2.
Canada offers lower pass marks for business immigrants, including entrepreneurs and
aliens with capital to invest. See Buckley, supra note 124, at 95; Kubat, supra note 93, at 31.
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United States, those admitted as immigrants to Canada are eligible to
apply for citizenship after a waiting period.5 9
Given that the optimal tariff may well call for discrimination in fa-
vor of skilled immigrants and against similarly skilled natives, we
might view an offer of citizenship after a short waiting period as an
efficient supplement or alternative to a negative tariff.'60 That is, the
option value of citizenship for the skilled immigrant, whether psychic
or economic, would probably equal or exceed any economic cost to
natives from making this offer. Therefore, an offer of U.S. citizenship
for skilled immigrants after a short waiting period would be an effi-
cient means for improving our offer of employment in the United
States.
K. Family-Based Immigration as a Negative Tariff
Similarly, immigration laws that allow skilled immigrants to peti-
tion for the immigration of their relatives might be viewed as an effi-
cient substitute for an explicit negative tariff. That is, the right to
sponsor relatives for immigration visas on more favorable terms than
they could otherwise obtain may well stimulate skilled immigration at
lower cost to natives than a formal negative tariff designed to be
equally attractive. For example, for family-based immigrants, a coun-
try of immigration might dispense with the requirement of employer
sponsorship applied to employment-based immigrants. In fact, U.S.
immigration laws require employer sponsorship only for employment-
based visas: family-based immigration does not require a petition
from a prospective employer."' The prospect of family reunification
may attract skilled aliens to the United States who would not other-
wise immigrate.
19 The waiting period is only three years in Canada, see Kubat, supra note 93, at 39,
whereas it is generally five years in the United States, see 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1994). An
immigrant who is married to a U.S. citizen may naturalize after only three years in the
United States if they have been "living in marital union" during this period. Id.
§ 1430(a).
160 The optimal policy may entail discrimination against even some skilled immi-
grants who make a positive contribution to the public sector. An offer of citizenship,
however, would not make it impossible to discriminate against immigrants: it would
only limit the period during which we could discriminate; it would not eliminate this
period. If this period is too short to allow us to impose the optimal tariff, then we lose
some tax revenues that we could otherwise have extracted from the immigrant.
161 Evidence of "an offer of prearranged employment," however, may be useful in
avoiding exclusion as an alien likely to become a public charge. See 22 C.ER.
§ 40.41(c) (1996).
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As an additional benefit for the immigrant family, we might also
offer these family-based immigrants permanent residence and access
to citizenship, which would imply nondiscriminatory taxes and access
to public entitlements, even if we might otherwise admit aliens with
similar skills only on nonimmigrant visas and impose a positive tariff
on them. Before Congress enacted new restrictions on immigrant ac-
cess to public entitlements in 1996, the United States generally pro-
vided such access to family-based immigrants even before naturaliza-
tion: as legal permanent resident aliens, they enjoyed formal access
to most of the public entitlements provided to citizens." 2 While the
new restrictions drastically curtail immigrant access to public benefits,
U.S. law continues to provide permanent resident aliens greater ac-
cess to public benefits than that enjoyed by nonimmigrant aliens.
63
Furthermore, as permanent residents, family-based immigrants are
eligible for naturalization as U.S. citizens, and once naturalized, enjoy
the'same fiscal policies applied to U.S. natives. This equal treatment,
even for less skilled immigrants, may be in the economic interest of
natives insofar as skilled aliens contemplating immigration to the
United States take into account the benefits their relatives will enjoy
as family-based immigrants."
In this sense, family-based immigration may act as an implicit
negative tariff. Like an explicit negative tariff, family-based immigra-
tion may reduce the external benefits associated with each individual
skilled immigrant, but as long as the family as a whole does not im-
pose a net cost, family-based immigration may stimulate enough
162 Even before 1996, however, permanent resident aliens had to reside in the
United States for at least five years to become eligible for certain Medicare benefits.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395o(2)(B) (1994). Other statutory provisions in effect imposed im-
portant restrictions on immigrant access to public entitlements for some years after
entry while maintaining such access in theory. See infra notes 168, 176.
163 For a summary of the new restrictions on immigrant access to public benefits,
see supra Part I.G.
164 See BoRJAs, FRIENDS OR STRANGERS, supra note 36, at 188 ("In fact, it isfamilies who
enter the immigration market, compare the various offers, and choose the option that
maximizes the household's economic well-being. Put simply, the family as a whole and
individual members within the household take actions that maximize total family income
.... " (footnote omitted)). Borjas suggests: "Policies that favor the immigration of fami-
lies ... may actually increase the average skills of immigrants." Id. at 191. Borjas finds
some empirical evidence suggesting that family considerations induce more skilled work-
ers to immigrate. He compares the incomes of single immigrant men with those of mar-
ried immigrant men; he also compares the incomes of men who immigrated alone with
those of men who immigrated contemporaneously with relatives. See id. In both cases,
immigrants with more family ties had higher incomes. See id. He infers that "family ties
increase the average skill level of the immigrant flow." Id.
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skilled immigration to be in the economic interest of natives. Fur-
thermore, the presence of a sponsoring relative in the United States
improves the likelihood that the sponsored relatives will integrate
smoothly into the U.S. economy and will thus yield external benefits
for natives rather than costs.'G' Thus, an offer of family-based immi-
gration may be an efficient means to improve our employment offer
to skilled immigrants while maintaining a nondiscriminatory tax sys-
tem. That is, once we account for the congestion costs imposed by
relatives and possible net transfers, the optimal tariff for the skilled
immigrant may go from negative to zero.
We have already seen that it may be efficient to allow even the
least skilled immigrant to bring a spouse and dependent children.
The efficient policy may vary with the wealth of the immigrant, inso-
far as a wealthier immigrant may be willing to pay more for the immi-
gration of a given relative. In the case of a wealthy immigrant, the
economic value of a relative's immigration may be more likely to ex-
ceed the external costs that the relative would impose on natives.
Given that skilled immigrants have higher levels of wealth than un-
skilled immigrants, their willingness to pay for the immigration of
relatives may make it efficient to admit more distant relatives of
skilled immigrants than of unskilled immigrants. If so, it may be op-
timal to allow skilled immigrants to sponsor a wider set of relatives
than unskilled immigrants. Natives can capture some of the resulting
surplus by raising the tariff on the skilled immigrant by enough to
cover any net external costs associated with these sponsored immi-
grants.
Finally, even if family-based immigration were not an economi-
cally efficient incentive for skilled immigrants, it may still be in the
economic interest of natives if political constraints prevent the im-
plementation of an explicit negative tariff. It may be worthwhile to
resort to inefficient policy instruments if the first-best instrument is
politically infeasible. If these inefficient instruments stimulate skilled
immigration, then their benefits may still exceed their costs.
From this perspective, current U.S. laws regarding family-based
immigration appear to be generally consistent with the economic in-
l See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of
the Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, on H.R. 5115 and S. 2104: Reform of
Legal Immigration, 100th Cong. 426 (1988) (statement of Doris Meissner) ("Families
are the facilitators of an immigrant's social, economic and.., political integration and
enhance the immigrant's ability to make a successful transition to the new community
and society.").
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terest of natives. Under current U.S. law, immigrants may petition for
the immigration not only of their spouses and children but ultimately
also of their parents, adult sons and daughters, and siblings. 66 The
United States does not grant temporary workers "permanent resi-
dent" status, however, and so they may not petition for the admission
of the same classes of relatives (either as immigrants or nonimmi-
grants), but they may bring spouses and minor children with them
into the United States as nonimmigrants.' 67
Although an immigrant may have access to some public benefits
after admission to the United States (and full access after naturaliza-
tion), any alien deemed "likely at any time to become a public
charge" may be excluded from admission into the United States.s
Under implementing regulations, consular officers presume an alien
to be ineligible if the alien's expected income falls below poverty
guidelines.9 Consular officers also consider other evidence, includ-
ing the alien's education, skills, and assets, such as real estate, stocks,
and bonds./7 Based on such evidence, consular officers have broad
266 Permanent resident aliens may sponsor their spouses, children (under the age
of 21), unmarried sons, and unmarried daughters for immigrant visas subject to quo-
tas. See8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2) (1994). Once an immigrant naturalizes as a U.S. citizen,
then, like other citizens, the immigrant may sponsor a spouse, children, and parents,
who can obtain immigrant visas available for "immediate relatives" without quantitative
limits. See id. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). All U.S. citizens may also sponsor their "unmarried
sons or daughters," id. § 1153(a)(1), "married sons or married daughters," id. §
1153(a) (3), and "brothers or sisters," id. § 1153(a)(4), for immigrant visas, with each
category subject to quotas.
" See id- § 1101(a)(15)(H).
'68 Id. § 1182(a) (4); see also LEGOMSKY, supra note 95, at 348 ("Over the years, the
public charge provision has become the single most common affirmative substantive ba-
sis for denials of both immigrant and nonimmigrant visas .... " (footnotes omitted));
Study, ConsularDiscretion in the Immigrant Visa-Issuing Process, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 87, 113
(1978) ("The public charge provision ... is responsible for the greatest number of immi-
grant visa refusals. In 1975.... consular officers relied on the public charge provision to
deny visas in almost sixty percent of all refusals." (footnotes omitted)). Furthermore, if
an alien becomes a public charge within five years after entry into the United States as a
result of "causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen since entry," then the alien may be
deported. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (5) (1994).
26 See 22 C.FR. § 40.41(d) (1996) ("An immigrant visa applicant relying solely on
personal income to establish eligibility... who does not demonstrate an annual in-
come above the income poverty guidelines ... shall be presumed ineligible ....").
170 See CARUNER Er AL, supra note 82, at 215 ("The standard applied by the authori-
ties involves an analysis of the totality of the alien's circumstances. Factors that may be
considered include age, health, past and current income, education, and job skills."
(footnote omitted)); James A.R. Nafziger, Review of Visa Denials by Consular Officers, 66
WASH. L. REv. 1, 18 (1991) ("[The controlling question is ... whether, taking account of
his or her total estate and income potential, the applicant can avoid becoming a public
charge." (footnote omitted)). Congress made these factors explicit in the statute in 1996.
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powers to screen out immigrants expected to have a negative effect
on the public treasury. 7 ' This exclusion ground serves to ensure that
family-based immigration as well as employment-based immigration is
likely to have a net positive effect on the economic welfare of na-
tives.' 7 In fact, U.S. Census data indicate that immigrants earn about
the same income per household that natives earn.73 Even before
Congress enacted new restrictions on immigrant access to public
benefits in 1996, the most careful empirical studies indicated that
employment-based and family-based immigrants admitted under our
immigration laws have had a positive effect on the public treasury:
that is, they have paid more in taxes than they have consumed in pub-
lic entitlements.' 74 If the new welfare law has the effects predicted by
See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, sec. 531 (a), 110 Stat. 3009 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. 1182(a) (4) (B) (i)).
171 "All that is required of INS [Immigration and Naturalization Service] and con-
sular officers is that they believe that the person who is seeking permission to enter the
United States is 'likely' to become a public charge at some distant point in the future."
Boswell, supra note 82, at 1483 (footnote omitted) (also noting "the virtual non-
reviewability of the consular officers' decisions").
' In fact, Borjas finds that immigrants tend to sponsor relatives who are even
more skilled than the sponsor: "[E]arly links in the immigration chain actually have
less education and lower wages than subsequent links in the chain." BORJAS, FRIENDS
OR STRANGERS, supra note 36, at 194. "The first link in the immigration chain is not, on
average, the person who is most successful in the labor market, but is in fact the person
who is the least successful." Id at 195. The first link, however, need not be an employ-
ment-based immigrant; those admitted as refugees can also sponsor relatives for immi-
grant visas.
173 In 1990, households with immigrant heads were 8.4% of all households and
received 8.3% of all nonwelfare income in the United States. See Borjas, Economics of
Immigration, supra note 36, at 1705 tbl.15; see also id. at 1705 n.36 ("Even though the typi-
cal immigrant worker earns less than the typical native, immigrants as a group do not
have a disproportionately low share of non-welfare income. This discrepancy is ex-
plained by the fact that immigrants have larger labor force participation rates than na-
tives.").
174 The Urban Institute, for example, concludes that immigrants pay at least $25
billion more in taxes than they impose in social service costs in one year. See FIX &
PASSEL, supra note 24, at 60. This calculation reveals a surplus even though it includes
the costs of public education for immigrant children without including the taxes that
these children are expected to pay in the future. See Sykes, supra note 7, at 175 ("A
proper accounting of the effect of immigrants on natives through ... the public sector
would account for all taxes paid by immigrants over their life span and... all services re-
ceived by them through the public sector over their life span...."). This surplus is also
striking because the calculation includes not only employment-based and family-based
immigrants but also refugees and illegal immigrants, who tend to be less educated and
poorer than employment-based and family-based immigrants. See FIX & PASSE, supra
note 24, at 5, 31, 34. Those seeking admission as refugees are not subject to the "public
charge" exclusion ground. See 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c) (3) (1994). As Michael Fix and Jeffrey
Passel note: "The only major immigrant population eligible to participate broadly in the
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its proponents, then this positive effect on the public treasury will in-
crease: the new restrictions would not only reduce the transfers paid
to individual immigrants but also discourage the immigration of low-
income aliens.'7 5
nation's welfare state from date of entry is refugees." FIX & PASSEL, supra note 24, at 63.
Their data indicate that refugees receive welfare at far higher rates than other immi-
grants. See id. at 65 fig.21; see also id. at 58 ("When refugees are excluded, it becomes clear
that immigrants of working age are considerably less likely than natives of working age to
receive welfare.").
On the other hand, the Urban Institute's estimate does not include any imputa-
tions for congestion externalities for public goods like roads. George Borjas performs
a "back-of-the-envelope calculation" suggesting that immigrants (including refugees
and illegal immigrants) imposed a net cost of $16.2 billion on the public sector in
1990, but only after assuming that the marginal cost of providing all government serv-
ices is equal to the average cost of those services. Borjas, Economics of Immigration, supra
note 36, at 1707; see id. at 1706 tbl.16. This assumption is inappropriate for many gov-
emment services, such as national defense, which are pure public goods: the marginal
cost of providing these services to an immigrant is zero. In 1990, the federal government
spent over $299 billion on national defense, the single largest expenditure identified by
the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, accounting for 24% of federal outlays. See
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1993, at 332
tbl.514 (113th ed. 1993). Bojas implicitly assumes that immigrants caused these defense
outlays to rise in proportion to their 8% share of the population, see Borjas, Economics of
Immigration, supra note 36, at 1705 tbl.15, costing about $24 billion. Thus, excluding na-
tional defense alone from the Borjas calculation changes the net cost to a net benefit.
Furthermore, Borjas arrives at his figure by assuming a low tax yield (30%) from
immigrant's nonwelfare income. See id. at 1706 tbl.16. Given the similarity in income
per household between immigrants and natives, there is no apparent reason to assume
a much greater tax yield from natives than from immigrants. See id. at 1705 ("In 1990,
immigrants received 8.3 percent of all non-welfare income (about the same as their
population proportion)."). Using the figures Borjas provides and applying the same
assumptions and the same procedure to the nonwelfare income of natives indicates
that natives impose a net cost of over $73 billion on the public sector. The Borjas pro-
cedure applied to any group is biased in favor of finding a net cost, in part because
government revenues failed to cover expenditures in 1990 (as is often the case). See
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supa, at 292 tbl.467. The burden of this government debt is
passed forward to future generations of taxpayers, which include the descendants of im-
migrants as well as the descendants of those who are currently natives. Furthermore, it is
hard to see how the low revenue figures Borjas uses can produce the $2 trillion in reve-
nue actually collected in 1990 to pay for the expenditures that Borjas expects to finance.
See id. Nevertheless, he repeatedly cites this "$16 billion net loss" figure, Borjas, supra
note 35, at 9, claiming that "immigrants impose a $16 billion annual burden on native
taxpayers," Borjas, supra note 53, at 77.
'75 See Robert Pear, Clinton to Sign Welfare Bill that Ends U.S. Aid Guarantee and Gives
States Broad Power, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 1, 1996, at Al (reporting that the welfare bill is ex-
pected to save $55 billion over six years); Lena H. Sun, Legal Immigrants Will Face
Harsher Welfare Deadlines, Advocacy Groups Say, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1996, at A8
(estimating that nearly 40% of the savings under the welfare bill would come from de-
nying aid to immigrants). But see infra note 178 (suggesting that the new restrictions
may also discourage some skilled immigration).
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To avoid the "public charge" exclusion ground, sponsoring rela-
tives have often provided affidavits of support and evidence of their
own incomes in order to gain the admission of the sponsored alien.
7 6
Thus, when the sponsored alien has had a low income, the income of
the sponsor would become relevant: this exclusion ground has in ef-
fect limited the right to sponsor low-income relatives to those peti-
tioners with adequate levels of income. In short, the "public charge"
provision has served to ensure not only that family-based immigrants
impose little burden on the public sector but also that the formal
right to petition for low-income family members is likely to prove
valuable in effect only for immigrants with relatively high incomes.'
7 7
176 See, e.g., Kohama, 17 1. & N. Dec. 257 (1978); see also CARUNERETAL, supra note
82, at 215 ("Aliens with income below the poverty guidelines may still avoid exclusion on
public charge grounds by submitting affidavits of support from persons who undertake a
moral obligation to support the alien."). Furthermore, the income and assets of a spon-
sor signing any affidavit of support are generally deemed to be available to the alien
beneficiary for a certain number of years after entry when determining the eligibility of
the alien for certain public entitlements. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 615(a) (deeming for five years
for Aid to Families with Dependent Children), 1382j(a) (1994) (deeming for three years
for Supplemental Security Income); 7 U.S.C. § 2014(i) (1994) (deeming for three years
for food stamps). Thus, affidavits of support will render otherwise eligible aliens ineligi-
ble for public benefits. Both houses of Congress passed immigration bills in 1996 that
would have extended "deeming" to all federal means-tested programs. See House Approves
Immigration Bill After Removing Legal Immigration Restrictions, supra note 22, at 354; Senate
Approves Omnibus Immigration Bill After Removing Exclusion Provisions, supra note 22, at 608.
These bills would have also extended the "deeming" period, in general applying
"deeming" until the applicant obtains U.S. citizenship. See Immigration Bills Head to House-
Senate Conference; Battles Over Particulars Loom, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 678, 680 (1996).
Faced with opposition from the Clinton administration, however, Republicans in Con-
gress deleted these "deeming" provisions from the immigration bill eventually enacted.
' Canada allows an independent (self-supporting) immigrant, either as a perma-
nent resident or as a citizen, to sponsor an even wider set of relatives than possible
under U.S. law, but also places weight on economic criteria. Independent immigrants
can bring not only their spouses and unmarried minor children but also grandparents.
The sponsor must agree to sign an undertaking of support and be capable of support-
ing these sponsored relatives as dependents. See Kubat, supra note 93, at 29-30. An
immigrant may also nominate other relatives-not only brothers, sisters, sons, and
daughters, but also more distant relatives, including uncles, aunts, nephews, nieces,
grandsons, and granddaughters-as "assisted relatives" if the nominating immigrant is
able to support them so that they do not become public charges. See id. at 29-31; Legal
Immigration Refom Proposals: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 104th Cong., 154, 160 (1995) (prepared
statement ofJohn Guendelsberger). Sponsorship of any relative "requires an annual
income above the poverty level and a pledge that the sponsored [relative] will not re-
ceive welfare or government health services for five years after entry." Id. Canada
evaluates assisted relatives as independent immigrants under a "point system," but
awards them bonus points for their status as assisted relatives, and still more points if
accompanied by an undertaking of assistance, which enables them to pass with lower
scores on economic criteria, such as education, specific vocational preparation, expe-
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Consequently, the availability of these family-based visas serves as an
incentive for skilled aliens in particular to choose to accept employ-
ment and residence in the United States.'78
In 1996, Congress imposed still more stringent requirements for
family sponsorship that will further limit access to these visas and will
tend to reserve them for sponsors with relatively high incomes. The
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
requires virtually all family-based immigrants to submit an affidavit of
support.' An affidavit of support must now be a contract enforce-
able against the sponsor not only by the sponsored alien but also by a
federal, state, or local agency seeking reimbursement for benefits
provided to the sponsored alien under a means-tested entitlement
program.8 The affidavit must bind the sponsor "to provide support
to maintain the sponsored alien at an annual income that is not less
than 125 percent of the Federal poverty line.".. The sponsor must
rience, and arranged employment. See id. at 160-61; Garcia y Griego, supra note 93, at
126 tbl.4.2; Kubat, supra note 93, at 32 tbl.2.
178 To the extent a skilled alien anticipates sponsorship of low-income relatives for
immigration to the United States, any public entitlements the sponsored relatives an-
ticipate may function as vicarious or indirect subsidies for the skilled sponsor. Indeed,
as Congress recently reduced immigrant access to public entitlements, see supra Part
I.G, it explicitly sought to shift the burden of supporting needy immigrants from the
public sector to sponsoring relatives. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportu-
nity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, sec. 400(2) (A), 110 Stat. 2105,
2260 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1601(2) (A)) (stating that aliens should "not depend
on public resources to meet their needs, but rather rely on their own capabilities and
the resources of their families, their sponsors, and private organizations"). By reduc-
ing the indirect subsidy (that is, the implicit negative tariff) for skilled sponsors, how-
ever, these new rules may reduce the incentives for skilled immigration, and thus
could be contrary to the national economic interest.
17 The new law states that any alien seeking admission as a family-based immi-
grant, with only very narrow exceptions, is excludable unless the alien's sponsor exe-
cutes an affidavit of support. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Respon-
sibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, sec. 531(a), § 212(a) (4) (C), 9B U.S.C.C.A.N.
(110 Stat. 3009) 1570, 1779 (Nov. 1996) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (4) (C)).
"a See id. sec. 551(a), § 213A, 9B U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 3009) at 1780 (to be codi-
fied 8 U.S.C. § 1183a). Furthermore, under welfare legislation enacted by Congress
that same year, if the immigrant beneficiary of such an affidavit later applies for "any
Federal means-tested public benefits," then the immigrant's income and resources
shall be "deemed" to include the income and resources of the sponsor, until the bene-
ficiary either obtains U.S. citizenship or has worked for a sufficient period of time ("40
qualifying quarters"). Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act, sec. 421, 110 Stat. at 2270 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1631). Thus, "deeming"
will render otherwise eligible immigrants ineligible for public benefits.
'8' Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, sec. 551(a),
§ 213A(a) (1) (A), 9B U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat. 3009) at 1781 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1183a(a) (1) (A)).
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demonstrate "the means to maintain" at least this level of income for
"a family unit of a size equal to the number of members of the spon-
sor's household (including family and non-family dependents) plus
the total number of other dependents and aliens sponsored by that
sponsor."1s2 To meet this requirement, a sponsor must provide certi-
fied copies of the sponsor's federal income tax returns for three183
years. These requirements will not only improve still further the ef-
fect of family-based immigrants on public coffers but also deter or
preclude those of modest means from sponsoring relatives for immi-
184gration. These requirements also ensure that the availability of fam-
ily-based immigration visas will prove most valuable for the immi-
grants with the most wealth, because the number of relatives an
immigrant can sponsor will be directly related to the immigrant's
wealth.
Although restrictionists have proposed drastic cuts in family-based
immigration, citing the national interest,"'5 these cuts may in fact re-
duce the economic welfare of natives by reducing the incentives for
skilled immigration and by excluding valuable workers and taxpayers.
Indeed, given the alternative of qualitative restrictions like the "public
charge" exclusion ground as a device for regulating immigration, it is
doubtful that quantitative restrictions on family-based immigration
serve a useful purpose at all in the pursuit of national economic wel-
... Id. § 213A(f)(1)(E), (6) (A) (iii), 9B U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 3009) at 1785, 1787
(to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(f) (1) (E), (6)(A)(iii)). The law allows a sponsor
who fails to meet this requirement to recruit another sponsor who can satisfy the re-
quirement by accepting joint and several liability. Id. § 213A(f)(2), (5), 9B
U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat. 3009) at 1785-86 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1183(f) (2), (5)).
This legal liability, however, is likely to deter all but the closest relatives from serving as
sponsors.
"3 Id. § 213A(f) (6) (A) (i), 9B U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat. 3009) at 1786 (to be codified
at 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(f) (6) (A) (i)).
184 Preliminary research sponsored by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
found that 30% of those who sponsored relatives for immigration in 1994 had incomes
below the new standard. See Celia W. Dugger, Immigrant Study Finds Many Below New
Income Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1997, § 1, at 1. Another study by the Urban Institute
found that 40% of immigrant families and 26% of natives in the United States in 1993
had incomes below the new standard. See id.
'85 Vernon Briggs, for example, has proposed elimination of the visa category for
siblings of U.S. citizens and significant reductions in the other family-based categories.
See BRIGGS, supra note 29, at 247. Similarly, the Jordan Commission recommended the
complete elimination of most family-based admission categories, including not only sib-
lings of U.S. citizens but also adult sons and daughters of U.S. citizens and of legal per-
manent residents. SeeJORDAN COMM'N, supra note 15, at 70-71. The Smith and Simpson
bills sought to implement these recommendations. See H.R 2202, 104th Cong. (1995); S.
1394, 104th Cong. (1995).
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fare. Liberalization or elimination of these quotas would probably
serve the interest of natives better than cuts in these quotas.'
L. Distributive Justice
The policies described above would maximize the total economic
benefits for natives from immigration. While I have addressed how to
maximize the total wealth of natives, I have not addressed the distri-
bution of that wealth among natives. Immigration not only expands
wealth, but also can have important distributive effects.
Those natives who must compete with immigrants in the labor
market may find that immigration reduces their real income. Em-
pirical studies, however, consistently find that immigration has only a
weak effect on native wages.Is7 On the other hand, even if present
levels of immigration have little effect on real wages in the United
States, a more liberal immigration policy could produce significant
effects.""8 Thus, much of the support for immigration restriction is
186 Michael Trebilcock criticizes the use of "total intake numbers or caps on cate-
gories of immigrants... largely plucked out of the air," arguing:
[I]f we collectively support the admission of close relatives of existing citizens
or permanent residents, we should simply let them in, with minimum re-
quirements pertaining to health and security checks, and so on, particularly
if, through family sponsorship, newly admitted family members must look for
a substantial period of time principally to their families for assistance, and not
to noncontributory public assistance programs ....
Michael J. Trebilcock, The Casefor a Liberal Immigration Policy, inJUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION,
supra note 7, at 219, 239; see id. at 242 ("I reemphasize my opposition to arbitrary caps on
the total immigrant intake or on categories of applicants within the total intake. If input
criteria are designed and applied sensibly, we should live with whatever numeric out-
comes emerge in administering these input criteria."); see alsoJohn Guendelsberger, Im-
plementing Family Unification Rights in American Immigration Law: Proposed Amendments, 25
SAN DIEGO L RE. 253, 254 (1988) (arguing that "national interests could be protected by
means which do not impede family unity" and that "Congress should eliminate the nu-
merical ceilings on entry of the spouses and minor children of permanent resident ali-
ens").
187 "Despite the popular belief that immigrants have a large adverse impact on the
wages and employment opportunities of the native-born population, the literature on
this question does not provide much support for this conclusion." Friedberg & Hunt,
supra note 102, at 42. "Even those natives who should be the closest substitutes with
immigrant labor have not been found to suffer significantly as a result of increased
immigration." Id.; see Borjas, Economics ofImmigration, supra note 36, at 1697 (surveying
the empirical studies and observing a "numerically weak relationship between native
wages and immigration ... across all types of native workers, white or black, skilled or un-
skilled, male or female").
"s Borjas claims: "Ironically, even though the debate over immigration policy
views the possibility that immigrants lower the wage of native workers as a harmful
consequence of immigration, the economic benefits from immigration arise only
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protectionist in nature: restrictionists often cite the need to protect
U.S. workers from foreign competition."" The requirement of labor
certification, in particular, is designed to ensure that immigrants do
not "take jobs away" from U.S. workers or drive down their wages.
Protectionist policies in the immigration context, however, are in-
appropriate in much the same way that they are inappropriate in the
context of international trade in goods. Standard trade theory pre-
dicts that trade along the lines of comparative advantage with nations
more abundant in labor than the United States will reduce the real
wages of U.S. workers." This distributive effect, however, is not suffi-
cientjustification for protectionism.
If we wish to protect workers from these distributive effects, the
appropriate response is not protectionism but redistribution. Opti-
when immigrants do lower the wage of native workers." Borjas, supra note 35, at 10-11.
This claim, however, refers only to the immigration surplus enjoyed by natives through
the private sector in labor markets with native workers. If only immigrant workers find
certain jobs worth taking, then natives can gain from immigration in these markets
without driving down the wages of any native workers. Furthermore, if immigrants
generate a benefit for the public sector in the form of tax revenues, then natives can
gain from immigration even if there is no effect on wages at all.
Borjas estimates that the "immigration surplus" enjoyed by the private sector in the
United States is "relatively small" ($7 billion per year), based on labor demand elastic-
ity estimates suggesting that a 10% increase in the labor supply would reduce wages by
only 3%. Id. at 7. This calculation, however, assumes that the domestic labor supply is
perfectly inelastic, so that it estimates only the benefits of the "consumption effect" on
the demand side from lower wages, not the benefits associated with the "production
effect" on the supply side. See id. at 6 n.2. Furthermore, higher levels of immigration
would bring a more than proportionate increase in the immigration surplus because
the marginal benefits of immigration increase with the quantity of immigration: more
of the decline in domestic wages comes at the expense of immigrant workers rather
than natives. Therefore, we would expect a more liberal policy to produce much
larger benefits for natives. Finally, this calculation does not include the role of the
public sector: taxes can greatly increase the benefit to natives from a given amount of
immigration by capturing some of the (much larger) gains from trade enjoyed by im-
migrants as quota rents. If immigration exerts only mild downward pressure on wages,
then these quota rents would be especially large.
89 See ECONOMIc REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 4, at 222 ("Arguments sup-
porting the restriction of immigration to protect American jobs are similar to those favor-
ing protectionism in international trade .... ").
,0o The standard Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade assumes two coun-
tries with the same technology and consumer tastes, but different endowments of two
factors of production. For example, countries may differ in their endowments of capi-
tal and labor, such that their capital/labor ratios are different. Residents in each
country consume two goods, one more labor intensive, the other more capital inten-
sive. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem predicts that opening trade between these two
countries will cause the real wage to fall in the capital-abundant country. See, e.g.,
CAVES & JONES, supra note 43, at 108-17 (presenting the Heckscher-Ohlin model and
concluding with the Stolper-Samuelson theorem).
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mal policies would liberalize both trade and immigration insofar as
they increase the total wealth of natives. As long as these policies in-
crease total wealth, then those who gain from these policies can com-
pensate those who lose and still be better off. That is, those who gain
by paying lower wages, or by buying products and services at lower
cost, can afford to pay enough to compensate those whose wages fall
relative to prices. Redistributive policies can shift the costs of liberal-
ized trade and immigration to the beneficiaries of liberalization.
This redistribution would produce some costly distortions, but the
deadweight loss of protectionism would be greater than the dead-
weight loss from redistributive taxes. That is, protectionism is less ef-
ficient than the tax system in producing a desirable distribution of in-
come. Steven Shavell and Louis Kaplow have shown that we can
always replace an economically inefficient rule with an efficient rule
without making any income class worse off, provided that we make
the appropriate adjustments in income taxes. '9' For example, if the
immigration of guestworkers reduces the wages of unskilled workers,
then raising taxes on those with higher incomes and reducing taxes
on those with the lowest can leave all classes of natives better off thant,. • • • 392
they would be in the absence of immigration. We can achieve this
redistribution by expanding programs already in use under the exist-
ing U.S. income tax system: we could increase the earned income tax
credit and liberalize its eligibility requirements, for example, to sup-
plement the income of the working poor if liberalized immigration
drives down their real wages. We can thereby reduce deadweight loss
while still redistributing the same wealth that we currently redistrib-
ute through costly protectionism.
'9' See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the
Income Tax in Redistributinglncome 23J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 669 (1994) ("[Elven though the
income tax distorts work incentives, any regime with an inefficient legal rule can be re-
placed by a regime with an efficient legal rule and a modified income tax system de-
signed so that every person is made better off."); Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vs.
Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking. Should Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal
Income Taxation , 71 AM. ECON. RE. PAPERS & PROC. 414 (1981). As Kaplow and Shavell
explain, "using legal rules to redistribute income distorts work incentives fully as much as
the income tax system-because the distortion is caused by the redistribution itself-and
also creates inefficiencies in the activities regulated by the legal rules." Kaplow & Shavell,
supra, at 667-68.
'2 See Chiswick, supra note 104, at 107 ("Through taxes and transfers some of the
gains of high-skilled workers and the owners of capital can be transferred to low-skilled
native workers to make all natives at least as well off as before the low-skilled migra-
tion.").
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To maximize the welfare of natives, the United States would ex-
clude immigrants from these redistributive programs. Otherwise, the
transfers to immigrants could dissipate the economic gains to natives.
In fact, excluding immigrants from transfers would be necessary if we
are to ensure that each class of natives gains.9 3 Exclusion from trans-
fers, however, is consistent with the immigration tariff described
above. Indeed, if we admit unskilled workers as nonimmigrants, then
the tariff on their labor could take the form of an income tax credit
available only to citizens and legal permanent resident aliens, com-
bined with an otherwise nondiscriminatory income tax system.
Economists have suggested immigration, international trade, and
technological progress as possible causes of the growing inequality in
income in the United States. 4 Such an effect, however, is no more
an argument for restricting immigration or international trade than it
is an argument for policies designed to reduce the pace of innova-
tion. As long as a policy increases national wealth, it can (when com-
bined with appropriate fiscal policies) make all economic classes of
natives better off.
M. Preferences for the Ethnic Status Quo
Some support for immigration restrictions seems to derive from
fear of (or distaste for) foreigners, especially foreigners of minority
'9' See id. ("Suppose ... the income transfer system ... treats immigrants and na-
tives equally.... [T]he inclusion of low-skilled aliens in the income transfer system
means that a Pareto optimal transfer cannot take place. Thus, low-skilled immigration
can make the native population as a whole worse off.").
[I]f immigrants are not included in the income transfer system, the increase
in the aggregate income of the native population means that appropriate in-
come redistribution policies can be devised to transfer some income from the
native groups that gain, to the native groups that lose, so that no native group
loses from the immigration. The welfare and tax systems can be the mecha-
nism for this transfer. This cannot be accomplished, however, if the immi-
grants themselves are to be substantial recipients of income transfers ....
Chiswick, supra note 27, at 304; see Krauss & Baumol, supra note 27, at 37 ("[A]ny at-
tempt to improve the welfare of domestic workers (for whom guest workers are perfect
substitutes) is likely to prove futile if the benefits are extended to all workers. ").
104 See, e.g., Gary Burtless, International Trade and the Rise in Earnings Inequality, 33 J.
ECON. LrERATJRE 800 (1995) (surveying the literature addressing whether international
trade or technological change is the primary cause of rising inequality in the United
States and other industrialized countries); GeorgeJ. Bojas et al., On the Labor Market Ef-
fects of Immigration and Tra4 in IMMIGRATION AND THE WORK FORCE, supra note 61, at 213
(estimating the share of the decline in the relative wages of high-school dropouts during
the 1980s that can be attributed to immigration and international trade).
LIBERALIZED IMMIGRA TION AS FREE TRADE
races or ethnic groups.'95 The nativist Peter Brimelow, for example, is
quite explicit in his expressions of alarm regarding the racial com-
plexion of the immigrant stream into the United States.16 One could
count the satisfaction of these xenophobic or racist preferences as
part of the economic welfare of natives. Immigrants might be
thought to generate a negative externality insofar as they erode the
"public good" of ethnic purity consumed by racists and xenophobes.
Even if we were to count this "public good" as economic value, how-
ever, it need not follow that this value should receive any weight as a
normative matter in the formulation of public policy. In choosing be-
tween alternative policies, we may therefore exclude them from our
measure of social welfare on ethical grounds:
Utilitarians disagree about whether all pleasures (or desires or interests)
are to count or only some.... Should a white racist's unhappiness at the
prospect of associating with people of color be counted in the calculus
of utility as an argument in favor of racial exclusion as reflected, say, in
the White Australia policy? What about the desire to preserve a distinc-
tive local culture as a reason for restricting immigration?
19
7
We may deem these preferences as morally "illegitimate," in the sense
that they are not legitimate grounds for imposing costs on other citi-
zens.'9 ' It is telling that we normally reject such preferences asjustifi-
cation for racial discrimination in the domestic context, at least when
the government excludes racial minorities from important opportuni-
ties. These preferences would also seem problematic as justifications
for immigration restrictions. Although a full discussion of these is-
sues is beyond the scope of this paper, an examination of the analogy
between racial segregation and immigration restrictions serves to il-
lustrate the issues raised.
'95 SeeJohnson, supra note 4, at 947 ("[T]here often is a racist core to the restric-
tionist demand."); see also id. at 948 ("The current negative reaction toward illegal
(and often legal) immigration is fueled at least in part by the increasing number of
immigrants of color coming to the United States from developing nations.").
'9 See PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA'S IM-
MIGRATION DISASTER 58-73 (1995) (describing white America as caught between the
"pincers" of Hispanic and Asian immigration).
197 Carens, supra note 26, at 263-64.
"3 See Thomas M. Scanlon, The Moral Basis of Interpersonal Comparisons, in INTER-
PERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING 17, 28 (Jon Elster &John E. Roemer eds., 1991)
("The reasons ... for excluding... 'antisocial' preferences... do not assert that the ful-
fillment of these preferences is not good for the individuals in question. All that is as-
serted is that these preferences 'have no claim on us'-that is, on society-for their ful-
fillment.").
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To take one example of a theory of illegitimate preferences, con-
sider Ronald Dworkin's distinction between two types of preferences:
"the preferences of an individual for the consequences of a particular
policy may be seen to reflect.., either a personal preference for his
own enjoyment of some goods or opportunities, or an external prefer-
ence for the assignment of goods and opportunities to others, or
both."' 99 He illustrates the distinction in the context of a law school
that excludes blacks: "A white law school candidate might have a per-
sonal preference for the consequences of segregation, for example,
because the policy improves his own chances of success, or an exter-
nal preference for those consequences because he has contempt for
blacks and disapproves social situations in which the races mix."0 0
Similarly, we may distinguish the desire for protection from foreign
competition and xenophobia as distinct bases for immigration barri-
ers.
Dworkin argues that a utilitarian calculus of social welfare should
exclude external preferences:
If a utilitarian argument counts external preferences along with per-
sonal preferences, then the egalitarian character of that argument is
corrupted, because the chance that anyone's preferences have to suc-
ceed will then depend, not only on the demands that the personal pref-
erences of others make on scarce resources, but on the respect or affec-
tion they have for him or for his way of life. If external preferences tip
the balance, then the fact that a policy makes the community better off
in a utilitarian sense would not provide a justification compatible with
201
the right of those it disadvantages to be treated as equals.
By similar reasoning, xenophobic and racist preferences cannot jus-
tify immigration restrictions any more than they can justify racial seg-
regation in the domestic context.
The nativist may object that aliens are not entitled to equal treat-
ment.2 0 2 Given that the very notion of maximizing the economic wel-
fare of natives through immigration policies relies on the legitimacy
of putting their interests before the interests of aliens, let us accept
this premise for the purposes of this discussion. Nevertheless,
199 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTs SERIOUSLY 234 (1977).
2'0Id. at 234-35.
202 Id. at 235.
22 Dworkin, after all, describes the egalitarian character of utilitarianism with re-
spect to citizens. "the utilitarian argument not only respects, but embodies, the right of
each citizen to be treated as the equal of any other." Id. at 234; see id. at 236 ("That
theory owes much of its popularity to the assumption that it embodies the right of citi-
zens to be treated as equals.").
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Dworkin's objection to external preferences still applies in the immi-
gration context. Immigration restrictions harm not only aliens but
also citizens. Those citizens whose personal preferences are satisfied
by immigration would suffer if we were to give weight to the external
203preferences of racist or xenophobic citizens. This outcome would
be incompatible with the egalitarianism described by Dworkin, be-
cause racist or ethnocentric preferences are incompatible with the
right of all citizens to equal concern and respect, regardless of race or
ethnicity.'" Similarly, xenophobia-the fear or hatred of foreigners
and foreign culture-is inconsistent with equal concern and respect
for citizens who may share the cultural traits that the xenophobe finds
disagreeable.
05
Nativists may respond that their preference is neither racist nor
xenophobic, but simply a matter of personal taste. Perhaps the nativ-
ist simply prefers to be surrounded by others who share the same cul-
ture and the same values, and fears becoming surrounded by those
who seem foreign and unfamiliar. But can we distinguish this associa-
203 Similarly, mandatory racial segregation in the domestic context harms individu-
als of all races. In Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917), the Supreme Court struck
down a law preventing blacks from buying homes in white neighborhoods, in order to
protect the right of a white plaintiff to enforce a contract for the sale of a house to "a
person of color." Id. at 81 (vindicating "the right of a white man to dispose of his
property if he saw fit to do so to a person of color").
24 Rosberg argues that the exclusion of aliens from the United States on the basis
of race or national origin should be subject to strictjudicial scrutiny,
not because of the injury to the aliens denied admission, but rather because
of the injury to American citizens of the same race or national origin who are
stigmatized by the classification. When Congress declares that aliens of Chi-
nese or Irish or Polish origin are excludable on the grounds of ancestry
alone, it fixes a badge of opprobrium on citizens of the same ancestry ... Ex-
cept when necessary to protect a compelling interest, Congress cannot im-
plement a policy that has the effect of labeling some group of citizens as infe-
rior to others because of their race or national origin.
Rosberg, supra note 113, at 327. The restriction of immigration in general, however,
has the same stigmatizing effect when the restriction is justified as an indirect means
of achieving the same invidious objective: controlling the population of disfavored
ethnic groups.
205 The right of citizens to be treated as equals, however, does not rule out all
forms of discrimination. As Dworkin notes, admission to law school based on intelli-
gence, for example, "relies... upon the law school's own judgment, right or wrong,
that intelligent lawyers are more effective in satisfying personal preferences of others,
such as the preference for wealth or winning law suits." DWORKIN, supra note 199, at
238. Similarly, an immigration policy may legitimately discriminate among aliens based
on their skills. Nor would the exclusion of external preferences rule out discrimination
against aliens as long as that discrimination could be justified on the basis of personal
preferences. The preceding economic analysis, for example, has presented a case for an
immigration tariff without relying on external preferences.
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tional preference from intolerance-the desire not to encounter
those who are different? Would the desire of residents to maintain a
white neighborhood, because they prefer its homogeneous culture or
simply value the familiar status quo, justify either laws to exclude
blacks or judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants?
' 0
Would we accept these associational preferences as a justification for
the exclusion of ethnic minorities from a law school?
07
Furthermore, it is unclear whether such associational preferences
can provide much support for immigration restrictions. The less re-
strictive means for addressing these concerns would be voluntary pri-
vate discrimination against immigrants or segregation mandated at
See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment prohibits states from enforcing racially restrictive covenants); Buchanan v. War-
ley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits laws that
forbid blacks to reside in white neighborhoods). Would we consider such covenants
or laws any more acceptable if they excluded aliens rather than racial minorities from
local communities? Why should the same intolerant impulse to exclude be any more
legitimate when the exclusion is on a national scale rather than at the local level?
,0' Again, Dworkin's objections to segregation apply readily to immigration restric-
tions:
Sometimes personal and external preferences are so inextricably tied to-
gether, and so mutually dependent, that no practical test for measuring pref-
erences will be able to discriminate the personal and external elements in any
individual's overall preference. That is especially true when preferences are
affected by prejudice. Consider, for example, the associational preference of
a white law student for white classmates. This may be said to be a personal
preference for.., one kind of colleague rather than another. But it is a per-
sonal preference that is parasitic upon external preferences: except in very
rare cases a white student prefers the company of other whites because he has
racist.., convictions, or because he has contempt for blacks as a group. If
these associational preferences are counted in a utilitarian argument used to
justify segregation, then the egalitarian character of the argument is de-
stroyed just as if the underlying external preferences were counted di-
rectly.... In any community in which prejudice against a particular minority
is strong, then the personal preferences upon which a utilitarian argument
must fix will be saturated with that prejudice; it follows that in such a commu-
nity no utilitarian argument purporting to justify a disadvantage to that mi-
nority can be fair.
DWORKIN, supra note 199, at 236-37; seeMark Tushnet, Immigration Policy in Liberal Political
Theory, injusTICE IN IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 147, 157 n.20 ("[T]he value-based ex-
clusion might serve as a mask for a race-based exclusion: we might say that some people
are 'not like us' because of their values when we really believe that they are 'not like us'
because of their race.");Johnson, supra note 78, at 1543 ("Great difficulties in attempting
to separate legitimate from illegitimate concerns exist because of, among other things,
the unconscious nature of much racism in U.S. society." (footnote omitted)); see also
Charles R. Lawrence III, The d the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (arguing that unconscious racism is ubiquitous and
should be taken into account in identifying invidious racial discrimination).
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the local level. Yet we normally reject associational preferences as a
justification for such discrimination against minorities. If we would
reject such associational preferences as a reason to exclude immi-
grants from local schools or neighborhoods, then why should we ac-
cept them as a reason to exclude them from an entire country, where
the claim of impact on one's personal associational interests seems far
more remote and tenuous?
Although we often allow private clubs to discriminate, in defer-
ence to their associational interests, we usually reject such discrimina-
tion when mandated by the state .21 Even if we identify legitimate as-
sociational interests that do not derive from intolerance, it seems
difficult to explain why we must protect these interests through dis-
crimination mandated by the government on a national scale rather
than through less restrictive voluntary discrimination in the private
sphere.21 ' What legitimate reason can there be for preferring ethnic
or cultural homogeneity on a national scale?
Nativists may base their preference for an ethnically homogenous
nation not on prejudice or associational preferences but on fears that
a more multiracial society would lead to ethnic strife and instability. '
These types of concerns, however, are also problematic, because they
may also be parasitic upon racism and xenophobia. We ordinarily re-
ject these concerns as justifications for compulsory racial segregation
in the domestic context. As Dworkin explains:
m Carens notes the "deep tension between the right of freedom of association
and the right to treatment" and suggests that "in the private sphere freedom of equal
association prevails and in the public sphere equal treatment does." Carens, supra
note 26, at 267. He observes that "it is clear that clubs are normally at one end of the
scale and states at the other" and concludes: "When the state acts it must treat indi-
viduals equally." Id. at 268; see WALZER, supra note 60, at 45 ("[A]dmission to a country
does not entail the kinds of intimacy that could hardly be avoided in the case of clubs and
families."); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration, Equality, and Diversity, 31 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 319, 331 (1993) ("[T]here would seem to be even less room for govern-
mental favoritism toward particular ethnic groups than for analogous private sector favor-
itism.").
See WALZER, supra note 60, at 44 ("Perhaps we should insist upon open countries
and permit closure only in non-territorial groups. Open neighborhoods together with
closed clubs and families: that is the structure of domestic society. Why can't it, why
shouldn't it be extended to the global society?").
210 See, e.g., BRIMELOW, supra note 196, at 123-33, 207.
2 In Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917), the Supreme Court struck down a law
forbidding blacks to occupy homes in white neighborhoods, rejecting the justification
"that this proposed segregation will promote the public peace by preventing race con-
flicts." Id. at 81.
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It does not matter•., whether external preferences figure in the jus-
tification of a fundamental policy or in the justification of derivative
policies designed to advance a more fundamental policy. Suppose Texas
justifies segregation by pointing to the apparently neutral economic pol-
icy of increasing community wealth, which satisfies the personal prefer-
ences of everyone for better homes, food, and recreation. If the argu-
ment that segregation will improve community wealth depends upon
the fact of external preference; if the argument notices, for example,
that because of prejudice industry will run more efficiently if factories
are segregated; then the argument has the consequence that the black
man's personal preferences are defeated by what others think of him."'
Similarly, because of the racism or xenophobia of natives, society
might function less well if it becomes more diverse. This concern,
however, is troubling as a reason to exclude immigrants, because it
allows racism and xenophobia to override more legitimate prefer-
ences: to base our immigration laws on these concerns gives effect to
113racist and xenophobic preferences for ethnic purity.
Nativists also raise general concerns about the cultural conse-
quences of immigration, worrying about the cultural traits of immi-
grant groups and their implications for economic success.2" We may
worry, however, that these arguments are often tainted by prejudice.2 1 5
Bias against foreigners is widespread enough that we should regard
with suspicion claims regarding the adverse effects of immigration on
the national culture.1
212 DWORKIN, supra note 199, at 237.
21s In Palmare v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), the Supreme Court held that a state
cannot deny a divorced mother custody of her child on the basis of her interracial re-
marriage, even if the persistence of racial prejudice in society implies that "a child liv-
ing with a stepparent of a different race may be subject to a variety of pressures and
stresses not present if the child were living with parents of the same racial or ethnic
origin." Id. at 433. The Court stressed: "Private biases may be outside the reach of the
law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect." Id.
211 See, e.g., BRIMELOW, supra note 196, at 178-81.
215 Jody Armour notes that "[t]he tendency of individuals to credit only those sta-
tistics and images which confirm their preexisting biases exacerbates ... irrational in-
fluences" such as "cultural stereotypes" and "racial antagonisms." Jody D. Armour, Race
Ipsa Loquitur Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negmophobes, 46
STAN. L. REV. 781, 791 (1994). Thus, Armour worries that "factfinders will inevitably ex-
aggerate the weight properly accorded to" facts that are consistent with these prior biases.
Id.
216 Again, Dworkin's comments on race are instructive:
Utilitarian arguments that justify a disadvantage to members of a race against
whom prejudice runs will always be unfair arguments, unless it can be shown
that the same disadvantage would have been justified in the absence of the
prejudice. If the prejudice is widespread and pervasive, as in fact it is in the
case of blacks, that can never be shown.
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Suppose, however, that we identify preferences for the ethnic or
cultural status quo that would survive in the hypothetical absence of
intolerance. Perhaps we can have equal regard for those of all races
and nationalities, but still prize an ethnically homogeneous nation for
its own sake, not out of intolerance. We may prefer the ethnic status
quo because we value the existing national culture and want to pre-
vent change in its values. For example, Walzer defends the power of
"the sovereign state.., to make its own admissions policy, to control
and sometimes restrain the flow of immigrants" on the basis of com-
munitarian values: "The distinctiveness of cultures and groups de-
pends upon closure .... If this distinctiveness is a value, as most peo-
ple... seem to believe, then closure must be permitted
somewhere.
2 1 7
We might nevertheless deem it inappropriate to give weight to the
preferences of some citizens for a particular national culture in a
utilitarian calculation of costs and benefits.21 Indeed, in a society like
DWORKIN, supra note 199, at 237.
227 WALZER, supra note 60, at 39. Walzer explains that we should prefer government
regulation at the national level over closure on a more local level, because "individual
choice is most dependent upon local mobility" and we should therefore prefer "local
communities ... determined solely by personal preference and market capacity." Id. Yet
we observe that in U.S. cities with large immigrant populations, different ethnic groups
readily form their own communities without any government regulation. This phe-
nomenon suggests that we would hardly need to restrict local mobility to ensure the sur-
vival of neighborhoods with distinctive cultures. These communities, however, would not
be permanent enough to satisfy Walzer. "Neighborhoods might maintain some cohesive
culture for a generation or two on a voluntary basis, but people would move in, people
would move out; soon the cohesion would be gone." Id. For Walzer, it seems important
that these communities not only remain distinct but also persist indefinitely in the same
geographic space.
2'8 Dworkin's objection, for example, may apply to such cultural preferences. His
concept of external preferences is broader than the concept of racist preferences. For
example, Dworkin includes "moralistic" preferences as external preferences. If some
"think that the theater is immoral and ought to be repressed," Dworkin argues that
these preferences should also be excluded from consideration in the formulation of
public policy: "If the moralistic preferences are counted .... actors and audiences will
suffer because their preferences are held in lower respect by citizens whose personal
preferences are not themselves engaged." DWORKIN, supra note 199, at 235. Similarly, a
preference that "homosexuality should be repressed," even if based on sincere moral be-
liefs rather than prejudice, would also be an external preference that Dworkin would ex-
clude from consideration. Id. at 236. John Harsanyi makes a similar distinction between
"personal preferences" and "moral preferences." John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory
of Rational Behaviour, in UTILTARIANISM AND BEYOND 39, 47 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Wil-
liams eds., 1982).
Dworkin also considers "political theories that are themselves contrary to utilitari-
anism" to be external preferences that a utilitarian should exclude: "If utilitarianism
counts these political preferences at face value, then it will be, from the standpoint of
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the United States, with a commitment to equal treatment and respect
for different individual conceptions of the good, it may be difficult to
justify immigration restrictions on the basis of preferences of some
citizens for a particular national culture while still remaining faithful
219to these liberal principles. Mark Tushnet takes the United States to
be an exemplary liberal state, "constituted by commitments to liberal
toleration."2° He observes that "limitations on entry attempt to pre-
serve the existing distribution of values in a society, in a way inconsis-
tent with a liberal state's commitment to the possibility of revising its
own values as the values of its members change."2' Tushnet con-
cludes that "[t]here is therefore no principled reason to object to the
transformation of the polity that will occur when those with different
values enter."2 As the U.S. Supreme Court once stated, "[i]f there is
any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
personal preferences, self-defeating, because the [outcome] will then not be, from
that standpoint, utilitarian at all." DWORKIN, supra note 199, at 235. Bernard Williams
also argues that a utilitarian should not count prejudices or moral preferences, for they
may be irrational from a utilitarian point of view. See Bernard Williams, A Cyitique of Utili-
tarianism in J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR & AGAINST 75,
104-06 (1973).
'19 As Michael Sandel observes, "[t]he public philosophy of contemporary Ameri-
can politics is a version of this liberal tradition of thought," which holds that
"government should be neutral toward the moral and religious views its citizens es-
pouse" and "should not affirm in law any particular vision of the good life." MICHAELJ.
SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 4-5
(1996).
= Tushnet, supra note 207, at 154.
2' Id. at 153; see id. at 154 ("[V]alue-based exclusions assume that the values consti-
tuting a polity are fixed, yet that assumption seems unfounded and arguably inconsis-
tent with liberalism's basic commitments."); see alsoJost Delbrfick, Global Migration-
Immigration-Multiethnicity: Challenges to the Concept of the Nation-State, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 45, 62 (1994) (setting forth the ideal of the "Open Republic," which would
accept "citizens of different ethnic, religious or cultural backgrounds" and would feature
"tolerance, respect for others being differen and the readiness of each person to let herself or
himself be enriched in her or his own personal development by the social diversity
around her or him").
= Tushnet, supra note 207, at 155 (footnote omitted). Tushnet adds, however,
"the qualification that the community must satisfy minimum norms of political jus-
tice-the 'no tyranny' requirement." Id. at 157 n.25. Similarly, Bruce Ackerman con-
cludes that the only legitimate reason for a liberal state to restrict immigration is to
protect the liberal state itself. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIALJUSTICE IN.THE LIBERAL
STATE 95 (1980) ("The only reason for restricting immigration is to protect the ongoing
process of liberal conversation itself. Can our present immigration practices be rational-
ized on this ground?").
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high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, na-
tionalism, religion, or other matters of opinion."2
Moreover, preferences for the ethnic status quo would only imply
an upward adjustment in the optimal tariff,22' unless we are prepared
to discriminate explicitly on the basis of ethnicity.2 We could, for ex-
ample, return to the infamous "national origins" quota system that
the United States used to regulate immigration from 1921 to 1965-a
quota system heavily biased in favor of immigration from Northern
and Western Europe and against immigration from elsewhere. In
fact, a Senate report defended this system in 1950 as "a rational and
logical method of... restricting immigration in such a manner as to
best preserve the sociological and cultural balance in the population
of the United States." 226 It was our recognition of the illegitimacy of
our preferences for particular ethnic groups, however, that motivated
Congress in 1965 to eliminate this quota system.2 7 If cultural con-
cerns could not justify policies so closely tailored to maintaining the
ethnic status quo, then how can they be any more acceptable as a rea-
son to restrict immigration generally?22 8
Finally, any legitimate preferences for the ethnic status quo would
have to be weighed against the countervailing preferences of those
who favor a more diverse, multicultural society.229 From this perspec-tive, it is unclear whether a utilitarian calculus would suggest that
West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (striking down
a compulsory flag salute as unconstitutional).
22 The optimal tariff would be raised to reflect the "external cost" imposed on na-
tives by the alien's race, ethnicity, or culture. The resulting quantity of immigration
would be an optimum that takes this "negative externality" into account.
2 Peter Brimelow, for example, suggests that U.S. immigration policy discriminate
explicitly on the basis of national origin, asking: "Isn't honesty the best policy?"
BRIMELOW, supra note 196, at 261. As a presidential candidate in 1992, Patrick Buchanan
cited cultural concerns as a reason to distinguish between immigrants based on national
origin: "[I]f we had to take a million immigrants in say, Zulus, next year, or Englishmen,
and put them up in Virginia, what group would be easier to assimilate and would cause
less problems for the people of Virginia?" Douglas Jehl, Buchanan Raises Specter of Intoler-
ance, Citics Say, L.A. TIMiES, Mar. 17, 1992, atAl.
226 S. RE. NO. 81-1515, at 455 (1950).
See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR- CIVIL RIGHTS
ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION 11 (1980) ("The national origins immigration quota system gen-
erated opposition from the time of its inception, condemned for its attempts to maintain
the existing racial composition of the United States.").
22s See supra note 204.
229 See, e.g., Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism-
Addressing the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in an Immigration-Driven Multiracial Society, 81
CAL L. REV. 863,869-70 (1993) (articulating a model of cultural pluralism as an ideal for
the United States).
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immigration on balance produces a public good or a public bad.230 As
Joseph Carens concludes in his defense of open borders:
Open immigration would change the character of the community but it
would not leave the community without any character. It might destroy
old ways of life, highly valued by some, but it would make possible new
ways of life, highly valued by others. The whites in Forsythe County who
want to keep out blacks are trying to preserve a way of life that is valu-
able to them.... [C]onstraining the kinds of choices that people and
communities may make is what principles of justice are for.... To
commit ourselves to open borders would not be to abandon the idea of
communal character but to reaffirm it. It would be an affirmation of the
liberal character of the community and of its commitment to principles
ofjustice.2s 1
Especially given the ugly role that racism and xenophobia have played
in the formulation of U.S. immigration policies in the past, we should
be reluctant to endorse preferences for the ethnic or cultural status
232
quo as ajustification for our current restrictions.
The nativist may respond that our moral intuitions regarding ra-
cial segregation are misleading when applied to the immigration con-
text. Perhaps some legitimate interests do support racial segregation
in theory, but we reject racial discrimination in the domestic context
because the costs to the victims of discrimination outweigh those
benefits, not because the benefits are wholly illegitimate. The immi-
gration context is different because the primary victim of immigra-
tion restrictions (the alien) is not entitled to equal concern in the
eyes of the nativist. The nativist discounts the interests of the immi-
2W We cannot rely on the political process to reveal which set of legitimate prefer-
ences dominates, because people may express illegitimate preferences as well as le-
gitimate preferences for the ethnic status quo when they support immigration restric-
tions.
23' Carens, supra note 26, at 271.
232 See Tushnet, supra note 207, at 150 ("A more realistic view, informed by the his-
tory of immigration policy, would be more skeptical about such policy. Rather than
admirable efforts to... preserve morally valuable communities, present immigration
practices seem racist and ethnocentric."). Michael Trebilcock criticizes Walzer's com-
munitarian justification for immigration restrictions:
I see no role at all for variables relating to applicants' ethnic or cultural back-
grounds, despite efforts by Walzer and others to justify exclusions on grounds
of preserving cultural homogeneity-they are not like us." This form of
communitarianism has been invoked in the past to justify some of the most
egregious forms of racial and religious discrimination in the history of Can-
ada and the United States.
Trebilcock, supra note 186, at 240 (footnote omitted); see U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, supra note 227, at 7-12 (reviewing the history of discrimination in U.S. immigra-
tion policies).
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grant and can thereby distinguish immigration restrictions from dis-
crimination among natives.
The problem with this logic, however, is that it would justify per-
vasive discrimination against immigrants by local governments, pri-
vate employers, and other parties in the domestic context. Our moral
intuitions regarding such discrimination suggest that we do not re-
gard preferences for ethnic or cultural purity to be legitimate justifi-
cations for discrimination against immigrants, either because such
preferences are illegitimate or because the welfare of immigrants
outweighs these interests. That is, our moral intuitions regarding dis-
crimination in the domestic context also raise the question: is it ap-
propriate either to ignore or to discount the welfare of aliens? Thus,
the analogy between immigration restrictions and racial segregation
challenges the morality of the nativist premise itself.23 In the re-
mainder of this Article, I relax the nativist assumption and consider
the welfare of aliens. The objections to racist, ethnocentric, and
xenophobic reasons to restrict immigration apply with still greater
force once we include the welfare of aliens among our objectives.
II. CONCERN FOR THE WELFARE OF IMMIGRANTS
The policies described above, which include discriminatory and
regressive taxes imposed on our poorest immigrants, may seem offen-
sive because we do not truly believe that the welfare of immigrants
should count for nothing. The preceding analysis assumed a nativist
measure of social welfare: our objectives included only the welfare of
natives. This assumption may be unjustifiably indifferent to the wel-
fare of immigrantsY 4 We can instead take a broader view of "national
economic welfare" that includes the welfare of immigrants.2 5 If our
23 Carens concedes that "the requirement of equal treatment applies fully only to
those who are already members of the community," but only "as a description of prac-
tice." Carens, supra note 26, at 268. For Carens, "the question is why it should be so."
Id.
d See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Just Borders: Normative Economics and Immigration Law,
inJUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION, supra note 7, at 201, 204 ("A social welfare function defined
over original residents presumes rather than demonstrates that original residents are the
people among whom resources should be distributed.... [T]his is obviously inadequate
as a contribution to the normative debate about ethically defensible policy with respect to
immigration.").
See Bhagwati & Srinivasan, supra note 27, at 212 ("[O]nce labour crosses na-
tional borders, we have to worry about which country's welfare it ought to be included
in.... [W]e need.., to consider the possibility that it may be regarded, after immigra-
tion, to be part of one's own welfare."). Bhagwati and Srinivasan analyze optimal poli-
cies from the perspective of national economic welfare, first "where welfare of immi-
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objectives also include the welfare of immigrants, however, then the
optimal policies are still likely to entail more immigration than our
laws currently allow. Indeed, if we care enough about the welfare of
immigrants, then we would also impose lower taxes on poor immi-
grants and offer them greater access to public entitlements than
would otherwise be optimal.
A. The Optimal Tariff
To the extent that immigrants are objects of our concern, their
needs may militate in favor of lower tariffs. The force of "market
power" considerations diminishes insofar as we consider the tax bur-
den on immigrants to be a social cost. Concern for the welfare of
immigrants militates against taxes designed to drive down their after-
tax wages. Therefore, to the extent that the supply of immigrant la-
bor is inelastic, so that the incidence of the tariff falls on immigrants,
concern for immigrant welfare will militate in favor of lower tariffs.
We would choose to extract less tax revenue from each immigrant
than we would otherwise, in order to comply with moral principles
that prevent us from ignoring the welfare of others.
On the other hand, it is also possible that concern for immigrants
could militate in favor of higher tariffs. If we include the welfare of
immigrants in our measure of social welfare, then we would modify
our measure of external congestion costs of immigration to include
the costs imposed on other immigrants as well as those imposed on
natives. To the extent that the welfare of immigrants is a matter of
concern, so are the congestion costs that they bear when we admit
additional immigrants. To the extent that immigrants make up a sig-
nificant portion of the total resident population, this concern will im-
ply a larger positive Pigouvian component of the optimal tariff.
The net effect of these two countervailing effects will in general
216be ambiguous. If concern for the welfare of immigrants cuts on
grant labour is considered part of only foreign welfare," then discussing "the com-
plexities introduced in the case when this cannot be assumed." Id. at 212-13.
If congestion costs loom large relative to "market power" considerations as
components of the optimal tariff, then it is possible for that tariff to rise as we attach
greater weight to the welfare of immigrants. If the supply of immigrant labor were
perfectly elastic, for example, then immigrants would not bear the burden of tariffs.
Only the effect on congestion costs would exist, and concern for immigrants would
militate unambiguously in favor of higher tariffs.
For relatively affluent immigrants, both effects are likely to be relatively small.
Congestion costs are likely to be a relatively minor consideration in the determination
of the optimal tariff. Whereas the other components of the optimal tariff would tend
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balance in favor of lower tariffs on immigrants, then it becomes more
likely that negative tariffs are optimal for skilled immigrants. These
negative tariffs would increase in absolute value, and they would
probably apply to a larger and less affluent class of immigrants. For
unskilled workers, we may reduce tariffs and extend public entitle-
ments beyond what the collective self-interest of natives would dictate.
Positive tariffs would decrease and would apply to a smaller and
poorer class of immigrants. As the optimal tariff falls below the level
that maximizes the economic welfare of natives, we transfer wealth
from natives to immigrants. To some extent, however, we would be
willing to pay this price to satisfy our altruistic preferences for the wel-
fare of immigrants or to comply with principles ofjustice.
If tariffs fall, then immigration would expand. As long as taxes
remain above Pigouvian levels, however, the marginal immigrant
would still make a net positive contribution to the public sector.
Therefore, expansion in immigration would be in the interests of
those already in the host country-both natives and inframarginal
immigrants-as well as in the interest of the marginal immigrant.
Because taxes above Pigouvian levels distort immigration below the
level that would maximize the welfare of those already in the host
country, this expansion in immigration counts as a benefit of tariff
reduction rather than a cost.
On the other hand, if concern for the welfare of immigrants cuts
in favor of higher rather than lower tariffs, then immigration would
fall below the level that would be optimal for natives. Natives would
gain more revenue from those who still choose to immigrate, but
higher tariffs would deter valuable immigration that would confer still
greater benefits on natives. We sacrifice these benefits in order to
spare prior immigrants the congestion costs that more immigrants
would impose on them.
In either case, if our social welfare criteria include considerations
of distributive justice as well as efficiency, it may become optimal to
set taxes below Pigouvian levels for some immigrants. If we extend
considerations of vertical equity to immigrants as well as natives, and
we give sufficient weight to the welfare of immigrants, then it may be
optimal to set taxes at such levels for the poorest immigrants, for
to increase in proportion with income, the congestion costs imposed by an immigrant
would probably fall as a proportion of income. On the other hand, "market power"
considerations are also likely to be unimportant for affluent immigrants. Given that
even natives in such high income classes are subject to high taxes, there will be little
reason to add an additional tariff on similar immigrants.
1997] 1223
1224 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 145:1147
whom these taxes would be most burdensome. 7 Taxes this low, how-
ever, would imply that the marginal immigrant would impose a net
cost on the public sector. This migration would be in the self-interest
of the marginal immigrant, but not in the self-interest of those al-
ready resident in the host country. These more generous policies
would induce immigration above levels that would maximize the eco-
nomic wealth of host-country residents. Indeed, immigration at this
level would be inefficient in that it would reduce the wealth of cur-
rent residents by more than it would increase the wealth of the addi-
tional immigrants. Immigration at this level would entail an effi-
ciency cost rather than confer a net benefit.
To some degree, however, principles of distributive justice would
require us to bear these costs, or we may be willing to bear them out
of an altruistic desire to improve the welfare of poor immigrants.
Even with respect to natives, after all, redistributive policies have effi-
ciency costs because in general they distort incentives to work and
save. Why should some inefficient migration be any less tolerable
than these other costs?
238
Nevertheless, the problem of excess immigration of poor aliens
would be a reason to make tax and transfer policies less generous
than would otherwise be optimal. For example, in the limit, we may
extend to aliens the same concern that we extend to natives. Equal
concern, however, need not imply equal tax treatment. Even if we
give equal weight to the welfare of aliens and of natives, optimal tax
considerations may call for different tax rates. If the supply of immi-
grant labor is more elastic than the supply of similarly skilled native
labor, then a given tax or subsidy would cause a greater distortion in
the supply of immigrant labor than in the supply of native labor. That
is, a given tax or subsidy for immigrants would entail greater social
237 Taxes below the Pigouvian level may be optimal even if the optimal tariff rises
rather than falls with increasing concern for the welfare of immigrants. Because the
Pigouvian component of the optimal tariff rises with increasing concern for the wel-
fare of immigrants, it may rise above the optimal tariff even if the optimal tariff itself
also rises. That is, the other components of the optimal tariff will fall, and with suffi-
cient weight for the welfare of immigrants, these other components will become nega-
tive for sufficiently poor immigrants.
Arthur Okun describes the tradeoff between equality and efficiency with the
metaphor of a leaky bucket. See ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALrrY AND EFFICIENCY. THE BIG
TRADEOFF 91-106 (1975). Redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor always oc-
curs with leakage, because it always entails some efficiency costs. A government con-
cerned with both equality and efficiency would choose to transfer wealth only until it be-
comes too costly to transfer more. Inefficient immigration would be one more example
of an efficiency cost of redistributive policies.
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costs than the same policy applied to native workers, because the pol-
icy would distort the immigration decision. Therefore, the optimal
tax on immigrants would still tend to be smaller than the optimal tax
on natives, and the optimal subsidy for poor immigrants would still
tend to be smaller than the optimal subsidy for poor natives.
B. The Optimal Quota
The foregoing discussion, however, excluded quantitative restric-
tions from consideration. Once our objectives include a desire to re-
distribute wealth to poor immigrants, so that some immigration ex-
ceeds the efficient level (which would maximize host-country wealth),
then immigration quotas can play a useful role, but only because they
permit more generous treatment of immigrants. In particular, immi-
gration ceilings enable the host country to offer poor immigrants
more generous fiscal policies without inducing excessive levels of
immigration in these income classes.3 9 Once a dollar in the hands of
a poor immigrant produces more social welfare than it would in the
public sector, then we may prefer quotas over tariffs as a means of
regulating immigration levels, because quantitative restrictions leave
quota rents in the hands of immigrants rather than extracting them
as tax revenue.
If we extend equal concern to immigrants and natives, for exam-
ple, then the optimal policy would generally apply nondiscriminatory
fiscal policies to immigrants but impose quantitative restrictions on
some immigration. If we do not wish to discriminate against these
immigrants, then we can also offer them access to citizenship consis-
tent with our preferences regarding redistributive policies. As long as
the policies we wish to apply to immigrants are sufficiently similar to
those we wish to apply to natives, we may also allow aliens to immi-
grate with a legal status that implies access to citizenship within a
short period of time. Quotas, however, would be justified only for
those classes of immigrants that impose a net burden on the public
sector.
Given a measure of social welfare that includes the welfare of im-
migrants, what would be the optimal immigration quota? One candi-
date might be the quantity of immigration that would emerge under a
29 The host country would also like to impose floors on the immigration of affluent
immigrants, because they would permit the government to impose higher taxes with-
out distorting such immigration below optimal levels. It is not possible, however, to
force people to immigrate.
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Pigouvian tax. That level of immigration would be efficient: that is, it
would equate the marginal benefits and marginal costs of immigra-
tion and thereby maximize the wealth of host-country residents. It
would exclude all immigration that would be inefficient from the per-
spective of national economic welfare.
This immigration quota would be quite liberal: it would be high
enough to exhaust the gains from trade (net of external costs). We
would permit so much immigration that foreign wages would rise to
the point where no more immigrants would be willing to immigrate if
subject to a Pigouvian tax. Given the large international differences
in wages created by current immigration policies, the efficient level of
immigration for the United States is likely to be higher than existing
immigration quotas permit.
On the other hand, if fiscal policies are in fact more generous
than a Pigouvian tax would be, then the marginal immigrant at the
Pigouvian level of immigration would impose a net burden on the
public sector without paying offsetting taxes and would have a nega-
tive effect on the wealth of other host-country residents. Given this
effect on incumbent residents, one might think that a more restrictive
quota would be appropriate. Such a conclusion, however, would be
perverse, because the only justification for immigration quotas in the
first place is to allow for policies more generous towards poor immi-
grants than a Pigouvian tax. If concern for the welfare of these immi-
grants motivates these generous policies, then it would be perverse to
exclude the very immigrants whose welfare we would seek to improve
through such policies.
It would be incoherent public policy to turn away the marginal
immigrant, citing a negative effect on the welfare of current residents,
given that we always have the option of permitting immigration sub-
ject to a Pigouvian tax. This option would improve the welfare of the
marginal immigrant and the welfare of current residents. It would
also transform the marginal immigrant into a resident, however, and
if our social welfare criterion includes the welfare of all residents,
then the same distributive concerns that justified generous policies
for other residents would seemingly apply to the marginal immigrant
as well. In short, no measure of social welfare that counts an individ-
ual's welfare if and only if the individual is a resident can provide a
coherent criterion for the optimal immigration policy, because that
policy determines the identity of the population of residents.
If we exclude the potential immigrant because we anticipate the
transfers that we would make to that immigrant after admission, then
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we produce an anomaly: the potential immigrant would be better off
if we never cared about that immigrant's welfare. To avoid this anom-
aly, we must consider the welfare of an alien to be morally relevant
not only after admitting the alien but also in deciding whether to ad-
mit that alien in the first place. Thus, the only coherent welfare crite-
rion would consider the welfare of the potential immigrant in setting
the immigration quota, not just the welfare of current residents (that
is, natives and inframarginal immigrants). No other criterion would
be consistent with the underlying rationale for immigration quotas. If
we consider the welfare of the potential immigrant, however, then the
optimal quota will be even more liberal than the quota equivalent to a
Pigouvian tax.
Although the Pigouvian immigration level would be efficient
from the perspective of national economic welfare, this perspective
neglects considerations of distributive justice. To maximize social
welfare, defined to include distributive concerns and the welfare of
the potential immigrant as well as the welfare of current residents, we
would choose higher levels of immigration. If we include the welfare
of the potential immigrant as a component of social welfare, then we
would increase the quota until the efficiency costs are too large rela-
tive to the increase in the marginal immigrant's welfare. At the Pig-
ouvian quantity of immigration, the marginal immigrant would enjoy
a large gain from immigrating, given fiscal policies more generous
than a Pigouvian tax. The marginal immigrant's gain would also rep-
resent a large (first-order) gain in social welfare. One additional im-
migrant would distort immigration only a small amount above effi-
cient levels, and so would impose only a small (second-order) social
welfare loss. As we allow more immigration, wages abroad would rise
and the gain to the marginal immigrant from migration would there-
fore fall. Meanwhile, the efficiency costs would grow larger at higher
levels of immigration. We would raise the immigration quota until
the gain to the marginal immigrant no longer justified the efficiency
cost. 24 That is, the optimal quota would be liberal enough to ensure
that the aliens excluded would suffer relatively little economic harm
from exclusion. This quota would probably entail significantly more
immigration than our laws currently allow, given that our welfare cri-
240 The optimal immigration quota, however, would still bind. The equilibrium
level of immigration in the absence of quantitative restrictions would be excessive.
The gain to the last immigrant would be small (second-order), but the corresponding
efficiency cost would be large (first-order). Therefore, it would be optimal to restrict
immigration below the equilibrium level.
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terion would include special concern for increasing the wealth of
poor immigrants as well as poor natives.
C. The Optimal Allocation of Visas Subject to Quotas
Any binding immigration quota also raises the issue of allocating
the immigration visas. Among the many who would be willing to im-
migrate on such favorable terms, who should receive these scarce vi-
sas? Given the excess demand for these visas, what would be the op-
timal criteria for deciding which aliens to admit?
First, the classes of immigrants subject to quantitative restriction
would include all immigrants poor enough to impose a net burden
on the public sector. To the extent that this category includes differ-
ent classes of immigrant labor, including some more skilled than oth-
ers, then the optimal mix of immigrants would generally include
some immigrants from each class. That is, the optimal quota for each
class would be determined by the type of social-welfare cost-benefit
analysis set forth above, including distributive concerns that give spe-
cial weight to increases in wealth for the poorest immigrants. If these
various quotas are set optimally, then there is no reason to allocate all
these quota-restricted visas to one particular class of immigrant labor
instead. In particular, there is no presumption that all visas should
necessarily go to the immigrants with the highest skill levels.24'
Second, within each class of labor, one would expect each poten-
tial immigrant to have roughly the same economic impact on incum-
bent residents. Yet there would still be excess demand for visas and
thus a need to distinguish among potential immigrants within each
class. From the perspective of social welfare, it would be optimal to
allocate these visas to those immigrants who would gain the most
from immigration. In this regard, refugees or relatives of current
2 1 Contrast this policy with that suggested by Bordas, supra note 35, at 12-19. Borjas
assumes implicitly that an overall quota on total immigration is fixed, applies to all
classes of labor, and binds regardless of how these visas are allocated among classes.
Boras suggests that to maximize the welfare of natives, the United States should allo-
cate the visas subject to this quota to skilled immigrants rather than unskilled immi-
grants. The analysis in Part II of this paper considers the welfare of immigrants as well
as the welfare of natives and assumes that we can set quotas at optimal levels. The op-
timal policy would not impose any quotas on the most skilled immigrants. It would
impose quotas on the least skilled immigrants, but these quotas would be generous
enough to exhaust all gains from trade (net of external costs) and would also reflect
considerations of distributive justice. Thus, optimal quotas would in general be liberal
enough to include a variety of skill levels within the classes of labor that are subject to
immigration quotas.
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residents have special claims to immigration based on the special
benefits their immigration produces. 24 The refugee escapes persecu-
tion and thus enjoys benefits beyond those produced by the immigra-
tion of other aliens with similar skills. Family-based immigration pro-
duces the psychic benefits associated with the reunification of
families, enjoyed by both the immigrant and the resident sponsor.
Thus, we may offer immigration visas to relatives of immigrants not
only to further the economic interests of natives but also for reasons
other than economic self-interest.243 Concern for the welfare of im-
migrants militates in favor of giving priority to refugees and family-
based immigrants in the allocation of visas subject to quotas.
III. GLOBAL ECONOMIC WELFARE
The preceding analysis considered the welfare of each potential
immigrant in deciding whether to admit that immigrant, but did not
consider the effects of admitting that immigrant on those aliens left
behind in foreign countries. If we are concerned about the welfare of
not only natives but also aliens, including potential immigrants, how-
ever, then why limit this concern to immigrants? What about the wel-
fare effects of each admission on foreign public coffers or on partici-
pants in labor markets abroad?
We might take a more cosmopolitan view of the appropriate wel-
fare objective. 244 Consider the theory of justice developed by John
Rawls, who asks what principles people would choose behind a "veil of
ignorance.",45 In this "original position," people know nothing about
242 Sykes describes these benefits from the perspective of national welfare, even
excluding the gains enjoyed by the immigrant: "Family reunification affords substan-
tial psychic benefits to existing residents, and entry for refugees allows existing resi-
dents the satisfaction of an altruistic policy... [T]he immigration of family members
and refugees confers more benefit upon other residents than the immigration of indi-
viduals in neither category, other things being equal." Sykes, supra note 7, at 183.
243 As discussed above, we may provide immigrants with the right to sponsor rela-
tives for immigration as a policy to encourage the immigration of skilled aliens. These
aliens may be reluctant to migrate without these relatives, or they may simply consider
the right to sponsor a relative to be an attractive benefit. The immigration of these
skilled immigrants may be valuable enough to warrant immigration visas for their rela-
tives.
24 See, e.g., Hadfield, supra note 234, at 205 ("If economists are to participate in the
normative debate over immigration ... there can be no starting point other than a
global social welfare function. Only a welfare function in which everyone at least po-
tentially counts avoids the question begging raised by a national social welfare func-
tion.").
245 SeeJOHN RAWLS, A THEORYOFJUSTICE 136-42 (1971).
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their own personal circumstances or traits. "They do not know how
the various alternatives will affect their own particular case and they
are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis of general con-
siderations. ,24 This condition ensures that the parties are "fairly situ-
ated and treated equally as moral persons.' 247 Using Rawls's theory,
Joseph Carens addresses the issue of immigration restrictions as a
question of international justice. 45 In seeking a justification for the
use of force to exclude aliens, "we don't want to be biased by self-
interested or partisan considerations" and instead "can take it as a ba-
sic presupposition that we should treat all human beings, not just
members of our own society, as free and equal moral persons. "29 '"We
should therefore take a global, not a national, view of the original po-
sition. "250
If we begin with equal concern and respect for all persons, then
immigration barriers are morally suspect and demand justification.
All immigration restrictions discriminate against individuals based on
their alienage, which in turn derives from immutable characteristics
such as birthplace (that is, national origin) and other circumstances
of birth such as parentage. 25' National origin would appear to be a
2146 Id. at 136-37; see id. at 141 ("If a knowledge of particulars is allowed, then the
outcome is biased by arbitrary contingencies.").
2147 Id. at 141.
248 Carens, supra note 26, at 255.
219 Id. at 256. Carens identifies this premise as a basic feature of all liberal political
theories. See id. at 265 (claiming that "our social institutions and public policies must
respect all human beings as moral persons," which "entails recognition ... of the free-
dom and equality of every human being"); see also id. at 269 ("No moral argument will
seem acceptable... if it directly challenges the assumption of the equal moral worth
of all individuals.").
2 Id. at 256.
2" See Roger Nett, The Civil Right We Are Not Ready For: The Right of Free Movement of
People on the Face of the Earth, 81 ETHICS 212, 224 (1971) ("May we expect the lesson which
the Negro has taught his fellow Americans about denial of fair opportunities to be re-
peated on a broader scale, with the underprivileged of the earth demanding
'desegregation' of nation states?"). The Supreme Court has recognized that discrimina-
tion against aliens may reflect popular prejudice against them or their lack of political
power. "[C]lassifications based on alienage, like those based on ... race, are inherently
suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class are a prime example of a
'discrete and insular' minority for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropri-
ate." Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (quoting United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)) (footnotes & citation omitted). Rosberg sug-
gests that the same reasoning applied to discrimination by the states in Graham v. Richard-
son should also apply to the federal government:
Aliens stand in the same position with respect to the federal government as
they do with respect to the states.... They are as effectively excluded from
the political process at the national level [as at the state level].... And aliens
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trait that Rawls would deem "arbitrary from a moral point of view." 52
Carens concludes that we cannot justify restrictions "on the grounds
that those born in a given territory or born of parents who were citi-
zens were more entitled to the benefits of citizenship than those born
elsewhere or born of alien parents. " 25s Nor can we justify restrictions
"on the grounds that immigration would reduce the economic well-
being of current citizens. " 25 Similarly, in a utilitarian calculation of
global social welfare, "current citizens would enjoy no privileged posi-
tion. ' s Carens concludes that "we have an obligation to open our
borders much more fully than we do now."2
have suffered as long a history of purposeful unequal treatment at the hands
of the federal government as they have at the hands of the states.
Rosberg, supra note 113, at 314 (footnote omitted); see id. at 294 ("[I]f alienage is a
suspect classification when made the basis of state legislation, should it not remain
suspect when it is used by the federal government?"). Nevertheless, the Court has re-
fused to apply close scrutiny to discrimination by the federal government against ali-
ens, especially in the context of immigration policy. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67,
81-82 (1976) (justifying "a narrow standard of review of decisions made by the Con-
gress ... in the area of immigration and naturalization" on the ground that "these
matters may implicate our relations with foreign powers"); Calavita, supra note 15, at
148 ("It seems then that inalienable human rights, such as the right of free movement,
do not apply to aliens.").
252 RAWLS, supra note 245, at 72.
Carens, supra note 26, at 261. Carens adds that "restrictions on immigration for
the sake of preserving a distinctive culture would be ruled out," because "in the origi-
nal position ... no one would be willing to risk the possibility of being required to
forego some important right or freedom for the sake of an ideal that might prove ir-
relevant to one's own concerns." Id. at 262. Even if the desire to preserve national
culture were free of prejudice, Carens argues that "the effect of immigration on the
particular culture and history of the society would not be a relevant moral considera-
tion, so long as there was no threat to basic liberal democratic values." Id. He bases
this conclusion on his reading of RAWLS, supra note 245, at 325-32.
Carens, supra note 26, at 262. Rawls advances two principles of justice. See
RAWLS, supra note 245, at 60-65. The first would ensure equal liberty for all. The second,
the "difference principle," would permit inequalities as long as they "work as part of a
scheme which improves the expectations of the least advantaged members of society." Id.
at 75. Rawls gives priority to the first principle over the second. See id. at 61. Carens ar-
gues that both the priority of liberty and the difference principle militate against immi-
gration restrictions. See Carens, supra note 26, at 262.
25 Carens, supra note 26, at 263. "[T]he utilitarian commitment to moral equality
is reflected in the assumption that everyone is to count for one and no one for more
than one when utility is calculated." Id. Even if we include the preferences of racists
and xenophobes in the calculus, once we also include the welfare of aliens, "the final
outcome is still likely to favor much more open immigration than is common today."
Id. at 264.
Id. at 270. Carens condemns immigration restrictions: "Like feudal barriers to
mobility, they protect unjust privilege." Id. Similarly, Bruce Ackerman concludes that
immigration barriers are inconsistent with liberal principles. SeeACKEPIAN, supra note
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My analysis now turns to the question posed by theorists like Car-
ens: What immigration barriers, if any, can be justified from the per-
spective of global welfare? This analysis should be relevant even for
those who have more provincial views of the appropriate welfare ob-
jective of national immigration policies. In particular, the optimal in-
ternational migration regime from the perspective of global eco-
nomic efficiency also represents the optimal outcome of international
negotiations. That is, it is in theory possible for the nations of the
world to negotiate a multilateral agreement, including appropriate
side payments, that would move us to that regime and simultaneously
make each nation better off than it is under current inefficient poli-
cies.2  Therefore, I will discuss policies that would require interna-
tional cooperation as well as those that a country of immigration
might undertake unilaterally.
To maximize global economic welfare, we would consider not
only the welfare of natives and immigrants but also the welfare of
those aliens who remain residents of countries of emigration. The
effects on their welfare, like the effects on the welfare of natives, may
be divided into those transmitted through the labor market and ex-
ternal effects. First, consider the effects of migration on labor mar-
kets and set aside the external effects of immigration.
A. Effects in the Global Labor Market
In the absence of external effects, free trade in the labor market,
like free trade in goods, would maximize global economic welfare.
Economic efficiency would call for unrestricted migration, which
would allow labor to move freely to the country where it earns the
highest return. Market forces would thus direct labor to the market
where its marginal product is highest. While natives gain from trade
with immigrants in the labor market, the countries of emigration lose
their gains from trade when these migrants depart. Workers will mi-
222, at 93 ("I cannotjustify my power to exclude you without destroying my own claim to
membership in an ideal liberal state.").
25 Thus, such an agreement can meet the test suggested by John Scanlan for
"[d]oing good for the world at large" consistent with national self-interest:
[D]oing good must be associated with the probability of the people at home
doing well--or at least doing better than otherwise would be likely. Coordi-
nated or collective international policies that meet this test are politically de-
fensible ... but multilateral or global policies that fly in the face of important
local interests will fail.
Scanlan, supra note 5, at 107 (footnote omitted).
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grate to countries where they can earn a higher real wage, that is,
where the gains from trade are greater. Thus, according to standard
economic theory, although the country of emigration may lose its
gains from trade with migrants, the country of immigration and the
migrants would gain more than the country of emigration loses.2 8
Whether imposed on goods or on labor, tariffs designed to exploit
market power only improve the welfare of the importing country by
extracting wealth from aliens. The benefit derived by the importing
country is a pure transfer, but the costs of these tariffs would be a real
deadweight loss to the world economy. Such "optimal" tariffs would
be beggar-thy-neighbor policies and inconsistent with the maximiza-
tion of global economic welfare. The optimal immigration tariff for a
host country would extract revenues from migrants for the benefit of
the host country (and by discouraging migration would incidentally
produce benefits for nonmigrants in the source country) but in the
process would also introduce costly distortions in migration. These
distortions would impose costs on the country of immigration as well
as on the migrants, resulting in a net loss for the world economy.
B. External Effects
What about the external effects of immigration? We have seen
how external effects on the residents of the country of immigration
can provide some justification for the regulation of immigration from
the standpoint of national economic welfare. To the extent these wel-
fare effects also enter into the analysis of global economic welfare,
perhaps they can also justify some immigration restrictions from this
broader perspective.
See Sykes, supra note 7, at 167 ("Such analysis implies that for a nation inter-
ested in maximizing its national advantage, emigration is a source of concern. Immi-
gration, by contrast, is to be welcomed .... " (footnote omitted)). The tendency of
migrant workers to send remittances back home to help support friends and family
who remain, however, may mitigate if not eliminate the welfare losses for the country
of emigration. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1995: WORKERS IN AN
INTEGRATING WORLD 66 (1995) ("Migration generally leads to important gains for the
sending country primarily through remittances. For some countries, remittances repre-
sent a sizable share of GNP-between 10 and 50 percent in Jordan, Lesotho, Yemen, and
the West Bank and Gaza."). A study of El Salvador in 1987 estimated that remittances
from emigrants were equivalent to at least 8.6 percent of the country's gross domestic
product. See Edward Funkhouser, Mass Emigration, Remittances, and Economic Adjustment:
The Case of El Salvador in the 1980s, in IMMIGRATION AND THE WORK FORCE, supra note 61,
at 135, 138.
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The analysis of national economic welfare did not consider the
external effects on the residents of countries of emigration. For ex-
ample, emigration reduces congestion in those foreign countries.Y1
Emigration of the wealthy deprives these countries of tax revenues,
and emigration of the poor may reduce the burden imposed on their
treasuries by redistributive programs. Thus, the level of migration
that is optimal from the perspective of national economic welfare is
unlikely to be the optimal level from the perspective of global eco-
nomic welfare. In particular, globally optimal migration is likely to
imply higher levels of migration for the poor (and lower levels of mi-
gration for the wealthy) than the levels that would maximize the eco-
nomic welfare of the country of immigration.
Thus, immigration policies that respond to these external effects,
like the "optimal" tariff, may maximize national economic welfare
only at the expense of foreign economic welfare. Pigouvian tariffs
that seek to internalize congestion costs, for example, could discour-
age efficient migration, insofar as countries of emigration also expe-
rience congestion costs. Unless such countries of emigration impose
Pigouvian taxes on their residents or offer them Pigouvian subsidies
to encourage emigration, Pigouvian tariffs on immigration would
lead to excessive global congestion. If fiscal policies in countries of
emigration do not force residents to internalize congestion costs,
then the appropriate Pigouvian tariff for the country of immigration
would include only the difference between the marginal congestion
costs in the host country and the corresponding cost in the source
country. Pigouvian tariffs any higher would be beggar-thy-neighbor
policies designed to shift congestion to other countries. Similarly,
policies to discourage unskilled immigration or to encourage skilled
immigration may benefit the public treasury in a country of immigra-
tion only at the expense of the public treasury of the country of emi-
gration.
C. Optimal Fiscal Policies
So what fiscal policies would maximize global economic welfare?
Suppose appropriate Pigouvian taxes internalize all congestion costs.
Some migration may be induced or inhibited by variations in other
taxes or entitlement programs across countries. Migration induced
2 Thus, the increase in congestion in countries of immigration and the decrease
in congestion in countries of emigration would tend to offset the welfare effects of mi-
gration in the labor market.
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by public entitlement programs would be inefficient from an eco-
nomic perspective because it would not produce net economic gains
for the world as a whole.260 The most direct response to this problem
would be to harmonize redistributive policies among different coun-
tries. Harmonization, however, would require international coopera-
tion and would significantly impinge on national sovereignty. Differ-
ent countries hold different views on how much redistribution is
worthwhile. Their different policies reflect different degrees of aver-
sion to inequality.
Another response would be for each country to discriminate be-
tween natives and immigrants, and indeed, between immigrants
based on their country of origin. To eliminate all distortions in mi-
gration decisions caused by fiscal policies, each country of immigra-
tion could present each class of migrants with the taxes and entitle-
ment programs that they faced in their home country.26' These
programs need not discriminate against an immigrant. These poli-
cies may be more generous than the policies offered natives (to avoid
discouraging efficient migration) or less generous (to avoid encour-
aging inefficient migration).
This system would allow each country to pursue its own redistri-
butive policies with respect to its own natives without distorting mi-
gration decisions. While migration in such a regime would always be
efficient, it could also transfer fiscal burdens and benefits between
countries. A country that attracted the affluent, for example, would
gain. To avoid these effects, one could imagine a regime in which
each country of origin continued to tax its natives abroad or provide
transfers to them. 2" This system would require the cooperation of the
country of origin and the host country, but would not require their
agreement regarding appropriate redistributive policies. In effect,
each country of origin could compensate host countries for burdens
that migrants imposed on them, and host countries could compen-
sate countries of origin for benefits derived from migrants.
See Sykes, supra note 7, at 193 ("By far the most convincing argument against
free immigration from the global efficiency perspective relates to cross-national varia-
tion in entitlement programs.").
261 SeeJohn Douglas Wilson, Optimal Income Taxation and Migration: A World Wefare
Point of View, in INCOME TAXATION AND INTERNATIONAL MOBILITY 201, 208-09 (Jagdish N.
Bhagwati &John Douglas Wilson eds., 1989).
262 At present only the United States and the Philippines attempt to tax their citi-
zens abroad. See Richard D. Pomp, The Experience of the Philippines in Taxing lts Nonresident
Citizens, in INCOME TAXATION AND INTERNATIONAL MOBILITY, supra note 261, at 43,43.
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Even in the absence of any international cooperation, the United
States could unilaterally, in the name of global economic efficiency,
restrict immigrant access to public entitlements to what the immi-
grant could have received in the immigrant's home country.2 Note
that this policy would probably be more generous than the policy dic-
tated by the economic welfare of natives alone. 2r" Furthermore, if our
measure of social welfare includes distributive concerns, then still
more generous transfer policies may be appropriate. If we believe in
more redistribution than some countries of emigration, and we apply
our own degree of inequality aversion to our measure of global social
welfare, then it would be optimal to engage in some more redistribu-
tion and to tolerate some inefficient migration.
In theory, it would be better to address the issue of global inequal-
ity through transfers that did not require the foreign recipients to
migrate. Under the ideal regime, we could provide immigrants with
equal access to our redistributive programs and allow free movement
of labor while the appropriate transfers to aliens abroad would ensure
that they did not have excessive incentives to immigrate. In this
sense, generous foreign aid may be more efficient than reliance on
domestic programs alone, because it could redistribute wealth to ali-
California and other states have recently moved toward such policies with re-
spect to welfare benefits for those who have resided in state for less than a year. Cali-
fornia's new policy will limit new California residents to the welfare benefits that they
received in their prior state of residence; only those coming from states providing
more generous benefits than California will get benefits at the California rate. Under
this policy, someone who moves from Mississippi to Los Angeles will receive $120 per
month in welfare benefits rather than the $565 per month paid to California residents
in urban areas. See Virginia Ellis, Lower Wefare for Newcomers Begins Tuesday, LA. TIMES,
Mar. 26, 1997, at A3.
264 The United States might also, in the name of global economic efficiency, offer
more generous public entitlements to an immigrant than those offered to natives, or
impose either higher or lower taxes on an immigrant than on natives, so as to match
the policies the immigrant would have faced in the immigrant's home country. These
discriminatory policies, however, could reduce the economic welfare of natives com-
pared to what they would enjoy under nondiscriminatory fiscal policies.
26 If we were to pursue our view of global social welfare, rather than national eco-
nomic welfare, then we would be similarly concerned about wealthy immigrants drawn
to our country by our less progressive tax rates. To prevent this inefficient migration,
we could impose higher taxes on them if they come from countries with taxes higher
than ours. We could implement this policy with or without the cooperation of the
countries of emigration. With the cooperation of the country of immigration, for ex-
ample, a country of emigration could tax emigrants at their higher rates and offer a
tax credit for taxes paid to the country of immigration.
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ens without distorting migration decisions." The United States
could transfer wealth either on its own or as part of a multilateral re-
gime designed to redistribute wealth from the rich to the poor
worldwide. Henry Shue notes, however, that foreign aid may not be
an effective policy instrument with which to redistribute wealth to
needy aliens: "With rare exceptions bilateral and multilateral foreign
assistance goes directly to, and falls under the control of, the govern-
ments of the recipient nation-states. The assistance then may or may
not reach the people for whom the donor government or multilateral
institution intended it .... 6 7 Unless our foreign aid program could
ensure that each alien received the appropriate transfer, inefficient
migration might persist from at least some countries, and this distor-
tion would militate in favor of less generous transfers for immigrants
from those countries than those offered natives.
D. Optimal Quotas
If equal access to transfers for natives and aliens would cause
some inefficient migration, then as before, distributive concerns cre-
ate a useful role for immigration quotas. If we give equal weight to
the welfare of aliens and of natives, then we would offer immigrants
the same transfers we offer natives and rely on quantitative restric-
tions to prevent excessive migration. The national policies that would
maximize global social welfare from this perspective would resemble
those that would maximize the welfare of natives and immigrants
taken together. There are, however, two important differences.
First, the quotas on poor immigrants that would be optimal from
this global perspective would apply only to immigrants from countries
with less generous redistributive policies, instead of all immigrants
261with a net negative impact on the public sector. Only unskilled
216 See Louis Michael Seidman, Fear and Loathing at the Border, in JUSTICE IN IMMI-
GRATION, supra note 7, at 136, 141 ("[F]oreign aid redistributes assets with the least dead-
weight loss.").
267 SHUE, supra note 31, at 161 ("Ideally, economic assistance to foreign governments
would constitute aid to the foreign poor. In fact, sometimes it does and sometimes it
does not."); see PETER BOONE, POLITICS AND THE EFFECrIVENESS OF FOREIGN AID 5
(National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 5308, 1995) (presenting
"strong evidence that aid flows primarily benefit a wealthy political elite").
If we are reluctant to impose higher taxes on affluent immigrants from coun-
tries with more progressive tax systems than ours, so as to prevent excessive migration
of this type, we can as an alternative policy impose ceilings on their immigration as
well as on that of poor immigrants from countries with less progressive policies than
ours.
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immigration from these countries would be inefficient. Other un-
skilled immigration would be efficient: although it might impose a
net burden on the public sector in the host country, it would impose a
similar or heavier burden in the source country.
Second, the optimal quotas from the global perspective would be
more liberal, because the emigration of the poor confers external
benefits on the public sector in foreign countries. Taking these bene-
fits into account implies that both the efficient level of immigration
and the socially optimal level (taking distributive justice into account)
will be higher than it would be if we considered only the welfare of
natives and immigrants. As before, the optimal quota would allow
some migration beyond the economically efficient level, but now
economic efficiency is measured with respect to global welfare rather
than the welfare of only natives and immigrants. The improvement
in the distribution of income produced by these higher quotas would
justify some distortion in migration patterns. The optimal quota
would equate this marginal gain in social welfare with the marginal
efficiency cost of excessive immigration.
We would accept some inefficient migration as part of the cost of
redistributive policies that differ among jurisdictions.W After all,
even within a unitary state, redistribution entails some deadweight
loss because it distorts incentives. From the perspective of global so-
cial welfare, why should we regard inefficient migration as any more
problematic than these other distortions?
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing analysis suggests that current immigration restric-
tions bear little resemblance to those that would maximize either na-
tional or global economic welfare. Indeed, it is difficult to rationalize
many of these restrictions as serving any coherent social welfare ob-
jective. The pursuit of virtually any economic welfare objective would
probably entail levels of employment-based and family-based immi-
gration higher than allowed by current U.S. laws.
If the United States were to maximize the economic welfare of na-
tives, we would eliminate quotas and "labor certification" require-
ments for all employment-based immigration. We would address is-
sues of distributive justice among natives through fiscal policies
26 Such inefficient migration is tolerated among jurisdictions within a federal
state. See Carens, supra note 26, at 267 ("No liberal state restricts internal mobility.").
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instead. We would offer more skilled workers admission as perma-
nent residents eligible to naturalize as U.S. citizens, and as a further
incentive for them to immigrate to the United States, we would also
offer to admit their relatives on favorable terms as family-based immi-
grants. We would use qualitative restrictions rather than quantitative
restrictions to regulate family-based immigration as well as employ-
ment-based immigration.2 70 Finally, we would admit unskilled aliens
as guestworkers without quantitative restrictions or "labor certifica-
tion" requirements, but deny them access to some public entitlement
programs and the earned income tax credit. These policies would
present low-income foreign workers with less progressive fiscal poli-
cies than those faced by natives.
If we were to maximize a measure of economic welfare that in-
cluded the welfare of natives and of immigrants on an equal basis, the
fiscal policies applied to poor immigrants would be more liberal.
These policies would entail less severe discrimination against un-
skilled immigrants than suggested by the maximization of the eco-
nomic welfare of natives alone. We would impose quantitative restric-
tions only on unskilled immigration and only in order to provide
poor immigrants with greater access to public entitlements and tax
benefits while avoiding excessively high levels of inefficient immigra-
tion. In the allocation of visas subject to these quotas, we would give
priority to family-based immigrants and refugees. Thus, these policies
would be qualitatively similar to our current policies toward unskilled
immigrants, but because these policies would reflect concern for the
welfare of the immigrants as well as considerations of distributive jus-
tice, we would set these quotas at levels much higher than our current
immigration quotas. Finally, if the United States were to choose its
policies to maximize global economic welfare, we would admit still
more unskilled immigrants, and quotas would serve a more limited
role in regulating their immigration.
Given that each welfare objective implies a different optimal im-
migration policy, what implications can we draw for the reform of ex-
isting immigration laws? There are some liberalizing reforms that
appear likely to improve matters compared to our current immigra-
tion laws, under any of our measures of social welfare. Liberalizing
reforms that serve the interests of not only immigrants but also U.S.
natives may stand the best chance of adoption, especially if we pursue
270 Thus, we would still exclude immigrants expected to impose negative externali-
ties on natives, such as those "likely at any time to become a public charge" or those
with sufficiently egregious criminal records.
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such reforms in modest increments. I present these proposals not as
ideal reforms but as the liberalizing reforms that seem most likely to
prove politically feasible.
First, we should liberalize or eliminate our quotas on the immi-
gration of skilled workers and eliminate the "labor certification" re-
quirements that impose protectionist restrictions on this immigra-
tion.2 We should also liberalize our quotas on family-based
immigration, subject to the "public charge" exclusion ground, which
provides an efficient incentive for skilled immigration while protect-
ing public coffers. Immigration of skilled workers is in the interests
of U.S. natives as well as of the migrants. The main question arises
with respect to the interests of countries of emigration. If we fear this
"brain drain" may be inefficient and thus impose excessive costs on
the countries of emigration, then we could offer to help those coun-
tries tax the migrants at an appropriate rate.r
Second, we should liberalize our existing guestworker programs
so as to allow more unskilled immigrants to work in the United
States. We should eliminate "labor certification" requirements for
271 See Buckley, supra note 124, at 94 (comparing the immigration policies of Can-
ada and the United States and concluding that the "labor certification" requirement,
"which has no parallel in Canada, lengthens the American immigration process and
weakens the United States in the competition for skilled migrants"); Sykes, supra note
7, at 187 (noting that the "labor certification" requirement "has little to commend it"
and that "it is certainly questionable whether any ceiling on the number of visas for
skilled immigrants with employer sponsorship is in the national interest").
272 See 2 THE BRAIN DRAIN AND TAXATION: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS at vii
(Jagdish N. Bhagwati ed., 1976) (exploring a proposal to levy a tax on the incomes of
skilled migrants from less developed countries into developed countries). A tax on emi-
grants would not only curb inefficient migration but also allow countries of emigration to
reap some share of the gains from trade enjoyed by the emigrants. Effective enforce-
ment of this tax obligation, however, would require the cooperation of the country of
immigration. See Richard A. Musgrave, Foreword to INcOME TAXATION AND INTERNATIONAL
MOBILITY supra note 261, at xv ("In the absence of an international tax authority, admin-
istrative cooperation by the country of residence would seem essential for successful im-
plementation .... This might not require outright collection with intergovernmental
revenue transfer, but the availability of tax returns from the residency country... would
seem essential."); Pomp, supra note 262, at 62 ("Enforcement... will require the assis-
tance of the host [country]. A host [country] can provide assistance at each stage of the
administration of the... tax by compiling a tax roll, assessing... tax liability, and collect-
ing the amount of tax owed.").
2" The Agricultural Committee of the House of Representatives recently sought to
attach a guestworker provision to H.R. 2202, 104th Cong. (1995), the immigration bill
ultimately enacted by Congress in 1996. See House Panels Add GuestworkerProgram, Delete
Federal Employee Provisions from Reform Big 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 290 (1996). The pro-
vision contained some modest liberalizing reforms confined to the agricultural sector.
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guestworkers, which raise protectionist barriers to their employment.
We should also liberalize our quotas on these admissions, our restric-
tions on the duration of their employment, and our limits on the
length of their stay in the United States as workers. A liberalized
guestworker program is likely to be in the economic interest of na-
tives as a group as well as in the interest of the migrants. One ques-
tion regarding national economic welfare arises with respect to the
costs low-income guestworkers might impose on natives through the
public sector. To the extent this problem arises, the appropriate re-
sponse would be fiscal: if we insist that such migration serve the in-
terest of natives, discriminatory fiscal policies can ensure that guest-
workers impose little or no net external costs.274 Even with such
discriminatory features, a liberalized guestworker program would be
an improvement for the many aliens excluded by existing laws. Un-
skilled guestworkers also raise an issue with respect to the distribution
of income among natives, but again the appropriate response is fiscal:
to compensate unskilled native workers for any reduction in their real
wages, Congress could combine immigration reforms with tax relief
for the working poor, such as expansions in the earned income tax
credit.
Why has the United States not moved toward the reforms de-
scribed above? Part of the problem may be the xenophobia and in-
tolerance that have unfortunately always exerted a powerful influence
275on the formulation of immigration policies. Part of the explanation
may be the same protectionist pressures generated by special interest
groups that oppose liberalized trade in goods: those who fear foreign
competition lobby for protectionist barriers. Unskilled native work-
ers, for example, may oppose the immigration of guestworkers. To
the extent Congress links a liberalized guestworker program with sub-
sidies for the working poor, however, progressive tax reforms de-
The House, however, rejected this proposed amendment. See HouseApproves Immigration
BillAfterRemovingLegal Immigration Restrictions, supra note 22, at 357-58.
24 Even if guestworkers have a negative effect on the public sector, the gain to na-
tives through the labor market may outweigh the external costs guestworkers impose.
Thus, tax revenues need not offset all external costs in order to produce a net gain for
natives from the admission of guestworkers.
275 SeeJohnson, supra note 4, at 967 (noting "the willingness to allow free trade and
the concomitant resistance to free immigration," which "undoubtedly tells us some-
thing about ethnocentrism, racism, and classism in the United States" and "suggests
that persons may fear difference and change brought by new and different people
joining the community").
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signed to compensate unskilled labor could help overcome opposi-
tion to liberalization.
The United States might also employ the same device used in the
international trade context to overcome protectionist opposition to
liberalizing reforms: multilateral agreements in which each country
agrees to reduce trade barriers in exchange for liberalization by oth-
ers. The prospect of reciprocal liberalization by our trading partners
would mobilize domestic producer interests in support of the agree-
ment that can offset the domestic producer interests opposed to lib-
eralization of our policies. Through such agreements, each country
can gain not only by obtaining access to foreign markets but also by
overcoming protectionism at home and opening its own market.
So far, the United States has applied a double standard to the lib-
eralization of trade in services:
Although at the level of general principle the United States espoused
the idea that negotiations on services should have a comprehensive
scope, the US position on the definition of services themselves had the
effect of focusing the negotiations on those sectors of most export inter-
est to the United States and other developed countries (e.g. cross-
border transactions in sectors such as telecommunications and financial
services), while excluding liberalization of factor movements, especially
labour, where developing countries might often have a comparative ad-
vantage (e.g. ship's crews, construction gangs, etc.).276
In the initial negotiations over the GATS, the United States failed in
its efforts to obtain a "hard" agreement along GATT lines, with gen-
erally binding obligations, including a "national treatment" obliga-
don, which would prohibit discrimination against foreign suppliers of
277services.
To promote more comprehensive liberalization in the future, the
United States could agree to place its own immigration policies per-
taining to temporary workers on the negotiating table under the aus-
pices of the GATS. The GATS Annex on Movement of Natural Per-
sons Supplying Services Under the Agreement states that "Members
may negotiate specific commitments applying to the movement of all
categories of natural persons supplying services under the Agree-
ment.
,,278
276 TREBILCOCK& HOWSE, supra note 2, at 226 (footnote omitted).
277 See Hoekman, supra note 2, at 925.
8 GATS Annex, supra note 12, art. 3, 33 I.L.M. at 1188; see Sauve, supra note 2, at
134 ("The Annex... establishes that Members may negotiate specific commitments
applying to the temporary entry of all categories of natural persons.").
LIBERALIZED IMMIGRA TIONAS FRFE TRADE
The development of this Annex was-and remains-of particular inter-
est to developing countries, given the comparative advantage many of
them enjoy in labour-intensive services (e.g. construction services, soft-
ware development, engineering design). Recognition of the fact that
most developed countries had not included categories of greatest inter-
est to developing-country exporters led to the adoption of a Ministerial
Decision calling for negotiations to continue beyond the conclusion of
the Uruguay Round and aimed at achieving higher levels of commit-
ments by GATS Members.
9
In exchange for commitments by the United States regarding tempo-
rary workers, the labor-abundant developing countries may be more
inclined to agree to liberalize their markets for services in which the
United States has a comparative advantage .2 The United States
would gain not only by reforming its own immigration laws, but also
by obtaining commitments from developing countries that they have
been reluctant to make thus far (such as a "national treatment" obli-
gation for services) 21
Liberalized immigration of skilled aliens and of unskilled guest-
workers, when combined with appropriate fiscal policies, would serve
the national interests of the United States. Indeed, in exchange for
sufficiently valuable commitments by developing countries, the
United States might go beyond immigration reforms that maximize
U.S. economic welfare and move toward those that maximize global
economic welfare. The United States might offer its cooperation with
countries of emigration seeking to tax an inefficient "brain drain."2 2
We might cut our "tariffs" on guestworkers, that is, reduce the degree
to which we discriminate against them in terms of our public entitle-
ments. We might also liberalize our restrictions on the access of un-
skilled aliens to permanent residence and to citizenship.
279 Sauve, supra note 2, at 135.
'8 U.S. offers to liberalize immigration policies could prove to be a valuable bar-
gaining chip in negotiations with developing countries. Indeed, Hamilton and Whal-
ley suggest that "liberalization of worldwide migration could possibly be the single
most important issue in current North-South exchanges for the South" and that citi-
zens of developing countries "could thus be well served if demands for removal of
immigration controls in the North were more forcefully presented." Hamilton &
Whalley, supra note 8, at 75.
2 2 The United States could use the same sort of "escape clauses" used in the GATT
in the context of trade in goods to provide a "safeguard" in the event of a serious
threat to domestic producer interests. See GAT, supra note 1, art. XIX, 61 Stat. pt. 5,
at A58, 55 U.N.T.S. at 258. The United States could reserve the right to raise tempo-
rary barriers in the event of unexpectedly severe consequences for U.S. workers.
2'2 See supra note 272.
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Negotiations would provide a justification for our failure to adopt
more liberal immigration laws. Whereas in an ideal world we might
adopt more efficient laws, we currently live in a highly nonideal world
in which other governments discriminate against our nationals (in
their goods markets, service markets, labor markets, or capital mar-
kets). Given this reality, we may use costly policies as bargaining
chips, offering to reform our protectionist policies in exchange for
liberalizing reforms by other governments that discriminate against
our nationals. Reforms implemented by all participants, when taken
together in a multilateral agreement, allow each to increase its na-
tional economic welfare while improving global economic welfare.
From this perspective, we discriminate against aliens only in order to
gain leverage that allows us to obtain better treatment from foreign
governments for our own nationals. 283 This rationale for our protec-
tionist policies, however, justifies our policies only if we in fact offer to
284
bargain over them. It is difficult to justify our restrictive immigra-
tion laws in the absence of such bargaining.
2" The Supreme Court has consistently applied minimal scrutiny to the federal
government's immigration policies, citing the important federal interest in foreign
relations. Seesupra note 251. "Such interests include the manner in which our citizens
might be treated in other countries, bargaining power with other governments .... or
simply the image which the nation wishes to present to the world." NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 107, at 705. Rosberg dismisses the "interest in creating a bargain-
ing chip" as ajustification for restrictions on immigrant access to Medicare: "[I]n all like-
lihood there are no negotiations on the subject under way or even remotely foresee-
able .... The nexus between the alienage classification and the desire to increase
bargaining power seems, to say the least, remote." Rosberg, supra note 113, at 315 n.146.
The same observation applies to most of our immigration policies, which would more
convincingly implicate foreign-policy interests if they were in fact the subject of interna-
tional bargaining.
28' This rationale might be described as a "nonideal" defense of immigration re-
strictions. Rawls distinguishes between "ideal" and "nonideal" parts of a theory ofjus-
tice. RAWLS, supra note 245, at 245-48. The ideal theory describes "a perfectly just basic
structure," id. at 245, whereas the nonideal theory takes account of "historical contingen-
cies," injustice in existing social arrangements, and the unjust conduct of others, id. at
246. Carens concludes that "ideal theory holds up the principle of free migration as an
essential part of the just social order toward which we should strive" and that "nonideal
theory provides more grounds for restricting immigration than ideal theory, but these
grounds are severely limited." Carens, supra note 26, at 262.
